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Natural language negation has been the object of numerous studies, but still no
satisfactory description has yet been given. Current theories tend to be based on
the negation in predicate logic, which they extend or extrapolate to increase the
coverage. However, they incur a number of empirical inadequacies, and for some
uses of negation, such as in yes/no-questions, it is difficult to envisage how a truth
functional description could be modified to accommodate them.
This thesis claims that the failure of previous theories stem from their reliance on
the common assumption that sentences refer to facts, which is linked to a view of
human communication as being a matter of transferring knowledge in the form of
propositions from one person to another. As a result of assuming that uttering a
sentence is equivalent to making a reference to a fact, it has been thought that
uttering a sentence with a negation amounts to a claim that the information of
the corresponding affirmative sentence is wrong. Negation has been viewed as
applying to information which is conveyed by sentence.
An alternative to the hypothesis that sentences are used to refer to facts is to
assume that they are used to make small changes in someone's representation
of the world—not in terms of adding and deleting propositions, but in terms of
slight reorganisation of entities and concepts, and the links between them. If
sentence meaning is thought of as instructions for how information about the
world should be organised, it is possible to give a simple, unified characterisation
of negation as being about a representation of information, not part of it. It is
shown that this approach has great advantages in terms of descriptive adequacy
and explanatory potential. For instance, it is possible to explain certain features
of the use and interpretation of multiple negations and scalar expressions. The
description proposed in this thesis also lends itself to an account of why speakers
would want to use sentences with negation, a question that it is difficult to answer
against the background of the traditional approach.
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Natural language negation is so common that it is often difficult to ignore while
studying any communicative aspects of language. Certain language processing
operations have even been argued to be affected by whether they occur in senten¬
ces with or without negation, e.g. focussing and determination of the speaker's
expectations (Anscombre and Ducrot, 1983; Moxey and Sanford, to appear), and
the interpretation of referential expressions (Kamp and Reyle, in press). Negation
appears to be a relatively basic feature of natural language, but despite this, no
satisfactory description of it has yet been given.
Because the function of negation is significant in the study of other issues, it
has often been necessary to act as if an adequate description of it existed. The
approximation that has been chosen is often that of the truth functional negation
of predicate logic. This, however, is inadequate in many cases—so inadequate
that it would be necessary to describe some uses of natural language negation in a
completely different way. But there is little evidence that "not" has more than one
function, so this is not a very appealing solution. If the aim is to provide a unified
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account of negation, then it must be quite different from a truth function. In view
of how much language research relies on there being an account of negation, it is
extremely important that a more satisfying characterisation is developed.
The issue of describing negation is not only interesting from an instrumental
point of view. The fact that it has been so difficult to formulate a satisfactory
description in the traditional disciplines of semantics and pragmatics may mean
that it might be necessary to revise some of the assumptions which form the basis
for them. The challenge of characterising negation should therefore also provide
an opportunity to consider some of the fundamental aspects of studying meaning
in language.
1.2 Background
Despite being the most common approximation of natural language negation, the
bivalent truth function of predicate logic is inadequate as a description. However,
it would not have been adopted unless there was some reason to assume that it
could be suitable. Before embarking on the task of proposing an alternative, it
will be useful to examine why this description is so commonly used, despite its
shortcomings.
1.2.1 Language and Communication
Natural language has developed as a tool for communication and therefore should
be expected to be highly adapted for these purposes. This statement is a truism.1
but the conclusions that are drawn from it can be quite distinct, depending on
what type of information is taken to be the object of communication. For the pur-
'Or maybe almost a truism—Relevance theory takes a different view, which will be discussed
in chapter 3.
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pose of characterising natural language, a number of assumptions are commonly
made, and they are worth drawing attention to.
Shannon and Weaver (1949) suggested a model of communication which has been
extremely influential. Information is defined as the ability of making non-random
choices, and communication is the transfer of this ability from a source to a
destination. Schematically, some information is selected at the source for transfer
to the destination. But it cannot be sent directly—it must be coded into a signal,
which can be transmitted. The signal passes through a channel where it is possibly
distorted, and then reaches a receiver at the other end, where it is decoded, ideally
into a copy of the original information, which then reaches the destination.
The Shannon-Weaver model was not intended primarily for human verbal commu¬
nication, but for information transfer in general, with a telegraph as the prototype.
It is nevertheless often used for the purpose of describing human communication,
or rather, for describing the role of language in communication. In this case, the
source and transmitter are both one human agent, who decides to convey some
information. The information is converted into a signal (in this case sentences
of the natural language) which is uttered2 and another human agent (the recei¬
ver/destination) hears it, decodes it, and, if all goes according to plan, constructs
a copy of it.
Assuming that this model is a useful way of thinking about the function of langu¬
age in communication, the following questions instantly arise: firstly, what is the
nature of the information that sentences correspond to, and secondly, what part
does this play in the more complex process of human communication?
These are issues which have been considered numerous times, including, of course,
prior to the formulation of the Shannon-Weaver model. In the case of the former
question, one particular answer tends to be given: "thoughts". "Thoughts" may
2The terms "utter", "utterance", and "speaker" etc. will be used as generic terms for the
production of natural language signals (written or spoken). "Write" etc. will only be used in
the discussion of specific data from written texts.
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seem like a rather vague concept, which could denote various types of "mental
objects", but for the purpose of describing meaning in natural language, a thought
is considered to be something rather precise (Dowty et ah, 1981, p.144):
Frege referred to the sense of a sentence as the "thought" (Gedanke)
expressed by the sentence, what is now often called the proposition
expressed by the sentence.
"Thoughts" are the objects of communication in for example the Relevance fra¬
mework (Sperber and Wilson, 1986) and Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp
and Reyle, in press), who also define them as propositions, or a set of conditions.
Lyons suggests that restricting language meaning this way makes sense for the
purpose of studying communication (1977, p.32):
The narrowing consists in the restriction of the term [communication]
to the intentional transmission of information by some means of some
established signaling system; and initially at least, we will restrict
the term still further, to the transmission of factual, or propositional,
information.
This may seem like a rather drastic restriction, but it is nevertheless a common
one to make, and as a result, it is assumed that language is often used in commu¬
nication to convey factual descriptions. The precise details of how these factual
descriptions can be represented differ between various approaches to meaning:
"propositions" in truth conditional semantics, "infons" in Situation Semantics
(Devlin, 1991), etc.3
The assumption that at least a subset of sentences of natural language can be
appropriately thought of as corresponding to factual descriptions is rarely questio¬
ned, and it is common for those who study interactional properties of language
to accept it, and to consider factual descriptions to be input to the more complex




Utterance Situation INTERPRETATION Message
Figure 1.1: Schematic model of the interpretation of an utterance.
interpretation system. This is the view of pragmatics taken in for example Le-
vinson (1983). Although Brown and Yule (1983) suggest that the importance of
the type of communication in which factual descriptions are conveyed is greatly
exaggerated, they do not dispute that it is a useful way of characterising some
linguistic activity. For instance, they suggest that written language is used mainly
for this purpose.
If this view of the function of language in (some) communication is adopted, then
in such circumstances, the task of generating an utterance is equivalent to deciding
what factual description to convey, and then converting it into words. The task
of interpreting one is to reconstruct the factual description, and then decide what
the speaker's purpose in mentioning it was, whether the description is correct,
etc.
This suggests a distinction between what can be called the MESSAGE4 (what the
speaker's intention behind making the utterance is), a factual description chosen
to perform the function of carrying the message, and the signal (the sentence)
which corresponds to the factual description. These two steps can be taken to
indicate that there are two different aspects to studying the communicative fun¬
ction of language: the relation between sentences and factual descriptions, and
the relation between the use of factual descriptions and speakers' intentions (fi-
Message" is not used here in the same way as Shannon and Weaver (1949) use it.
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gure 1.1). The distinction between decoding (which only takes sentences as its
input) and interpretation (which takes the output from the decoding as input,
together with knowledge and contextual factors) represents one way of seeing the
semantics/pragmatics distinction.5
The distinction was originally made by Morris (1938 and 1946) and Carnap (1942),
although it should be pointed out that for Carnap in particular, it does not cor¬
respond exactly to this outline. Significantly, both Morris and Carnap viewed
the study of natural language as necessarily involving pragmatics. It is however
quite common to treat fragments of language as if the relation between factual
descriptions and sentences can be explained without reference to the language
user, i.e. semantically—Montague Semantics (Dowty et al., 1981) is a paradigm
example. For others, such as the proponents of Radical Pragmatics (e.g. Atlas,
1989), and Relevance theory, sentences correspond to factual descriptions, but the
correspondence cannot be determined without reference to their use.
1.2.2 Negation
If the meaning of a sentence is a factual description, it makes sense to talk about
it as being true or false with respect to some discourse universe. This is the basis
for truth conditional semantics. Dowty et al. write (1981, p. 4):
A truth conditional theory of semantics is one which adheres to the
following dictum: To know the meaning of a (declarative) sentence is
to know what the world would have to be like for the sentence to be
true. Put another way, to give the meaning of a sentence is to specify
its truth conditions, i.e., to give necessary and sufficient conditions for
the truth of that sentence.
5 I use the phrase "decode a sentence" to mean the construction of a representation of the
information of a sentence (token) when it has been used in a discourse. This is not the same
thing as constructing an interpretation (figuring out why the speaker wanted the addressee to
construct such a representation).
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One common assumption about negation is that it indicates that there is some¬
thing wrong with the sentence it occurs in. What is wrong often seems to be that
the information it corresponds to is incompatible with the discourse universe.
If the information in sentences is taken to be equivalent to factual descriptions,
which can be true or false, then it follows that negation can often be thought of
as reversing their truth values: it is a truth function.
There are however some problems with this description. For instance, there are
many examples of natural language negation where it is used in a way which
is inconsistent with this characterisation. Some of them are incompatible to the
point that it is nearly impossible to envisage how the description could be extended
to cover them, as will be shown in chapter 2. Adopting the truth function of
predicate logic as a description of natural language negation makes it necessary to
postulate that it is ambiguous, for which there is little linguistic motivation (this
issue will be discussed in chapters 2 and 4).
Another problem arises, not at the level of correspondence between factual de¬
scriptions and sentences, but at the level of messages, in the sense it was used
above. Sentences with negation are often recognised as less "informative" than
those without (this debate is reviewed in Horn, 1989), but speakers still use them.
Why should a speaker want to convey that a factual description is false with res¬
pect to the world? It will be shown in chapter 3 that the "obvious" answer, that
they are trying to correct a previous assertion or assumption that it is true, is
too simplistic. This is not a trivial issue—it means that there is no obvious or
generally applicable procedure for describing the interpretation of sentences with
negation, in the sense of retrieving the message. All it contributes in the context of
studying natural language and communication is at the level of encoding/decoding
factual descriptions.
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1.3 Goals of this Investigation
The main goal of this thesis is to formulate a characterisation of natural language
negation, which has the following properties: it is descriptively adequate, in that
it covers all data, and explanatorily adequate, so that it can explain restrictions on
its use, and allow for an explanation of why speakers use sentences with negation
i.e. it should be suitable for the generation and interpretation processes.
It is also hoped that this discussion may be useful in the wider perspective of
describing the function of language in communication. The issues that are of par¬
ticular interest are the assumptions that some sentences convey user-independent
information, and that the information they convey corresponds to factual descrip¬
tions.
1.4 Outline of the Chapters
The first task of this thesis will be to introduce a body of data which will serve
as a basis for the rest of the discussion. In particular, it will be shown why it
is unlikely that a truth functional description could be extended to cover the
use of natural language negation in general. In chapter 3 various approaches to
describing language and communication will be examined. The assumptions about
language and communication outlined above will be discussed in more detail.
Chapter 4 investigates possible evidence for considering "not" to have more than
one function. It also draws attention to some interesting restrictions on it. which
will be used to formulate some basic requirements on a representational frame¬
work which allows for a more plausible description of negation. A conceptual
framework which meets these requirements will be proposed in chapter 5. Using
the interaction between "but" and negation, a hypothesis about the function of
negation will be formulated. This hypothesis will be examined in chapter 6. in
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which its descriptive and explanatory potential will be assessed. Finally, chap¬
ter 7 concludes the discussion by relating the proposal to the other frameworks






The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of the various uses of natural
language negation, and to set out the goals concerning what a theory of it should
be expected to cover. The data introduced here will be used as a basis for the
discussion in the rest of this thesis.
The starting point of this discussion will be the by now uncontroversial observation
that the traditional account of natural language negation as a straightforward
bivalent truth function is inadequate for explaining at least some of its uses. There
are many problems with it, the most outstanding one being that it is incompatible
with a lot of data: speakers sometimes use sentences with negations when the
corresponding sentence without a negation would be true. Section 2.2 contains an
overview of data of how negation is used, including examples of varying degrees
of incompatibility with the truth functional description.
Despite the discrepancies between negation in natural language and the negation
of predicate logic, the traditional account is often retained for the subset of data
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with which it appears to be compatible, with the consequence that "not" must be
ambiguous between that and some other function. Section '2.3 considers whether
there is any known cross-linguistic evidence which supports such a claim.
2.2 Truth Functional Operator and Natural Ne¬
gation
2.2.1 Negation as a Bivalent Truth Function
The traditional semantic account of negation suggests that it corresponds to a
bivalent truth function which maps the truth value false to true and vice versa.
Negation as a Truth Function
Let S be a sentence in a natural language, whose semantic represen¬
tation is r. Let NEG-S be a sentence identical to S except that it also
contains a main clause negation. Then NEG-S is true if and only if r is
false. The representation of NEG-S is ->r, where -> is a bivalent truth
function.
According to this description, the only function of negation is to reverse the truth
values of sentences: a sentence with a negation is true if and only if the corre¬
sponding sentence without a negation is false. For instance, the (a)-sentence in
each of the examples 2.1 and 2.2 below is true if and only if the (b)-sentence in
the same example is false.
('2.1) a. He's not in.
b. He's in.
(2.2) a. Florence is not irritatingly well-adjusted.
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b. Florence is irritatingly well-adjusted.
It is usually assumed that the representation of a sentence can be derived more or
less directly from it. This is particularly the case with e.g. Montague Semantics
(Dowty et al., 1981), in which rules to construct the semantic representations from
the syntactic form are spelt out explicitly, but it tends to be assumed informally
in other frameworks too.1 For this reason, it is common practice to say that a
sentence of the natural language is true when its representation is true. By uttering
the sentence in 2.1(a) the speaker thus asserts that it is false that whoever 'Tie"2
refers to is at wherever "in" is at the time of the utterance. Likewise, uttering
the sentence in example 2.2(a) amounts to asserting that it is false that Florence
is irritatingly well-adjusted.
It seems straightforward to give skeletal truth conditions for the sentence in ex¬
ample 2.1(a), even without knowing what person and place "he" and "in" refer
to. Say that "he" refers to some male person P, and "in" to some location L, and
that t is a time when the sentence is uttered. Then a one-sentence truth condition
can be formulated:
P is not at L at t
Establishing the truth conditions for the sentence in example 2.2(a) is more com¬
plicated. This sentence could be used truthfully about at least two different and
incompatible situations. "Florence is not irritatingly well-adjusted" would be true
both in worlds where Florence is not well-adjusted (in which case it does not
matter whether this is irritating or not), and worlds where she is well-adjusted,
but where this is not irritating. While the corresponding positive sentence only
describes one type of situation (where Florence is irritatingly well-adjusted) the
Proponents of Radical Pragmatics and Relevance theory, as pointed out in chapter 1, would
however disagree.
2Quoted italics will be used throughout to indicate that the word or phrase is used as sig¬
nifying the linguistic expression.
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negative one can describe different types.3 The negation can apply either to the
modifier "irritatingly" or to the predication "well-adjusted". Therefore it is less
obvious how to go about it with the sentence in example '2.2(a). Rather than
having truth conditions which are of the form of a proposition (or a set of propo¬
sitions), which are to be satisfied, its truth conditions must consist of a disjunction
of propositions:
It is not the case that Florence is well-adjusted or
It is not irritating that Florence is well-adjusted
This suggests that there is an asymmetry between sentences with negation, and
those without. It is easier to establish truth conditions for the latter than for the
former. Unless a sentence without a negation contains a disjunction, or is seman-
tically ambiguous, its truth conditions are a non-disjunctive set of propositions.
To see this, consider a sentence S which has three truth conditions {p,q,r}. It is
enough that any single one of these does not obtain for S to be false. So S is false
and NEG-S (s with a main clause negation) is true e.g. if {-ip,q,r} or {p,—>q,r}
obtain. But {->p,q,r} and {p,->q,r} cannot simultaneously hold, so there are at
least two distinct, and incompatible, types of situation in which NEG-S would be
true.
The truth conditions of a sentence with a negation are indirect ones, in the sense
that they must be thought of in terms of the truth conditions of the correspon¬
ding positive sentence, and consist of a disjunctive list of the negations of its truth
conditions. Only for the most simple negative sentences can non-disjunctive truth
conditions (that pick out only one type of context) be given. Natural language
3Someone who is used to thinking about truth conditions as simple to establish may at
first wonder if the complex conditions on the use of this sentence stem from presuppositions
(see section 2.2.2) rather than its "meaning". However, "irritatingly" does not presuppose, but
implies, the proposition that follows it. "Florence is irritatingly well-adjusted" can hardly be
said to lack a truth value if she is not well-adjusted, and "No, she isn't" would be natural reply
in that case.
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sentences are typically not that simple, and there may be many conditions associa¬
ted with their appropriate use, meaning that in general, a specific interpretation of
a sentence with a negation can only be given with reference to a specific situation
which it is used about.
It may be that it is sometimes appropriate to think of some of these conditions as
propositions that must be true in the world that the sentence is used to describe.
When natural language negation is used to indicate that some condition of this
type does not obtain, it is compatible with the truth functional account. But
expressions of natural language have other types of conditions as well, and it will
be shown below that negation can be used when such conditions fail too.
2.2.2 Presupposition Canceling Negation
It was noted above that the traditional account of negation as a truth function
means that negation is considered to indicate that some condition on the discourse
universe associated with the corresponding positive sentence does not obtain. It
was hinted that negation is not restricted to applying to this this sort of condition,
but before considering such cases, it will be worthwhile to examine one commonly
suggested objection to this theory.
The objection in question is derived from an intuition that while it makes sense to
talk about some sentences as having a truth value of either true or false relative to
the world, for some sentences and some worlds this does not apply. The intuition
can be thought of as correlating the truth value of a sentence with whether it
can be satisfactorily confirmed by saying "yes", in which case it is true, or denied
by saying "no", in which case it is false. If neither of these responses would be
adequate, it is either considered to have a third truth value (e.g. Seuren, 1985) or
to have no truth value at all (Fodor, 1979).
For instance, although the information conveyed by the sentence "Steve has stop-
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ped smoking" could, and perhaps should, be objected to, if Steve never smoked
in the first place, to merely say "no" would usually imply that Steve has smoked.
To say "yes" also implies that Steve has smoked, so neither "yes" nor "no" are
accurate replies. If the accuracy of a "yes" or a "no" reply is considered to be the
diagnostic of truth and falsity respectively, then the sentence is neither true nor
false. The implication, that Steve has smoked, from both these answers is termed
a PRESUPPOSITION.
Although "no" might not be an appropriate reply in case Steve has never smoked,
it is possible to object to that sentence with a negation, at least if the information
that Steve never smoked is somehow provided too, as illustrated in example '2.3.
(2.3) Steve hasn't stopped smoking. He never smoked in the first place.
In this example, the negation is said to apply to a sentence S ( "Steve has stopped
smoking") which is neither true nor false, to form a new sentence NEG-S, which
is true. Since the sentence is used to object to the information that Steve has
stopped smoking on the grounds that its presupposition (that Steve has smoked)
does not hold, this usage of negation is often termed PRESUPPOSITION CANCE¬
LING (as opposed to PRESUPPOSITION PRESERVING). Some authors (e.g. Seuren,
1985) argue that the presupposition canceling use is semantically different from a
negation which maps falsity into truth, such as the one in the example below.
(2.4) Steve hasn't stopped smoking. He couldn't go without more than one
day.
If the conditions of truth and falsity outlined above are accepted, then the ne¬
gations in examples 2.3 and '2.4 cannot be described as the same truth function.
This type of example is sometimes used to suggest that there is a weakness in
the description of negation as a mapping between truth and falsity. However, it
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is usually not considered to discredit the truth functional account of negation in
general. Instead, it is taken as evidence that "not" is semantically ambiguous bet¬
ween one operator which maps falsity to truth, and one which maps a third truth
value to truth, which Seuren (1985) call minimal and radical negation respectively.
The alleged ambiguity obviously hinges on the definition of truth and falsity de¬
scribed above. The truth conditions of "Steve has stopped smoking" include that
he has smoked, so the issue is whether this is also a truth condition of "Steve
hasn't stopped smoking". It is not for the "Steve hasn't stopped smoking" in ex¬
ample 2.4, so it remains to decide if it is for the "Steve hasn't stopped smoking"
in example 2.3, i.e. if they are semantically different. It all depends on whether
"Steve has stopped smoking" is considered false if Steve never has smoked, or if it
is neither true nor false because it would be inappropriate to reply by only saying
The sentence "Steve hasn't stopped smoking" is verified by different, and incompa¬
tible, contexts in examples 2.3 and 2.4. This on its own, however, does not prove
that the negations are different, since, as pointed out in section 2.2.1, sentences
4Presupposition failure is not, as it were, defined by whether "yes" or "no" applies, but this
is a test which I believe correlates with the examples of presuppositions that the proponents of
these theories provide. They tend to be defined either as conditions both for the truth and the
falsity of a sentence, or as conditions for the truth both of a sentence and the same sentence with
a presupposition preserving negation. In both these cases, it is assumed that some sentences
can be shown to be neither true nor false, but the test for this is not provided.
Atlas (1989) argues that the purported correlation with whether "yes" and "no" are ap¬
propriate replies is "the wrong kind of evidence", citing Kripke (recounted in Quine, 1974).
Essentially, the argument is that although an informant may be puzzled by a statement such
as "Steve has stopped smoking" if Steve never smoked, and consider "no" an appropriate reply,
there are other sentences where similar preconditions fail where such a reply would be natural.
Kripke's example is "the present king of France will invade us"—definite noun phrases are sup¬
posed to presuppose the existence of a single entity which they refer to—to which a "no" reply-
is perfectly acceptable.
There is one "test" which is sometimes mentioned in connection with presuppositions. Ho¬
wever, it is not a "test" of truth values, but of type of negation (presupposition preserving or
cancelling). The idea is that by paraphrasing a sentence neg-s into "it is not the case that s
the presuppositions of s are not preserved (assuming that they exist of course). Atlas (1989)
points out that the purported weaker interpretation of the paraphrase is hardly recognised by-
normal language users, but only exists because of logicians' prejudices. If the third truth value
and the presupposition canceling negation always co-occur, and no independent tests for either
of them are at hand, then the theory is non-demonstrable. Burton-Roberts (1989) argues on
these grounds that the theory of semantic ambiguity cannot be falsified.
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with negation cannot generally be expected to have non-disjunctive truth condi¬
tions. The difference is in other words not as significant as it may seem at first,
and it is questionable whether the proposed negations could be comprehensively
defined and distinguished.
It is likely that the reason why these negations have been perceived as different is
the selection of data to illustrate "ordinary" presupposition preserving negation.
The function of "ordinary" negation is usually explained with reference to com¬
paratively simple sentences, e.g. "John doesn't love Mary", for which it may have
appeared possible to give a single truth condition. But as noted above, natural
language negation can be rather more complex while still being compatible with
the bivalent truth function.
2.2.3 Truth Conditions vs Utterance Conditions
The examples of sentences with negation that have been considered so far illustrate
one way natural language negation can be used. This use has often been thought
of as semantic, in the sense of being independent of the situation where it is used.
It is taken to indicate that some truth condition of the corresponding sentence
without the negation fails to obtain. The use of natural language negation is
however not restricted to expressing that a sentence does not accurately describe
the world. It can also be used when some condition on the use of the sentence,
as opposed to on the world it describes, does not obtain, as illustrated by the
following example:
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(2.5) A and B live in Edinburgh. B is going to Glasgow to practice with his
band. A is not a native speaker of English.
A: Do you want me to help you to carry the stuff to the station?
B: No, it's OK, thanks.
A: Are you bringing the (guitar) amp?
B: I'm not BRINGING it, I'm TAKING it.
In English, the choice of "take" and "bring" depends on where the speaker and the
addressee are at the time of the utterance—in general, if either of them are at the
target location of the transporting action then "bring" should be used, otherwise
take.0 A is native in Swedish, which has one single phrase corresponding to both
"take" and "bring". When B says "I'm not bringing it" the negation does not
indicate that some truth condition on the action of B transporting the amplifier
from Edinburgh to Glasgow fails to obtain. Although the negation could be said
to apply to a condition associated with the phrase "bring'\ it is a condition on
the utterance situation and not on the discourse universe. The sentence "are you
bringing the amp?" would have been appropriate if A or B had been in Glasgow at
the time of the utterance, in which case the sentence "I'm not bringing it" would
have been false. The use of "bring" is therefore not inappropriate with respect
to the situation that the sentence purports to describe, but with respect to the
circumstances of the utterance.6
°It appears that there is some individual, or perhaps regional, variation in how strong this
distinction is.
6In general, the choice of "take" and "bring" and the analogous pair "come" and "go" depends
on the position of the agents in the discourse universe, and if one location has been designated
as the setting of the discourse. Consider the following sentence:
John's mother came/went to see him in the hospital.
"Came" would be more natural if the previous discourse had been about something which
happened in the hospital, and "went" if it was set somewhere else. Certain locations can also be
strongly associated with an agent, so that "come" can be used even if no other relevant agent
is at the location at the time of either the utterance or the action, e.g. "home":
When I came home yesterday.. .
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To choose between "take" and "bring" in English does not amount to making
a statement, or implying something, about the world. Instead, the speaker is
complying with constraints on lexical items with regard to the utterance situation.
Example 2.5 illustrates how one person fails to comply with such a constraint,
and how this failure is indicated by another person using a negation. Although
conditions on the utterance situation can theoretically be expressed as conditions
on the sentence, they are clearly not independent of the language user.
2.2.4 Non-Optimal Descriptions
A truth functional description of negation may be compatible with some of its
uses, but as seen in section 2.2.3, this is not always the case. In this section some
data will be considered where the negation applies to how the sentence relates to
the discourse universe, but in contrast to the examples in section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2,
there does not appear to be any truth conditions which fail to obtain.
This typically happens when an agent has uttered a sentence which another agent
considers to be inadequate given the circumstances. The sentence may be "true"
relative to the world, but the second agent can still use a negation to indicate that
the choice of that particular sentence is not considered optimal. Often, this use
of negation occurs when a part of a representation can be perceived as a position
on some scale, such as the scale of natural numbers, or a scale of how positive the
feelings an agent has for something or someone are. e.g.:
(2.6) A: Does he have a good bike too?
B: He doesn't have a good bike, he has three.
(2.7) A: Therese seems to like Carol.
B: She doesn't like her, she loves her.
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If someone has three good bikes, they certainly have one,7 and "/owe" is usually
taken to imply "like". If the second clauses of B's utterances are true, the speaker
should be committed to the representation of the sentences that were rejected.
Such apparently contradictory utterances are, however, used in felicitous utteran¬
ces, and their addressees can make sense of them. Although the addressee might
first be led down the garden path (due to a precocious assimilation of the first
sentence), they do not end up assuming that the speaker has contradicted them¬
selves.
Use of negation in sentences that would theoretically be true without it is not
confined to scalar expressions, although such examples have perhaps received more
attention than others (e.g. Grice, 1975; Gazdar, 1979; Levinson, 1983; and Horn,
1989). But this phenomenon is not limited to scalar expressions, as shown in
example 2.8. For instance, if it is true that someone did something, then it is also
true that they managed to do it.
(2.8) A: Did you manage to put the wheel back on?
B: What do you mean, manage? I didn't manage anything. It was
dead easy.
Assuming that agents who make utterances like these are not being inconsistent,
it seems that the negation does not indicate that some truth condition fails to
obtain. It cannot be described as applying to some condition on the utterance
situation either. The issue is the appropriateness of the information: someone
who uses negation in this way is typically trying to convey that some description
is not considered optimal.
The B speakers' utterances in example 2.6 to 2.8 are intended to change the A
speakers' representations, in that the rejected descriptions and the preferred ones
' One could think of other ways of representing these sentences such that they do not imply
each other, but it is commonly assumed that it ought to be done this way (e.g. Horn, 1989). See
chapter 3, section 3.4.1.
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are not identical. If one wishes to see this in terms of truth conditions, then those
of the A speakers' sentences are a subset of those of the B speakers' preferred ones
(at least in the former two examples). This means that it might be tempting to
suggest some quasi-semantic (pragmatic) solution which keeps the negation truth
functional, even though it cannot be as a mapping between truth and falsity of
the explicit information. Possible approaches here are to postulate that scalar
expressions automatically assert their own maximality (i.e. the representation of
"a" in example 2.6 should be 'EXACTLY ONE', or that the speaker has left out
a "just" or an "only", which should be part of the semantic representation even
though it is not realised linguistically.
The first approach leads to inconsistencies with sentences such as as B's reply in
example 2.9, which would be contradictory if "he has a good bike" asserted that
the person in question has only one bike.
(2.9) A: Does he have a good bike too?
B: He certainly has a good bike, in fact he has three.
Thus it will not do to claim that a sentence with an expression corresponding to the
position N on a scale always means that N is the upper bound. The claim would
have to be weakened, so that such expressions sometimes mean 'AT LEAST N'
and sometimes 'EXACTLY N'. This means that the problem is shifted somewhere
else: instead of explaining why negation can be used in two apparently different
ways, the task is seen as one of determining which of two senses a different type
of expression has.
The second approach differs from the first one in that the scalar (or other) expres¬
sion is not considered ambiguous, but instead the 'AT LEAST' and 'EXACTLY' part
of the interpretation is part of the representation of the sentence, although the
speaker chose not to realise it linguistically. That is, in example '2.6, the B speaker
meant that HE DOES NOT HAVE EXACTLY ONE BIKE', but decided to leave out
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the "just", "exactly", "only" or other expression which would have conveyed this
sense. Since this is a common phenomenon, it would appear that in general, when
one wants to reject one description in favour of another one which implies it, it is
not necessary to explicitly realise the modifier. But why is it then, that although
"X arranged Y" implies that "X knows about Y", it would sound odd if someone
used the B' sentence in example 2.10?
(2.10) A: Does the head know about it?
B: He doesn't just know about it, he arranged it.
B!: *He doesn't know about it, he arranged it.
If it is only possible to leave out maximality indicators in certain contexts, then
it is clearly necessary to specify what conditions must be satisfied. Stating that
speakers sometimes leave out maximality markers which have to be inserted into
the semantic representation is merely a post hoc measure, which is applied if a
negation cannot be given a truth functional interpretation otherwise.
Examples 2.6 to 2.8 are interesting, because in the circumstances where they would
be appropriate, the negated sentences do not violate neither truth conditions nor
utterance conditions of the type discussed in the previous section. It could be
argued that accepting the sentence which was negated would be misleading, and
that to this extent it is in breech of some form of utterance conditions, but they
are not of the same type as the direct ones considered above.
2.2.5 Objections to Linguistic Realisations
Horn (1985) drew attention to the fact that negation can be used when an agent
wants to point out what they perceive to be a linguistic inaccuracy in an utterance
made by another agent. One example including a linguistic error has already been
considered in section 2.2.3, but that differs from the ones that Horn discusses by
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violating some constraint associated with the expression that was used. In Horn's
examples, the mistakes, or perhaps misjudgements, are ineffectual, in that they
do not result in the word or phrase in question having any truth or utterance
conditions that are distinct from what the correcting speaker prefers. Exam¬
ples 2.11 (from Horn, 1989) and 2.12 contain objections to a gender mistake and
a mispronunciation respectively:
(2.11) A: Est-ce que tu as coupe le viande? (pronounced with an English
accent)
Is it that you have cut the{masculine} meat?
'Have you cut the meat?'
B: Non, je n'ai pas 'cou-pay luh vee-and', j'ai coupe la viande.
No, I not have not cut the{masculine} meat, I have cut
the{feminine} meat.
No, I haven't "cut the meat", I have cut the meat.
(2.12) A: Vill du ha en appel?
Want you have "an apple" {wrong gender & mispronounced}?
'Do you want "an apple"?'
B: Jag vill inte ha en appel, men ett apple vore inte sa dumt.
I want not have "an apple" {wrong gender & mispronounced}
but an apple were not so bad.
'I don't want "an apple", but I wouldn't mind an apple.'
The mistakes in these examples do not mean that the relevant word is automa¬
tically understood as conceptually different from what the speaker intended, as
was the case with the example in section 2.2.3. No new, or different, conditions
are directly associated with the A-utterance, that are not also associated with the
same utterance, had it been realised properly. Accordingly, Horn suggests that
the negation does not apply to information at all in these cases.
Not only non-native speakers' failed attempts can be objected to in this way, but
so can also other linguistic expressions which are deemed "inappropriate". This
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might be for instance because the register, focus, or connotations of a phrase are
considered unsuitable (examples from Horn 1989):
(2.13) Grandpa isn't feeling lousy, Johnny, he is just a tad indisposed.
(2.14) I'm not his sister, he's my brother.
2.2.6 Dealing with Conditions
The intuition that a negation indicates that there is something wrong with the
corresponding positive sentence is equivalent to saying that there is some condition
on the use of the sentence that is not met. It is reasonably easy to specify what
the conditions are when it comes to incompatible information and constraints on
the utterance situation. When the information is correct, but not optimal, the
task becomes more difficult; even more so when the grounds for using the negation
is the linguistic realisation.
Although the examples that have been discussed so far differ in the aspect of
the utterance the negation seems to apply to, they seem to have this important
property in common: the negation indicates that something is not quite right.
Because of this, it may seem that one way of dealing with uses of negation which
do not conform to the ordinary truth functional description would be to adapt
the semantic framework. By allowing linguistic or pragmatic operators into the
semantic representation, the various conditions on the utterance situation, and on
linguistic wellformedness and appropriateness are elevated to truth conditions; and
a negation which applies to such a condition is truth functional. This approach
is favoured by e.g. Seuren (1991), for at least some of the examples above: the
idea is that by uttering the phrase "le viande", one simultaneously asserts that
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"viande" is a masculine noun in French (or at least that the expressions used is
the correct one).
Natural language negation can be used by speakers when they want to indicate
that some feature of a sentence is inappropriate given the circumstances. The
different features are however not easily classified into distinct categories. The
layout of this chapter has perhaps made it seem like this can be done: that there
are truth conditions, utterance conditions, conditions on the linguistic realisation
etc. In reality the boundaries between these are vague: the anomalous features
cannot always be easily classified (this will be discussed in chapter 4, section 4.2).
Although it is questionable whether it is a good idea to treat all different aspects
of an utterance as truth conditions, this approach has the merit of reflecting that
there are no obvious subcategories of negation. It would, however, be difficult to
find suitable operators for some of the examples discussed above.
The notion that negation applies to some feature of a sentence or an utterance
is a common hypothesis, which is nearly omnipresent, even in accounts such as
Horn's (1989) which does not consider all negation truth functional. Why does
it seem natural to take this type of approach? The answer is, because the set of
data used as examples is limited to such sentences that would typically be used
to indicate that "something is not quite right" with the corresponding positive
sentence. It is usually data of affirmative sentences with a main clause negation.
In the next section, some examples will be considered where the truth functional
approach fails completely, even if it is weakened to seeing negation merely as an
indication that the sentence is not optimal.
2.2.7 Yes/No-Questions
While negation in declarative sentences has received a lot of attention, its function
in other types of sentences has not. Consequently most of what has been written
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about negation is conceived to fit this type of data. It is however worthwhile
considering other types as well, as the following examples illustrate:
(*2.15) a. Is Manchester rainy?
b. Isn't Manchester rainy?
If someone who considers Manchester to be rainy was asked these questions, and
answered them sincerely, the answer should in both cases be "yes". If the ne¬
gation in 2.15(b)8 is interpreted truth functionally, the whole utterance will be
understood as a request to confirm or deny that the proposition that 'MANCHE¬
STER IS RAINY' is false, which is not how this type of question is used. Not
even the weakest version of negation as a bivalent operator, according to which
negation only indicates that something is not right, applies in this case—an agent
who treats an utterance of the question "isn't Manchester rainy?" as the speaker
seeking confirmation or denial that there is something wrong with 'MANCHESTER
IS RAINY' would produce an anomalous answer. This holds for intonationally
unmarked yes/no-questions in general. When a speaker requests a confirmation
or a rejection of a fact, the status of the fact in the question is not affected by
whether the speaker uses a negation or not.
(2.16) Isn't the weather in Scotland dreadful?
In English, this usage of negation is only common in demands for the assessment of
descriptions. In Swedish, on the other hand, it is also found in requests to perform
an action. The two sentences in example 2.17 are equivalent if one wants to ask an
addressee to open a door. The (b)-sentence is not perceived as the speaker asking
for the second time, or being irritated, as the corresponding English question could
be.
8This example was brought to my attention by Tom Wachtel.
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(2.17) a. Kan du oppna dorren?
Can you open door-the?
'Can you open the door?'
b. Kan du inte oppna dorren?
Can you not open door-the?
'Can't you open the door? '
Negation used like this may possibly add a degree of politeness. This is the effect
it has in the French and Irish9 examples below. The Irish b example would be
perceived as more polite in a formal conversation. In a more informal one. it may
indicate that the speaker is becoming irritated.
(2.18) T'as pas un clop?
You have not a fag?
'You don't have a fag? '
(2.19) a. An bhfreagroidh tu ceist domsa?
part, answer-will you question for-me?
'Will you answer a question for me?'
b. Nach bhfreagroidh tu ceist domsa?
NEG answer-will you question for-me?
'Will you not answer a question for me?'
The sentences in examples 2.17 to 2.19 are typically used to ask the addressee
to perform an action, rather than to assess the status of of the information. It
is nevertheless interesting that the negation is irrelevant for the interpretation
of the request. That is, a speaker who uses the sentence in example 2.17(b) is
not asking their addressee to not open the door. In fact, it is not possible to
use this type of construction with a negation to ask an addressee not to perform
an action in Swedish—it would be necessary to use an expression corresponding
f,I am grateful to Breanndan O Nuallain for providing this example.
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do "refrain" instead.10 Unless one is prepared to claim that negation used in
the main-clause position in yes/no-questions is different from negation used in
declarative sentences, the position that negation is essentially a truth function is
clearly untenable.
2.2.8 Summary
This section has introduced a body of data that will serve as a basis for discussion
throughout this thesis. Negation has been shown to be a versatile expression,
which is not limited to indicating that some truth condition of the corresponding
positive sentence does not obtain. On the contrary, it can apply to a wide range
of properties of utterances of sentences, many of which it would be difficult to
formulate in terms of a truth conditional semantics. In order to extend the cover¬
age of the traditional account, it would be necessary to allow the representations
to contain also predicates that are about the situation in which the sentence is
uttered and about formal properties of language.
While some of the data made it seem likely that the function of natural language
negation is to indicate inappropriate features of sentences, this interpretation sim¬
ply is not available for the use of negation in yes/no-questions. If such a question
with a main clause negation were interpreted as a request for the confirmation
that there is something wrong with the corresponding positive description, the
wrong answer would be produced (except if the negation is heavily stressed). A
main clause negation in a yes/no-question should not normally appear in the re-
10It is possible to get this reading out of a corresponding English utterance, with the negation
in a different position and with contrastive stress on "not":
Can you not open the door, please?
Swedish also has a choice of syntactic position for the negation, but there is only one possible
reading in both cases. It is worth noting that the English example above would probably be
interpreted as meaning more than a mere request to leave the door shut, such as the speaker
being rather irritated etc. As opposed to the ordinary request, a "yes" or a "no" would not be
suitable replies to indicate that one accepts/rejects the order. Instead, it would be necessary to
reply with "OK" or similar.
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presentation of it, if this is thought of as a factual description whose status is
unknown. This suggest that the intuition that negation indicates that there is
something anomalous with the sentence it occurs in is, after all. not as reasonable
as it may appear.
2.3 Cross-Linguistic Considerations
Despite the fact that the differences between various uses of natural language ne¬
gation are slight, and gradual, it has sometimes been suggested to be semantically
ambiguous, on the grounds that no single description will fit all cases. This section
contains a brief discussion of the distinctions made in some languages with more
than one morpheme corresponding to the English "not", for the purpose of inve¬
stigating whether the differences between them could be used to justify viewing
"not" as ambiguous.
Why should cross-linguistic evidence matter? One reason to consider it is that
most, if not all, accounts of "not" that have been proposed so far either have
exceptions or suggest that negation is ambiguous, while there is no evidence from
English that it is not a uniform phenomenon.11 This is for instance the case with
the presupposition preserving and cancelling functions, outlined in section 2.2.2
above. One is required to decide whether the sentence "Steve hasn't stopped
smoking" in example 2.3 is different from the one in example 2.4:
(2.3) Steve hasn't stopped smoking. He never smoked in the first place.
(2.4) Steve hasn't stopped smoking. He couldn't go without more than one
day.
uThe arguments about possible multifunctionality (as opposed to ambiguity) of negation in
English will be examined in chapter 4.
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Since they are linguistically identical, declaring them different requires an act of
faith—unless some other language distinguished them lexically.
Semantic ambiguity (when two different concepts happen to be denoted by identi¬
cal linguistic strings), can usually be verified by translation into another language.
If one word has two meanings, and this fact is purely incidental, then it would be
expected that other languages, at least if they belong to different families, have
different words for the two. An example of this is the English word "cry": other
languages tend not to have one word which signifies both 'WEEP' and 'SHOUT .
The translation test for ambiguity is however hardly a failsafe one, since languages
often differ in the specificity of the concepts they have lexicalised. This point is
made in Atlas (1989). To demonstrate it with yet another example, there is
no single Swedish word corresponding to the English "cut". Instead, there are
different verbs for cutting with a knife, cutting with an axe, cutting with a pair
of scissors, etc. If the translation test was the be-all-and-end-all of semantic
ambiguity, then "cut" would be ambiguous between these functions, rather than
a general label for all of them. A native English speaker would probably not feel
that is the case. Similarly, a Swedish speaker would probably not consider the
phrase "ta med sej" to be ambiguous between the concepts labeled as "take" and
"bring" in English.
Any evidence produced by the translation test is therefore likely to be influenced
by the concepts one is used to having specific labels for, and perhaps, on a different
level, by the theory that one is trying to promote. Nevertheless, it is interesting
to see what categories different linguistic communities have come to label, so
even if it cannot be considered hard evidence that "not" is ambiguous, it is surely
worthwhile to consider what categorisations that are made or, equally significantly,
not made. This does not purport to be a comprehensive review of such categories,
but some points are worth making.
There are many languages into which the English "not" does not translate uni-
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formly as one particular morpheme (or combination of morphemes). To take a
familiar example, there may be specific morphemes for certain categories of ne¬
gated objects, so that a morpheme meaning "nobody" is preferred to a phrase
corresponding to "not anybody". Negation in French, for instance, is in the form
of a particle "ne" (which is usually dropped in spoken language), followed by a
comparatively specific negative morpheme, so there is no single word for "not":
(2.20) a. On n'a rien vu.
We not have nothing seen.
'We didn't see anything.'
b. On ne l'a pas vu.
We not it have not seen.
'We didn't see it.'
c. On n'a vu personne.
We not have seen nobody.
'We didn't see anyone.'
d. On ne l'a jamais vu.
We not it have never seen.
'We have never seen it.'
The difference between "not" and negation in French is similar to the one between
"cut" and the Swedish equivalents: it is a case of more finely grained descriptions
in one of the languages, rather than of ambiguity in the other. Still, there would
be more substance to a claim that negation is ambiguous between two particular
functions (e.g. those that it is said to have in example 2.3 and example 2.4 respec¬
tively) if it can be shown that some language actually has different morphemes
corresponding to them. As for the presupposition preserving and canceling ne¬
gations, Gazdar (1979) notes that no language is known to make this distinction
morphologically, which makes it hard to believe that they are indeed distinct.
One use of negation that constitutes a counterexample to virtually every account
that has been suggested so far is that in yes/no-questions. This use in particular,
it would be desirable to discount as a separate category, but no data available
data supports this (although this could be due to lack of reasons to look for it
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among those who have investigated such things). Likely candidates would have
been for instance Scots and Irish Gaelic, which have different negation morphemes
in declaratives and questions. However, the one (or the ones) used in yes/no-
questions are also used in question-word-questions (as well as in relative clauses),
while it is only in the former that the truth functional interpretation fails.
In fact, even if a language which consistently used a different negation morpheme
in yes/no-questions could be found, the problem would not be solved. It must also
be explained why the ordinary truth functional negation does not usually occur
in yes/no-questions, and why one would have to use some complicated paraphrase
using an embedded declarative if one really seeks the verification of a negative
fact:12
(2.21) Can you confirm that it is not Thursday today?
The lack of a formal negation in the most obvious semantic representation of a
yes/no-question is not an incident or an idiomatic peculiarity—it is impossible to
construct a question with a main clause negation such that it would be interpreted
as a request to verify a negative fact. This might reflect that there seldom is any
reason to seek negative information, but that does not make it any less interesting
for the purposes of representing natural language negation.
While no evidence has been found to support a categorisation of negation which
includes one sense which corresponds to the truth function, it is worth drawing
attention to a distinction that appears to be made in several unrelated langua¬
ges: they have special morphemes and/or constructions for rejecting a focussed
element. In English, which permits little syntactic freedom, such negation is ty¬
pically expressed using intonation or an h-cleft.
12Even so, it is not obvious that one can be completely certain of what e.g. a "yes" reply
would mean.
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(2.22) In France they don't eat their food, they enjoy it.
(2.23) It wasn't the derailleur that was bent, it was the dropouts.
I will refer to such use as CONTRASTIVE NEGATION for the time being.13 Certain
languages, e.g. Welsh and Yoruba (cited by Payne, 1985; a further few are men¬
tioned by Horn, 1989) have specific forms for it. That is, the English sentence
uwe didn't go to the Canaries last year" in examples 2.24(a) and (b) would not
be translated to the same sentence in such a language. The Welsh equivalents are
given in example 2.25.14
(2.24) a. We didn't go to the Canaries last year. We didn't go anywhere.
b. We didn't go to the Canaries last year. It was the year before.
(2.25) a. Aethon ni ddim i'r Ynysoedd y Canary y llynedd. Aethon ni i
le'm byd.
Went we not to-the Islands of Canary last-year went we to no-
place-at-all.
'We didn't go to the Canaries last year. We didn't go anywhere."
b. Nid y llynedd aethon ni i'r Ynysoedd y Canary, ond y flwyddyn
cynt.
Not{contrastive} the last-year went we to-the islands of Canary,
but the year before.
'We didn't go to the Canaries last year, but the year before."
13It has also been labelled "focussing" by Atlas 1990. I prefer the term "contrastive" for
reasons that should become clear later on.
14I am grateful to Geraint Jones for helping me with the Welsh data. The accounts of negation
in Welsh differ quite a lot, which probably is due partially to a conflict between written and
spoken language, and partially to regional differences. Contemporary Welsh Grammar (1976)
lists "md" as a literary form, but it seems to be in use at least in some parts of Wales. The
alternative would be using "dim" (of which "ddim" is a form) in the same construction.
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It is interesting that contrastive negation is sometimes distinguished morphologi¬
cally, and as will be seen in chapter 4, this contrastive use is sometimes reflected
in other morphological distinctions. Apart from this, there is little evidence for
any conceptually different negations, which is striking, given that many languages
have more than one word or phrase which corresponds to the English "not".
2.4 Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to describe the versatility of the phenomenon that
is natural language negation, and to discuss what is required of a description of
it. Although natural language negation has often been described as corresponding
to the truth function of predicate logic, it was shown that it would be difficult to
give a unified description of it based on that characterisation. There is no cross-
linguistic evidence to suggest that "not" is semantically ambiguous, so postulating
that it has more than one meaning is undesirable. The challenge for a theory of






This chapter examines some different approaches to describing the meaning or
information carried by sentences, as well as some recently proposed descriptions of
natural language negation. I will begin by comparing some ideas about the nature
of sentence meaning, which increasingly differ from the traditional conception of
meaning as truth. The frameworks that will be considered are Relevance theory
(Sperber and Wilson 1986), Radical Pragmatics (Atlas, 1989), and Argumentation
theory (Anscombre and Ducrot, 1983).
With this background, some different approaches to the description of negation
will be considered. I will concentrate on four approaches: negation as a pragmatic
operator; Horn's (1989) proposal that it has more than one function; Atlas' (1981)
and Ivempson's (1986) approach to keeping negation unambiguously truth func¬
tional; and Anscombre's and Ducrot's (1983) account which suggests that it has
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argumentative properties. These approaches were chosen because they represent
distinct ways of accounting for the behaviour of natural language negation, and
because their coverage of data is comparatively large.
Finally I will consider a different, but related, issue, namely how to account for
the interpretations of what has been called scalar expressions. This problem has
been addressed by some of those whose accounts of negation are reviewed, and
examining this part of their theories will help explicate the differences between
their approaches.
3.2 Approaches to Describing Language
3.2.1 Meaning and Context
I have deliberately left out until now the sentence which has probably received
the greatest amount of attention in the literature about negation. It is, of course,
(3.1) The king of France is not bald. (There is no king of France.)
This particular sentence has been given numerous explanations, and anyone who
writes about negation is almost obliged to include it among the set of data they
discuss. But what is interesting about this sentence is perhaps not so much the
function of the negation in it, as the study of the sentence itself.
It is difficult to imagine in what sort of context this sentence would be uttered.
Presumably it would be used to reject an earlier assertion that the king of France is
indeed bald. But why did the other speaker say that? Did they genuinely believe
that there is a king of France, and if so, on what did they base the judgement
that he is bald? Was it a jocular reference to president Mitterand, or to Jacques
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Delors? Was it a reference to one of the two people who claim to be the legitimate
heir to the French throne?
On the view that sentences have a meaning which can be derived more or less
directly from their linguistic form, there is nothing incongruent in considering the
sentence above without knowing when or if it was used. If meaning is independent
of the language user (the Morris/Carnap definition of semantics) and a subset of
sentences of natural language can be given semantic representations, then that
subset has informational properties which can be discussed without reference to
use.
Semantic representations can be given for expressions of language which do not
reflect any communicative aspects except at a user-independent level of referring
to factual representations. But it is generally accepted that not all expressions of
natural language fulfil this criterion. Pronouns and deixis is one exception—they
need to be evaluated with respect to how they are used (although it has been
argued that some of them can be defined with respect to the context only, so that
no specific reference to the user need be made, cf. Montague Semantics, Dowtv
et al., 1981). But many types of expressions, including those sentences which are
taken to correspond to propositions, and connectives such as "and" and "not
are often considered to be semantic, and therefore user-independent.
Some theories of language would disagree with the assumption that sentences
have a meaning (in the specific sense of a factual description) which can be de¬
rived independently of their use. Sentences are taken to correspond to factual
descriptions, but their representations can only be computed with respect to a
situation where they are used. This is the approach taken in Relevance theory
(Sperber and Wilson, 1986) and Radical Pragmatics (e.g. Atlas, 1989). Further,
more far-reaching criticisms of the traditional role of language in communication
have been made by other scholars, who reject the assumption that sentences cor¬
respond to factual descriptions at all. This perspective is taken in Argumentation
theory (Anscombre and Ducrot, 1983).
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Those who have adopted (truth conditional) semantics as a description of meaning
in language in general do not express, or even view, this as making a point about
the role of language in communication. It does however imply a commitment to
a number of non-trivial philosophical and practical assumptions about the nature
of language and its use, some of which I will try to point out below.
3.2.2 Relevance theory
If sentences are considered to correspond to factual descriptions, then communi¬
cation is viewed as a subroutine in reasoning—a way of providing input to the
deductive system. To many, this consequence of adopting it as a representatio¬
nal framework would seem too strong. However, one recent proposal, Relevance
theory, prefers to strengthen these claims.
Sperber and Wilson (1986) argue that language must not be seen in the light
of communication. In their eyes, a language is merely "a grammar governed re¬
presentational system" (p.173) created for cognitive, and not for communicative,
purposes. Although it would be possible to define language as "semantically inter¬
preted well-formed formulas used for communication," this would be scientifically
unjustifiable, since there is no natural connection between language and commu¬
nication. Language is a necessary tool for information processing and memorising,
but its use for communication is completely incidental. In fact, they go so far as
claiming that (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, p. 173):
the fact that humans have developed languages which can be used to
communicate is interesting, but it tells us nothing about the essential
nature of language. The originality of the human species is exactly to
have found this curious additional use of something which many other
species also possess, as the originality of elephants is to have found
that they can use their noses for the curious additional purpose of
picking things up. In both cases, the result has been that something
widely found in other species has undergone remarkable adaptation
and development because of the new uses it has been put to. However,
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it is as strange for humans to conclude that the essential purpose of
language is for communication as it would be for elephants to conclude
that the essential purpose of noses is for picking things up.
In other words, a language is a tool for reasoning. Human natural language is.
in addition, used as a tool for communication, in which case its function is to
describe reasoning.
According to Sperber and Wilson, the purpose of communication is that the agents
involved share representations of the topic in the end. This is achieved by pre¬
senting stimuli, which the recipient ideally processes in such a way that their
representation becomes similar to that of whoever produced it. The role of lan¬
guage in this is to provide a means for producing complex stimuli in the form of
coded representations, which would be impossible if all the agent could do was
to draw attention to particular states. To some extent, these claims probably re¬
present consequences of accepting that sentences of natural language correspond
to propositions, but what is interesting in this case is that Sperber and Wilson
accept it prior to choosing a representational framework.
Although Relevance theory ultimately derives a semantic representation from sen¬
tences, it differs from the ordinary approach in how the representations are obtai¬
ned. Conventionally, there is considered to be a direct mapping from each sentence
of the natural language to a proposition (or set of propositions, if the sentence is
ambiguous). According to Sperber and Wilson, when an agent hears an utterance
of a sentence, they retrieve a skeleton proposition corresponding to the informa¬
tion represented by it (this is possible because there is a direct mapping for some
words). Certain words, such as pronouns, will be represented as variables in the
skeleton proposition, but they contribute constraints on the type of context that
it can be interpreted in. The proposition is completed by finding a context which
satisfies the constraints. The variables are instantiated, and it is made sure that
the full proposition is consistent with it. After this, the proposition is assessed,
so as to decide if it contributes something new to the agent's representation. If
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this fails, then other bindings are tried until it does (the information has become
"relevant").
3.2.3 Radical Pragmatics
Radical Pragmatics is the name of a collection of papers edited by Cole (1981).
Although the various articles in it share the feature that they question that mea¬
ning can be derived directly from sentences, the alternative proposals are quite
distinct from each other. This section introduces one particular view of Radi¬
cal Pragmatics, that of Atlas (1989). Radical Pragmatics shares with Relevance
theory the idea that the meaning of a sentence only can be derived with reference
to how it is used. In Atlas' terms, sentences are SENSE-GENERAL. They do not
have specific meanings—only when a sentence is used in an utterance can its mea¬
ning be specified. There are, however, some significant differences from Relevance
theory. For instance, language is viewed as a tool for communication, as opposed
to a tool for reasoning.1 This is an important theoretical difference, in that it
forms part of the justification for the concept of sense-generality, although it is
less critical for the application of the accounts.
By considering language to be a tool for communication, Atlas argues that mea¬
ning must be defined in terms of use (assertability) rather than truth. The
meaning-as-truth position defines the meaning of sentences as being completely
independent of the language user, and what they know. But this is unlikely, given
that language is acquired through use,2 and he argues that assertability captures
ordinary language users intuitions about meaning better than truth does.
These different approaches to describing meaning are the basis for the distinction
xIt should be said, though, that Radical Pragmatics is not presented as a theory of language
in communication, but rather as a theory of meaning in language.
2The meaning-as-truth position seems to necessitate the view that natural language is iso¬
morphic to some intrinsic capacity such as Fodor's concept of a language of thought (Fodor,







Utterance Situation INTERPRETATION Message
Figure 3.1: Schematic model of the interpretation of an utterance: Radical Prag¬
matics and Relevance Theory
between sense-generality and ambiguity. Sense-generality means that there are
several types of context where a sentence would be appropriate. This is reflected
by the fact that language users often can name different situations where an
utterance of a sentence would be appropriate. But naming situations in which
a sentence could be used is not equivalent to giving disjunctive truth conditions.
Atlas gives the following example: the sentence "I'm going to the game" can be
used for instance to convey that the speaker is going to watch a baseball match or
a football match, but it does not mean that the speaker is going to watch baseball
or football (or some other game). It is non-specific and would be suitable on both
occasions. He writes (1989, p. 146):
Understanding an utterance is not simply knowing a logical form that
the context SELECTS from the meanings of an ambiguous sentence.
Understanding an utterance is knowing a proposition that in the con¬
text the hearer CONSTRUCTS from the meaning of a univocal, sense-
general sentence. The general meaning of the sentence is made specific
in the hearer's understanding of the utterance.
Considering this in the view of the model of utterance interpretation in chapter 1,
figure 1.1, this means that although sentences in principle refer to factual descrip¬
tions, the actual description intended cannot be derived directly by decoding the
sentence. Rather it is determined by feedback from the interpretation process
(as illustrated in figure 3.1). Atlas does not specify what the sense-general repre-
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sentations are like, except for stating that they cannot be a logical form (1989.
p. 131):
Formal languages as we know them are not designed to represent this
aspect of grammatical meaning.
3.2.4 Data or Manipulation
The approaches to describing meaning in language which have been discussed so
far have one thing in common: they agree that the act of uttering a sentence3 is
equivalent to conveying a factual description. The last of the theoretical frame¬
works that will be discussed here, Argumentation theory, is based on a different
assumption. The amount of conceptual rethinking that is required for this is
considerable, so it will be useful to begin with an attempt to explicate what the
alternative view of sentence meaning is.
Reddy (1979) argues that thinking about communication in natural language as
the transfer of thought (the CONDUIT METAPHOR) is a mistake, and a dangerous
one at that. But it is difficult to avoid this perspective, as much, if not most, of
language about language is metaphoric and biased towards this view, e.g. "put
ideas into words". He offers an alternative metaphor for the role of language in
communication—the toolmakers paradigm (henceforth TMP).
The setting of the metaphor is a wheel-shaped area which is divided into partitions,
with one person living in each of them. The environments in the partitions are
similar, but not identical, and the people try to make the best of their situation by
constructing various tools so that they can cultivate the soil, etc. They can only
communicate with each other by passing blueprints of tools through a letterbox
in the middle, in the hope that the recipient has the materials to construct the
3The phrase "the act of uttering a sentence" is used in order to distinguish it from the purpose
of uttering the sentence, which is to convey the message in the terminology used above.
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tool, and that it will be of use for them.
When they receive a blueprint, they try to build a copy of the tool in question,
and to work out what it is meant to be used for. Since their environments are
different, the tools they build are usually not identical to the original ones, and
they often use them for other purposes than what the person who made the
blueprint intended.
Green discusses the TMP in her pragmatics textbook (1989, p.11):
Reddy argued that the conduit metaphor is not only misleading, but
harmfully, perniciously so. For our purposes, however, it is enough to
assume that there is more to understanding utterances than parsing
them and deriving representations of their propositional meanings in
terms of intensional logic or model theory (cf. Dowty et ah, 1981). It
is necessary also to make inferences about what the utterer believes
about what the addressee believes, and about what effect the utterer
intends the utterance to have.
There are at least two ways of interpreting Reddy's argument. Using the termino¬
logy from chapter 1, it could either be about the interpretation process, or about
the decoding of sentences. I am not entirely sure which one he intended, but it
seems to me that Green's description of it is biased towards the former, to the
exclusion of the other one.
Green's description of Reddy's argument can be interpreted as being about the
necessity of using pragmatics for the understanding of utterances, in the tradi¬
tional way that was outlined in chapter 1. That is, sentences are decoded into
factual descriptions, which serve as input to the interpretation mechanisms that
yield the message. The TMP is understood as saying that interpretation is not
equivalent to decoding; the message is not equivalent to the factual description.
However, it is also possible to interpret the TMP as being about the decoding
process. The position that the interpretation of utterances requires more than the
derivation of propositions is after all hardly controversial, but Reddy mentions
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several times how difficult it is to explain what he means, since it requires a
fundamental rethinking about basic concepts. It is because of these statements
that I think that he might have meant a more far-reaching change than what is
perhaps reflected in Green's paragraph above.
The metaphor of blueprints makes it natural to assume that Reddy wanted us to
think about language as instructions. Now, there already is an approach to the
study of language which is based on this type of conception of its function: Speech
Act theory (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969). In this framework, to understand an
utterance it is not sufficient to know what it refers to, but one must also determine
what the speaker was trying to achieve by making this reference. Utterances
should be interpreted as instructions to behave in a certain way.
Reading the TMP at another level, the blueprints need not be seen as instructions
about behaviour, but could be seen as instructions about how to represent infor¬
mation. The fact that the blueprint was passed on can be viewed as an instruction
about behaviour (the equivalent of a speech act): this tool may be useful. To in¬
terpret the toolmaker's intention behind sending the blueprint at this level is to
find out how to use the tool once it has be constructed. But the blueprints as
such are also sets of instructions, which are decoded by biLilding the tool from
what is available in the environment.
Decoding and interpretation can be viewed as trying to follow instructions at
different levels of the representation: achieving small organisational changes on
the one hand (building the tool), and determining the speaker's intentions on the
other (using it). This is in contrast with the traditional view of the meaning
of sentences, which using this metaphor would be equivalent to saying that the
blueprints represent tools, rather than being instructions of how to build them.
If the decoding of sentences4 is viewed as the process of working out what changes
4Recall that this phrase is used in the sense of constructing a representation of sentence
tokens that have been uttered, see chapter 1, note 5.
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the speaker wanted the addressee to make, it is not just the interpretation of
utterances which depends on taking other agents' representations into account—
the actual decoding process makes the same requirements. I will refer to the
two approaches to describing meaning of language as the DATA HYPOTHESIS ( =
sentences correspond to factual descriptions) and the MANIPULATION HYPOTHESIS
(= sentences correspond to sets of instructions as to how some representation
should be changed) respectively.
This issue is not often discussed in the Anglo-Saxon philosophical tradition, where
the data hypothesis tends to be taken for granted. Sperber and Wilson are an
exception, in that they state explicitly that they assume that the function of
language is to represent facts. However, they do not consider any alternatives.
This is in contrast with some of the French tradition, e.g. Anscombre and Ducrot
(1986), Roulet et al. (1985), where these distinctions are debated, and some
version of the manipulation hypothesis often is preferred.
It may seem that the distinction between a set of instructions about the organi¬
sation of someone's representation and proposition is inconsequential, since the
result of following the instructions should be equivalent to a prepositional repre¬
sentation. This would make it similar to the use of context in deriving a prepo¬
sitional representation of sentences in Radical Pragmatics and Relevance theory.
But there are non-trivial differences, and that is what this thesis is about.
3.2.5 Argumentation Theory
Adopting a data oriented approach to describing natural language meaning basi¬
cally is to suggest that speakers only provide prepositional input to their addressees—
they cannot influence their addressees' processing of information unless they men¬
tion explicitly what particular inference rules should be applied. In contrast with
this approach, Anscombre's and Ducrot's Argumentation theory emphasises the
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function of language in guiding the addressee's processing and changing their re¬
presentations. Their central theory (e.g. Anscombre and Ducrot 1983, Anscombre
and Ducrot. 1986) is that coherent communication does not depend 011 any int¬
rinsic logical relation between the facts referred to in utterances, but 011 how the
speaker presents the information. They argue that the argumentative function
of utterances is more important than the facts they refer to when it comes to
understanding why certain expressions are chosen.
This claim is based on observations of communication where the informational
content and the argumentative properties of sequences of sentences are at odds
with each other. For instance, there are situations in which, from the logical
point of view, speakers appear to be contradicting themselves. In example 3.2. B
simultaneously supports two facts that are mutually exclusive, but the utterance
is nevertheless perfectly functional as coherent argumentation.5
(3.2) A: Is dinner ready yet?
B: Yeah, almost.
In this example, the speaker first accepts that dinner is ready, and then adds that
it is almost ready, which amounts to simultaneously accepting that dinner is ready
and that it is not.6 In contrast, references to facts that are logically compatible
and relevant can be combined into less than coherent utterances, if an unsuitable
modifier is chosen. Example 3.3 illustrates how the use of the quantifier "few" is
odd when followed by another fact modified by nearly", but not when followed
by "only
5It is worth noting that one is often not even aware of the potential contradiction in an
utterance of this type, as opposed to for instance the examples in chapter 2, section 2.2.4.
6Atlas (1984) argues that "almost" does not implicate "not", but only "not quite". However,
if "read;/" is an achievement predicate, in which case "not quite ready" entails "not ready".
Anscombre's and Ducrot's account of "almost"/"not quite" is quite different, see page 52.
'The issue is not that 20% is too many to be "few", because "only 20%" might well be a
larger number than "nearly 20
(3.3) a. ?Few drivers exceed the 70mph speed limit (nearly 20%).
b. Few drivers exceed the 70mph speed limit (only 20%).
As for joining sentences, there may be several possibilities which are truth func¬
tionally equivalent. Despite this, one might be acceptable while the other one is
not. A speaker who wants to recommend the film "The Doors" on the grounds
that the acting is good, while admitting that the direction was not perfect, could
not use the sentence in example 3.4(a). The (b)-sentence, which refers to the same
facts is, on the other hand, fine.
(3.4) a. ?You should go and see "The Doors", it is badly direc¬
ted, and extremely well acted,
b. You should go and see "The Doors", it is badly directed,
but extremely well acted.
The reason why these examples make good, or bad, utterances cannot be dedu¬
ced from their "informational content". Anscombre and Ducrot (1983, p.79, my
translation) write:
Linguists and philosophers have always been struck by the the possibi¬
lities of "reasoning"—used in a very vague sense—offered by language.
But they have generally chosen to reduce this activity to an orderly
presentation of logical relations, i.e. relations depending on the truth
value of sentences are used: incompatibility, implication..., etc. Even
though "reasoning" is considered linguistically relevant, its reduction
to logic (understood as a truth functional system) is ... unacceptable.
Anscombre and Ducrot offer an explanation of the examples above in terms of
what they label ARGUMENTATIVE ORIENTATION. Argumentative orientation is a
property of utterances with respect to a context. If an utterance is presented as
supporting a certain conclusion, then it is oriented towards that conclusion. The
Atlas (personal communication) does not agree that (3.3a) is odd. Even if he were right, it is
beyond question that the (b)-sentence is better, which cannot be explained in terms of logical
properties of "few", "nearly", and "only".
speaker can use certain linguistic expressions to indicate that some information is
used as an argument for something. I will return to their definition of argumenta¬
tive orientation below, but first it will be useful to consider intuitively what this
means for the examples discussed above.
In example 3.2, speaker B can simultaneously confirm that the dinner is ready and
commit himself or herself to a description of the dinner according to which it is not
ready (but not far off) because both these situations would justify A taking the
same kind of action, e.g. setting the table. "Almost" as a description of the state
of the readiness of the dinner is used to indicate that the addressee should behave
in the same way as if it was ready. This can be contrasted with an expression
such as "not quite" which would steer the addressee in the opposite direction, i.e.
towards acting as if the dinner was not ready. "Yes, not quite" would be an odd
answer (cf. Sadock, 1981).8. For Anscombre and Ducrot, there is no relation (by
for instance implicature) between "almost" and "not quite". They are both used
to refer to the same type of state of affairs, but they are used to achieve different
reactions.
An agent who used the sentence in example 3.3 would appear to assert that the set
of drivers who break the law is insignificant, but following it by the qualification
"nearly 20%" suggests that the set is close to some particular size, as if this size
is significant. Although the number of drivers referred to by "few drivers" and
"nearly 20% of the drivers" may be compatible (depending on one's views of
driving behaviour), the ways it is referred to in the sentence appear to support
opposite conclusions.
The sentence in example 3.4(b) could be used by speaker to recommend a film
to someone. If a film is well acted, that usually counts as an advantage for
it, whereas the opposite holds for being badly directed. This means that "the
8 "Yes, but not quite" can be an acceptable combination in principle (although it can hardly
be used, at least not to the same effect, in example 3.2). This is because of the "but", see
chapter 4, section 4.3 and chapter 5, section 5.3.
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film is well acted" and "the film is badly directed" have the opposite orientations
with respect to a recommendation to see it. To join two sentences with "and",
they must have the same orientation relative to the context which prompted the
speaker to use them. Joining them with "but" requires them to have the opposite
orientation. So if the speaker considered both the direction and the acting to be
good, then only "and" would be suitable:
(3.5) a. You should go and see "The Doors", it is well directed,
and extremely well acted,
b. ?You should go and see "The Doors", it is well directed,
but extremely well acted.
Argumentative orientation reflects what Anscombre and Ducrot consider to be
the most important feature of utterances: they have a direction with respect to
the topic of the discourse in which they are uttered. When a speaker makes an
utterance which refers to some fact p, they are not primarily trying to convey p
to an addressee, but to steer the addressee in a certain direction in the discussion
(which may be towards accepting p, but need not be).
Argumentative orientation has been defined in several ways throughout their
works, moving away from a logical definition towards a speaker dependent one.
The earlier definitions suggested that when agents argue a point, they apply ru¬
les to facts in order to show that other facts can be deduced from the present
ones. The definition in Anscombre and Ducrot (1983) links the concept to parti¬
cular agents' representations of information. It uses a different view of "rules", in
which the logical ones have been replaced by (possibly agent-specific) probabilistic
connections. They label them TOPOI9, loosely based on the Aristotelian notion.
Using it, a description of argumentative orientation can be given.
9The existence of the topoi is a claim about a feature of human knowledge representation,
which they suggest is most closely approximated by probabilistic rules. The topoi are open to
criticism that they are not rigorous enough, but rigour in this case imposes structure that is
not necessarily empirically justified. The topoi are intended to refer to a feature of cognitive
processing, not a logical system which approximates it. There is nothing intrinsically wrong
with holding a discussion at that level.
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Argumentative Orientation
An utterance ui representing the information pi is oriented towards
another utterance U2 representing the information P2 if ux presents px
in such a way that it licences an application of a topos from px to P2-10
The way this is formulated shows an important difference from data oriented ac¬
counts: identifying the argumentative orientation of an utterance is not equivalent
to recognising which inference rule the speaker used, but that they used one.
Anscombre and Ducrot argue that decoding an utterance is not about retrie¬
ving a proposition, but about retrieving instructions about how some information
should be incorporated into the representation. Truth conditional semantics fails
as a representation, because its very purpose is to isolate propositions and their
truth value from context. Deduction schemas cannot be used to describe natural
language communication precisely because in the former, premises must not be
interconnected, and all references to the same fact must have the same value. This
is typically not the case in natural language, where referring to the same infor¬
mation in different ways can influence the addressee to process the information in
radically different manner.
3.2.6 Comparing Approaches
The data hypothesis corresponds to a model of communication in which speakers
convey factual descriptions to their addressees, which the latter process using
some form of inference rules. It invites the question of how the addressees select
what rules to apply—speakers typically do not convey enough premises for a valid
deduction. But if the input is in the form of apparently unconnected propositions,
then the addressees are clearly going to have to reason with them to make sense of
the communication. This problem has been discussed by e.g. Sadock (1977), who
suggests that conventional abbreviations of deduction schemata are used. He calls
10px = p2 is not excluded.
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these "modus brevis". When Anscombre and Ducrot would say that a speaker
has presented p as an argument for q, indicating that they consider there to be
an applicable rule, a logical approach to communication prefers it as the speaker
having presented p, omitted the rule that p —> q, and concluded q. Understanding
the utterance is a matter of identifying the rule p —» q.
A typical utterance which lacks a connecting premise is given below:
(3.6) I walked in today. The front tyre of the grey bike was flat.
If this utterance only conveys two propositions (which by the nature of propositi¬
ons must be unconnected), then the addressee will need to find some rule which
connects them. If Sadock's modus brevis are adequate as reasoning schemata,
then there is a (single) rule which connects the two propositions referred to by
the sentences. One rule which would comply with this requirement is
i. The Speaker's (S) grey bike has a flat tyre —»• S walks to the office.
There are some important comments to be made about this. To begin with, it is
"obvious" that the propositions should be ordered this way (q —>■ p rather than
p —> q), although it is very unlikely that anyone would actually have internalised
a rule like (i). This is because of contextual knowledge, but such knowledge need
not correspond to rules as usually conceived of. The default situation with respect
to example 3.6 may well be that S fixes flat tyres instantly, so that this situation
is an exception. It would not make the utterance less valid.
Not only is the addressee not likely to have internalised the rule given in (i), but
the same holds for the speaker—it is too arbitrary. If the speaker was asked to
actually describe the reasoning "used" to arrive at the conclusion to walk to their
office, it would in all likelihood be significantly more complex than the simple rule
given above. More premises, including for instance the following would be needed:
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ii. If one of the bikes can be used, S usually commutes by bike.
iii. If S does not commute by bike, then S walks.
iv. If a bike has a flat tyre and someone fixes it then the bike does not have a
flat tyre.
v. S could not be bothered to fix a flat tyre at the relevant time.
But what about the addressee? Although they may be able to recognise some of
these premises, they are unlikely to be able to reconstitute the whole reasoning
behind the action. This fact does however not prevent the understanding of the
utterance—the recognition that there is some connection which corresponds to
(i) is quite enough, and the speaker can hardly have intended to convey more.
To this extent, the modus brevis hypothesis is acceptable, but the way it was
formulated indicates that it should be viewed as a logical deduction rather than
simply expressing that there is a reasoning behind it.
It follows from the data hypothesis that understanding a sentence such as the one
in example 3.6 is equivalent to either applying the suitable rules for deduction, or
postulating some if they are not already available. This is spelt out explicitly in
Relevance theory. This is where Argumentation theory differs, as it does not de¬
scribe argumentation in terms of factual constraints. Consider another example:
A data oriented theory of meaning would view the interpretation of these sentences
as a matter of recognising that the speaker has used a rule, in this case one which
says that if one is going to visit someone, they need to be home. The reason why
this rule should be used is the fact referred to in the second clause (the probability
of Pat being home is low), together with the fact that going to Pat's place is a





(3.8) Tit's not worth going via Pat's, it's possible he'll be in.
Argumentation theory gives quite a different account of the interpretation of these
sentences. The reason why a topos from 'visit Pat' to 'pat is home' is chosen is
the formulation of the sentence.11 The phrases "I'm not sure" etc. have the effect
of weakening the argumentative strength of the expressions they modify to the
extent that its argumentative orientation is reversed. The phrase "it is not worth
it", modifying the first clause, suggest that the conclusion 'visit Pat' should
not be accepted. It is because of the reversal of the orientation of the presented
argument in conjunction with the rejection of the conclusion that a topos from
'visit Pat' to 'pat is home' is selected for the interpretation.
The advantage of this approach becomes clear when the sentence in example 3.8
is reconsidered. There is in fact nothing wrong with it. The reason why it seemed
odd is that example 3.7 has just been considered, and the way it is expressed leads
us to consider a connection from Pat's being home to the possibility of visiting
him. Example 3.8 on the other hand, by using "it is possible" rather than "I'm not
sure" suggests that 'Pat is in' is oriented against 'go to Pat's', i.e. a different
topos should be used. This is because the phrase "it is possible" weakens the
argumentative strength of the expression it modifies, but contrary to those in
example 3.7 it does not reverse the argumentative orientation.
When first considering example 3.8 above, one is still influenced by the topos
selected for the previous example, which despite being out of context apparently
is interpreted as being about the same individuals and actions. The sentence in
the latter example appears odd: not because of any intrinsic contradictions in the
factual descriptions, but because of context that was established by the selection
of the expressions of uncertainty. This illustrates how much power linguistic ex¬
pressions have when it comes to influencing the addressee's selection of context.
^Normally it would be contextual knowledge and the formulation of the sentence, but since
not much context is given here, one basically has to rely on the latter.
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and that factual information is not the only input to reasoning. This influence
cannot be ignored as a feature of the interpretation of sentences, and Argumenta¬
tion theory therefore has an advantage over the semantics based accounts in that
it recognises argumentative orientation as an important part of lexical meaning.12
3.3 Some Approaches to Describing Negation
It was noted in chapter 2 that it does not seem possible to account for negation
in general as a feature of factual descriptions which are expressed by sentences. If
semantics fails, a legitimate question would be if it be possible to give a pragmatic
account instead, i.e. if it can be described in terms of the interaction between the
participants of the communication. This will be discussed in section 3.3.1.
The fact that there are discrepancies between natural language negation and the
negation of predicate logic has been recognised for a long time, and there have
been many attempts to account for them. Sections 3.3.2-3.3.4 review three compa¬
ratively recent proposals. The discussion here is not intended as a comprehensive
account of theories of negation, and perhaps the selected accounts are not repre¬
sentative of the issues that have been debated through the years.13 However, they
illustrate three quite different ways of dealing with the task. The main reason
why they were selected is that they are formulated to cover a large range of data,
which until recently has not been widely considered, and that they represent the
different approaches to describing language outlined in section 3.2.
12Grice's conventional implicature can perhaps be said to reflect the same phenomena, alt¬
hough it has not been used or discussed on the same scale.
13For instance, I have chosen not to review the negation/presupposition debate. For a more
comprehensive review of theories of negation, see Horn (1989).
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3.3.1 Negation as a Pragmatic Operator?
When semantics fails to account for some feature of natural language, it is common
to designate it pragmatic instead. In chapter 1, semantics was described as the
relation between sentences of natural language and the factual descriptions they
express. Pragmatics, on the other hand, is supposed to explain how the factual
descriptions are integrated into the addressee's representation. If negation is not
semantic, but pragmatic, it must be used to indicate what the addressee should
do with the factual description, instead of simply applying to the description as
such. The aim of this section is to consider whether negation could be described
in these terms.
Although nobody, to my knowledge, has proposed a purely pragmatic description
of negation, several people (e.g. Allwood, 1972 and Givon, 1978) have suggested
that its use is pragmatically restricted. Their reason for this is that they feel that
sentences with negation have a different status in the discourse from those without.
But this cannot be explained in terms of the logical characterisation of negation,
since it is a feature of the bivalent negation of predicate logic that there is no
difference in status between a sentence S without a negation and a sentence NEG-
S which has one. Allwood and Givon consider the meaning of natural language
negation to be equivalent to the bivalent truth function, but they argue that it is
not sufficiently described unless restrictions on its use are specified. In order to
completely account for natural language negation, one must turn to pragmatics.
Both Allwood and Givon treat their pragmatic restrictions as complements to a
logical description, but given that the latter has been shown to be untenable as
a general account, the pragmatic restrictions will be treated as if they were the
description of negation for the present examination. The proposed restrictions
range from Allwood's relatively weak one, to Givon's much stronger statement.
According to Allwood, a sentence with a negation is only used when the corre¬
sponding sentence without a negation would have been expected to be an accurate
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representation of what the speaker is talking about. Givon claims that sentences
with negation are only used to correct erroneous beliefs on behalf of the addressee.
Givon's position is too strong, and is not supported by data on negation. Even
though some dubious cases, such as when a speaker makes a linguistic mistake,
could be construed as manifestations of erroneous beliefs, this is not true for
negation in general. This can be seen in the Norwegian example below (the italics
are mine):
(3.9) The interviewee is talking to a journalist about how he used to deal
hash, but now only sells larger quantities to other dealers:
Na etter at jeg sluttet a selge sjelv, har jeg bare noen fa personer
a forholde meg til. Og faerre folk betyr mindre risiko for a bli avslprt.
Men enna er det noen som kommer pa dprene og som enna ikke har
fprstatt at jeg ikke selger lenger.
'Now after I've stopped dealing myself, I only need to see a few people.
And fewer people means less risk for being busted. But there's still the
odd person who comes to the door, and who still hasn't understood
that I don't deal anymore.'1
That the interviewee does not sell anymore is known to the journalist at the
time of the utterance of the underlined sentence. Although this example could
be characterised as drawing attention to someone's erroneous beliefs, it is not the
addressee (the journalist) who is the offender, but the people who turn up at the
ex-dealer's door (a similar example is cited in Atlas, 1980).
Example 3.10 proves even more problematic: it can hardly be argued that the
person who wrote the instructions in example 3.10 thought that the reader would
believe that the cable ends would fray if the cable end covers are taken off:
(3.10) If you can't take out the cable at the lever end, which is probably
unlikely, then you'll have to undo the bolts on the calipers. Mark the
cable positions before you do, and you may have to take off any cable
end covers, but be careful not to fray the ends.
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If anything, the writer seems to assume that the reader might fail to consider
a case in which the cables fray. It is also impossible to reconcile the notion of
erroneous beliefs with the use of negation in yes/no-questions, as described in
chapter 2, section 2.2.6.
Allwood's proposal, being weaker than Givon's, is compatible with much of the
data of main clause negation in declarative sentences. To some extent it actually
seems compatible with the use of negation in yes/no-questions (although All-
wood's simultaneous assertion that negation is truth functional is not): when a
speaker uses a negation in a yes/no-question, it could well be that they indicate
that they are of the opinion that it would have been reasonable to assume that the
information were accurate. Moreover, it does not have the same problems with
the negation in example 3.10 as Givon's approach has, since it does not refer to
the addressee's beliefs. By simply saying that negation applies to something that
could have been expected (by anyone), cases where the speaker is the only one
who thinks that some state of affairs may obtain are not excluded. This means
that the approach is consistent with example 3.10, where the speaker, but not
necessarily the addressee, is aware of the possibilities that the cables may fray.
It would clearly be necessary to define the notion of "expectancy", which is likely
to involve more than a truth conditional semantics. As far as the representation
of information is concerned, the use of defaults or probabilistic rules is implied.
Furthermore, it would be necessary to distinguish appeal to different agents' be¬
liefs. In other words, quite extensive changes to the representational framework
are needed.
Turning to the use of negation in relative clauses, it becomes obvious that both the
notion of erroneous beliefs and that of expected situations are too restrictive. Both
Allwood's and Givon's proposals would predict that the negation in example 3.11
is misused.
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(3.11) B has just opened the fridge to take some milk out. A sits at the table.
A: Can you get me some jam while you're at it?
B: Sure. Which one do you want?
A: Apricot. It's the one that doesn't have a label.
A description of negation which claims that it indicates that a default rule does
not apply, or that someone holds an erroneous belief, would fail for this example.
Firstly, although jam jars may be considered to have labels by default, it is clear
that A knows that the default is overridden in this case. Secondly, given that A
knows that B has already opened the fridge, and quite possibly has seen the jar.
the default may for all that B knows be overridden for B as well. Now it could
perhaps be argued that A uses the negation because the jar could have had a label
in principle (consistent with Allwood's account), but I disagree. The negation is
used in order to distinguish a particular jar from the others—it is used to contrast,
not to correct or reject. The important feature is not that the jar could have had
a label, but that it lacks a property that a set of similar objects has, and that
this distinguishes it from that set.
Nor does the use of the negation in example 3.11 depend on there being an ac¬
cepted default in principle. To see this, consider another example:
(3.12) A and B have just arrived at a party. A does not know anyone, but
has been told that Ian, who A has heard of, will be there. B knows
most of the people, including Ian.
A: Who is Ian?
B: It's the one who doesn't read Sartre.
It is hardly a default (in Britain at least) that people read Sartre, but if most of
the people in the room look very serious and/or wear black rimmed glasses, while
Ian is a sporty type, B may well succeed in referrring to him. In making this
utterance, B is effectively commenting on the appearance of the others as well
as identifying Ian, The expression "the one who doesn't read Sartre " is not used
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to deny an expectation of Ian, but to contrast two sets of individuals by some
selected identifying property. A pragmatic account of negation which specifies
that it is used to object to an erroneous belief or previous expectation does not
capture this use.
3.3.2 Horn: Multifunctionality
Horn's (1985, 1989) takes a fairly conventional approach to describing language,
assuming that sentences have semantic representations which are independent of
their use. Because he considers the representations of sentences to be close to their
linguistic surface form, a lot of the data discussed in chapter 2 cannot be covered
by the truth functional description of negation. Despite this, he argues that some
uses of natural language negation are truth functional, and hence that it must be
ambiguous. So when negation appears to object to a linguistic realisation, occurs
in a sentence that would be true without it, or is used to cancel a presupposition
(as described in chapter 2, section 2.2.2), then it is of a different type, which Horn
claims can be characterised as a pragmatic operator. He does not give any formal
descriptions of the two, but the following informal ones can be found in the text:14
"Apparent sentence negation represents either a descriptive truth-
functional operator, taking a proposition p into a proposition not-p
(or a predicate P into a predicate not-P) or a metalinguistic operator,
which can be glossed 'I object to U', where U is crucially a lingui¬
stic utterance or utterance type rather than an abstract proposition."
(1989, p.377)
Horn considers this ambiguity to be a pragmatic one, rather than a case of two
different meanings. That is, the metalinguistic negation is in principle performing
a similar function as the descriptive one, but at a different level, with the negation
applying to the sentence as if it denoted an utterance of it, rather than the fact
14His categorisation of negation is based on a distinction made by Ducrot (1972, 1973) (see
below), from which the labels are borrowed, but differs from it, as will be shown in section 3.3.5.
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it refers to. He suggests that this is common in natural language, and that the
situation with other logical operators is analogous. To illustrate this, he uses the
following example of a conditional.
(3.13) If I may say so, you look beautiful tonight.
In order to make sense of the conditional as a material implication, it is necessary
to consider the sentence "you look beautiful tonight" to refer to the act of uttering
it, rather than the fact it normally would be taken to represent.
Although he argues that the dual function of negation is best described as a prag¬
matic ambiguity, the parallel between the two is called into question by some of
his other assertions. For instance, he writes that metalinguistic negation can
be glossed as "I object to [an utterance]", while elsewhere he makes it clear
that descriptive negation cannot be (analogously) characterised as "I object to
[information]."15 If this were the case, then natural language negation would in
general correspond to a speech act of objecting. Horn is quite adamant that this
is not the case in his criticism of Givon's (1978) position (summarised above). His
reason for rejecting this characterisation of description negation is that it leads to
undesirable interpretations of sentences like the ones in examples 3.14 and 3.15.
(3.14) Either he isn't going to the opera tonight or he's going to miss the first
act.
15A characterisation which is close to pragmatic ambiguity has been suggested by
van der Sandt, using what he calls an "echo-operator", which applies to sentences in order
to denote utterances of them. The truth functional negation can operate outside the echo-
operator, which allows it to apply to any (informative) aspect of an utterance. This basically
means that the negation can indicate that some utterance condition of the sentence fails to
obtain, in the same way as it would indicate that a truth condition fails to obtain, which is a
way of formalising pragmatic ambiguity.
Horn (personal communication) however considers this approach to fail for objections to
linguistic realisation, and therefore that metalinguistic negation requires a descriptions which
is different from that of descriptive negation. But that means that the descriptions of the two
negations would not be analogous, which they ought to be if negation were pragmatic ambiguous
in the same way as the other phenomena that Horn discusses.
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(3.15) I promise not to come.
Clearly these sentences would not be used in the sense of 'EITHER I OBJECT
TO HIS GOING TO THE OPERA/THE ASSUMPTION THAT HE IS AT THE OPERA
TONIGHT...' or 'I PROMISE TO OBJECT TO THE ASSUMPTION THAT I WILL
COME'.
There is also other evidence that he considers the ambiguity to be more than
pragmatic. He gives what he calls three "diagnostics" of the different types of
negation, which are other linguistic phenomena that he argues correlate with
them (the diagnostics will be discussed in chapter 4). One of them is the selection
of -morpheme in languages that have two different ones, which according to
Horn covary with his two categories of negation. But the difference between the
two BUTs is not one of pragmatic ambiguity (which is typically not lexicalised),
so the purported correlation, if it is significant, also indicates that the difference
between the two negations is not merely one of pragmatic ambiguity.
3.3.3 Atlas and Kempson: the Return of the Truth Fun¬
ction
Despite differences in their general theories, Atlas (1977, 1981, 1989) and Kempson
(1986) give relatively similar accounts of natural language negation. In contrast
to Horn, they do not assign any significance to ambiguity in the explanation of
it, but consider most of its uses to be adequately described by the bivalent truth
function. Kempson acknowledges that there is metalinguistic use of negation,
but reserves this description for what could be called "typical" objections to a
linguistic realisation,16 such as objections to e.g. pronunciation. Atlas does not
discuss this type of data, and for him, natural language negation is invariably to
be interpreted as a truth function.
16See chapter 4, section 4.2.3 for a discussion of negation as applying to linguistic realisation.
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The idea, behind these accounts is that if the reason why a negation is used is
tht the information of the sentence in which it occurs is less than accurate with
respect to the world, then the negation can be characterised as truth functional,
and therefore should be. This includes not only the instances of negation that Horn
would consider descriptive, but also those where the negation is presupposition
canceling, or objects to the suitability of e.g. a scalar expression.
As shown in chapter 2, there are many acceptable utterances with negation where
a straightforwardly derived prepositional representation would be contradictory
or inconsistent with the world, if it is taken to correspond to the ordinary truth
function. In order to avoid these problems, prepositional representations of ut¬
terances cannot simply be derived from the sentences, but a more complicated
approach must be adopted.
Atlas describes the process using the concept of sense-generality (as discussed
in section 3.2.3). Only when a sentence is uttered can a representation be con¬
structed. For a sentence such as the one below, this means that "eggs" is sense-
unspecified for 'EGGS ONLY' and 'EGGS (AS A PART)'.
(3.16) John didn't cook eggs, he cooked broccoli and eggs.
If this sentence was uttered, the first occurrence of "eggs" would be interpreted
as ('EGGS ONLY'), as its representation would otherwise be contradictory.
Kempson's relevance based account is similar, except that she makes slightly stron¬
ger claims about the status of the different readings. Certain expressions may have
two possible interpretations in a sentence, one "literal", and one strengthened by
relevance criteria (i.e. required by the context in order to make the sentence con¬
sistent with the context and maximally informative). She only gives one example
to illustrate this, but argues that it generalises to other cases:
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(3.17) Mark didn't have three biscuits, he had four.
The literal meaning of "three" is, according to her, 'AT LEAST THREE', so the lite¬
ral meaning of the first clause is that Mark had less than three biscuits. However,
that is not consistent with the context (he had four), so "three" is strengthened
to mean 'EXACTLY THREE'.
These two accounts shift the burden of explanation from the description of nega¬
tion to the representation of the other expressions used in sentences. The former
is kept relatively simple, in that negation is only considered to have one function,
but is still so specific that it requires a lot of adjustment to the construction of
representations.
3.3.4 Anscombre and Ducrot: Argumentative Properties
The last of the accounts of negation to be examined here is the one by Anscombre
and Ducrot. The discussion of it will however be rather tentative, as they have
not written specifically on negation for some time, while the framework in which
the account is situated has developed considerably. Because of this, it is almost
necessary to look back at how they were first described in order to understand
the motivation for the way they are characterised in Anscombre and Ducrot (1977
and 1983).
They consider negation to have two functions: DESCRIPTIVE and POLEMIC. The
first time a distinction similar to the current one is mentioned is in Ducrot (1973).11
The difference between them is one of function, rather than of meaning (p.123.
my translation):
uDucrot (1972) also discusses two categories of negation, then labelled descriptive and
metalinguistic (hence Horn's terms) which more or less correspond to presupposition preser¬
ving and presupposition canceling negation as described in chapter 2, section 2.2.2. Horn's two
negations are basically modelled on those in Ducrot (1973) rather than on this early account,
but he prefers the term "metalinguistic".
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"we distinguish two types of negation. One polemic negation which
corresponds to a speech act of negation, and appears as a refutation of
a corresponding positive utterance (it is always, in this case, a phrasal
negation). And on the other hand, a descriptive negation, which is an
affirmation of a negative content without reference to an antithetical
affirmation (we can have either phrasal or predicate negation here).'1
The descriptive negation is considered to be semantically equivalent to the bivalent
truth function. The polemic one is characterised as a speech act: it indicates that
some speech act that has been or could be carried out using the same sentence
without the negation in the context would be inappropriate. In Ducrot (1973),
descriptive negation can be used polemically, as long as it is primarily used to
present a fact, and does not have as immediate function to contradict. This is
in contrast with Anscombre and Ducrot (1977), in which a descriptive negation
must make no reference to an earlier assumption at all. But this stipulation still
leaves a grey area of uses which could be considered either polemic (in a weak
sense) or descriptive, such as a negative reply to a yes/no-question, e.g. "Is Pierre
French?".
However, their characterisation of negation is not complete with this, but it is
also considered to have argumentative properties. Interestingly, it is descriptive
negation which receives most attention in this aspect, as opposed to the majority
of the other accounts of negation which tend to assume that the truth function is
sufficient as a description of negation in those cases where it is compatible at all.
Descriptive negation is considered to be subject to two argumentative constraints:
the LAW OF NEGATION and the LAW OF INVERSION (Anscombre and Ducrot
1983). The law of negation states that if an utterance of a sentence S would be
considered an argument for a conclusion C in a particular context, then an ut¬
terance of NEG-S is an argument against C. This is possible since the argument
relation is not defined in terms of factual constraints between situations, but in
terms of the significance of uttering a sentence. If the argument relation corre¬
sponded to a logical relation, e.g. s -A c, then ->c could not be inferred from ->s.
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But the argument relation is about how an actual utterance referring to s, or
-is, would be used. That is, if the purpose of the current conversation is to say
something about c, it is known that s —> c, and one speaker goes to the trouble
of conveying ->s (by saying NEG-S), it is quite easy to accept that the speaker
would be trying to say that c is not likely, although that does not follow logically.
That this should not primarily be viewed as a question of making the addressee
perform certain deductions, in the sense of realising that their reasons to believe
something has been undermined. Rather, it is a case of the addressee accepting
that the conclusion does not obtain on the grounds that the speaker seems to
think that it does not. The law of negation is about taking negative sentences as
evidence for what the speaker thinks, and accept a representation on authority so
to speak, not about taking sentences as input to reasoning.
However, the process is more subtle than this. It is not simply about drawing
attention to certain propositions. Anscombre and Ducrot point out that two
equivalent propositions, one of which is expressed using a negation and the other
one not can have radically different effects. They use the following utterance,
made by a French minister of state, to illustrate this:
(3.18) Les 3/4 des travailleurs touches par des suppressions d'emploi ne
connaitront pas une situation de chomage.
The 3/4 of workers touched by [determiner] suppressions of work [ne¬
gation particle] will-know not a situation of unemployment.
'Three quarters of the workers affected by redundancies will not expe¬
rience unemployment.'
This is presented as an optimistic statement, as an argument for believing that
the politicians are doing fine (at least if unemployment is considered undesirable).
Contrast this with the effect it would have had if the minister had used the
sentence in example 3.19 instead.
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(3.19) Le 1/4 des travailleurs touches par des suppressions d'emploi
connaitront une situation de chomage.
The 1/4 of workers touched by [determiner] suppressions of work will-
know a situation of unemployment.
'One quarter of the workers affected by redundancies will experience
unemployment.'
Although the propositions expressed by the sentences in examples 3.18 and 3.19
have the same truth conditions, they are clearly not equivalent for argumenta¬
tive purposes. The action of negation with respect to argumentative orientation
therefore is more complicated, and does not simply derive from the fact that the
speaker found it relevant to draw attention to the situation. Anscombre and
Ducrot suggest that descriptive negation has the property of reversing the argu¬
mentative orientation of a predication, so that two sentences S and NEG-S' have
the opposite orientation if they have the same predicate and the subjects are of
the same type.
There is one case where the law of negation is not supposed to hold for descriptive
negation, and that is when the phrase it applies to contains a numerical expression.
That is, if one considers a pound to be a cheap price for a cinema ticket, then
both the sentences in example 3.20 would constitute arguments for going to see a
film at that price.
(3.20) a. It costs a pound.
b. It doesn't cost a pound.
In Ducrot (1973), this was just considered to be an exception. In Anscombre and
Ducrot (1983) they claim that they have different argumentative orientation with
respect to some aspect of cinema ticket buying. The idea is that the (b)-sentence
would be used if someone would be likely to assume that it was more expensive
(using their notion of polyphony, see below), so the two sentences would have a
different argumentative orientation for them. However, since they allow the notion
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of argumentative orientation to apply also to potential use of sentences, both (a)
and (b) must be considered to have the same orientation in some cases.18
The law of inversion says that if S and s' can be used as arguments for a conclusion
C and S is stronger than s', then using NEG-s' amounts to making a stronger
argument against C than using NEG-S.19 This is supposed to reflect the different
effects of the sentences in example 3.21 in some suitable context. Consider for
instance a situation where two people are at a lake and one of them asks the
other, who is already in the water, what it is like. Say that the person who is in
the water interprets this as a question about whether the other person should go
for a swim too, and uses a topos which correlates a good swim with the water
having a pleasant temperature.
(3.21) a. It's freezing.
b. It's cold.
c. It's not cold.
d. It's not freezing.
18Thinking of sentences as potential utterances indicates that they consider them to have
an independent meaning. They distance themselves from that assumption in Anscombre and
Ducrot (1986). However, it is necessary to have a notion of potential utterance if one wants
to talk of descriptive negation as reversing the argumentative orientation—this would not be
possible unless it can be determined what argumentative orientation the corresponding sentence
without negation would have in the same context.
19The notion of argumentative strength is not defined in Anscombre and Ducrot (1983).
Moeschler (1989) suggests a definition in terms of sets of conclusions that the argument supports,
e.g. S is stronger than s' if the set of conclusions C supported by S is a superset of the set C
supported by s'. For Anscombre and Ducrot, however, argumentative strength is a linguistic
primitive, which cannot be defined, in that certain expressions are ordered with respect to their
strength without reference to any factual situation (they can be used to modify a reference to a
fact to signal how strong an argument it should be considered, see section 3.4). But references
to different facts used as arguments can also be of different strength, in which case the strength
must depend on the facts rather than on any intrinsic linguistic property.
The formulation of the law of inversion in Anscombre and Ducrot (1983) is actually consider¬
ably stronger than the version I have given here. It says that if S is an argument for c and s'
is an argument for c', and the latter is stronger than the former, then the reverse is true for
the negated sentences with respect to the opposite conclusions. They do not discuss any cases
of where C and c' are different, which is why I have chosen the formulation given here. It is
difficult to conceive of how the argumentative strength of different arguments with respect to
different conclusions could be compared. If one tries, the law does not appear to hold anyway.
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Anscombre and Ducrot argue for expressions such as "cold", "freezing" etc., the
difference between them is not what temperature they indicate, but their argu¬
mentative strength. If "freezing" is used rather than "cold", then the speaker
is trying to make a relatively strong argument against going for a swim. When
these expressions are negated (with a descriptive negation), the ordering of them
is reversed so that "not cold" is a stronger argument for going for a swim than
"not freezing".
It is noteworthy that Anscombre and Ducrot have stated the law of inversion as
an argumentative one. If it were the case that "freezing" implied "cold", and
the negation is truth functional (which they accept that it is), then the negative
phrases would denote different subsets of the temperature scale, with "not cold"
situated in the warmer subset of "not freezing". If the pleasantness of swimming
is linked to the temperature of the water, the law of inversion should not need to
be expressed as a particular argumentative constraint, but would follow from the
truth functional description of the negation and the law of negation. But as noted.
Anscombre and Ducrot (1983) do not consider expressions such as "freezing" and
"cold" to imply each other. They simply have different argumentative strength
(why they chose this approach will be explained in section 3.4), so the law of
inversion is needed.20
Polemic negation is not bound by the law of negation. Ducrot (1973) writes
that it may or may not reverse the argumentative orientation. Anscombre and
Ducrot (1983) have very little to say about it, but they (perhaps unintentionally)
strengthen the earlier description of it to require that it applies to something
which has been explicitly or implicitly referred to, as opposed to covld be referred
to, and insist that it must be followed by a rectification.
The last property that Anscombre and Ducrot assign to negation is that it is
20Even if the arguments in question could be ordered according to some logical rule, the reason
for the effect of negation would be the same as above, i.e. a reversal of the argumentative
strength. But of course the varying argumentative strength might be a consequence of a factual
constraint.
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POLYPHONIC, i.e. if a speaker uses a sentence with a negation, they attribute the
belief that the corresponding sentence without the negation would be appropriate
to some other agent. It does not have to be an actual agent, but can be an
imagined one.21 For some reason, they are quite adamant that this only applies
to descriptive negation.
Finally, there is an important aspect of the characterisation of descriptive negation
that is problematic, and must be mentioned. Although it is defined functionally
(as asserting negative information), it is nevertheless thought of a corresponding
to the truth function of predicate logic. The problem with this is that in the
last chapter of Anscombre and Ducrot (1983), and in particular in Anscombre
and Ducrot (1986), they move away from propositional representations. Instead,
they write that "the meaning of a phrase is the set of topoi whose application
it legitimises in the situation where it is uttered" (1986, p.88), which makes it
appear that their idea of of meaning is akin to a spread of activation in a network.
But it is not obvious how the idea of a truth functional negation translates to this
type of representation.
3.3.5 Comparing Negations
This section evaluates how the three accounts described in sections 3.3.2-3.3.4 fare
with respect to the data discussed here and in chapter 2. The only concern here
will be coverage: whether the categories as such can be justified will be discussed
in chapter 4.
To begin with, they all assume that if a sentence with a negation is appropriately
used, the negation indicates that there is something wrong with the sentence it
occurs in—either that one of its truth conditions fails to obtain, or that there is
some inadequacy with respect to the circumstances of its utterance. This means
21This resembles a formal description of Allwood's notion of expectancy. Some problems with
this was noted in section 3.3.1.
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that none of them is compatible with how negation is used in yes/no-questions.
The are no obvious extensions or changes to them that would remedy this.
They also have individual problems. One of them is related to the way non-truth-
functional negation is accounted for by Horn and by Anscombre and Ducrot. Both
metalinguistic and polemic negation are defined as objections to a previous ut¬
terance. But speakers do not have to object to any feature of a previous statement
to use a negation in such a way that it cannot be straightforwardly accounted for
as truth functional:
(3.22) A: Who do you think will win?
B: David Gibson I suppose.
A: Sarah Phillips will get the ladies' prize.
B: Yeah, you don't expect her to win, you know she will.
B does not refer to any previous assertion that Sarah can be expected to win. An¬
scombre and Ducrot could in principle revert to Ducrot's earlier characterisation
of polemic negation, and claim that it refers to a potential utterance on behalf
of somebody else. But that would miss the point, because this utterance is not
a rejection of someone's assumptions but a comparison of the probability that
David will win with the probability that Sarah will.
It is possible to achieve observational adequacy by weakening ''previous utterance"
to "potential utterance", but while this ensures that the above example is not
ruled out, it is unclear what it achieves from an explanatory point of view. If, for
instance, this description of metalinguistic negation was used in a natural language
generation system, when should the program postulate a potential utterance? And
for that sake, when should an ordinary language user postulate one? A possible
answer would be when there is some reason to believe that some agent could
utter it because they would believe it to convey appropriate information. But
that means redefining it in terms of information, and no longer simply in terms
of linguistic activity, as the speaker who uses it must consider the reasoning that
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lead to the inadequate statement (otherwise they would not know that it could
be made).
It has been pointed out several times that it can be appropriate to use a negation
to indicate that some representation is inaccurate even when the addressee is
not thought to believe that it is. This has typically only been illustrated with
data where either a straightforward propositional representation of the sentence is
consistent with the world, or where there is a third party who could be assumed to
hold the non-optimal belief. One such example (3.9 was discussed in section 3.3.1.
Another one is given in Atlas (1980): a speaker can begin his talk by saying that
"I shall not speak for more than 1^5 minutes"even if he or she is known to give
short talks and there is no convention to speak for longer. Significantly, in both
these examples, a simple representation of the sentence with a logical negation is
accurate with respect to the situation.
But example 3.22 can be used to make an even stronger statement: it includes
a sentence of the type that is typically used to illustrate metalinguistic negation,
as it could seemingly be inferred that if one knows that something will happen,
one also expects it. In this case, however, neither the addressee nor some third
party holds the limited view that Sarah is only expected to win. The negation
contrasts the two states of 'KNOWING' and 'EXPECTING', but does not object to a
(possible) assertion of the validity of one of them with respect to Sarah's winning.
The reason for drawing attention to the contrast is that the rejected description
has been asserted (and accepted) about somebody else. That someone holds a
less than optimal belief is thus not necessary factor for the use of the type ol
negative sentences where the corresponding positive sentence could be considered
true either.
Atlas and Kempson do not have this particular problem, since they do not explain
this type of usage by reference to a previous utterance. However, there are pro¬
blems with their approach as well. If a sentence such as the one in example 3.22
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is used, its representation is considered to contain a maximality marker of some
sort, e.g. 'YOU DON'T JUST EXPECT. . . ' . It is not necessary to realise the maxi¬
mality marker linguistically in this example, as the addressee can be relied 011 to
adopt an appropriate interpretation of 'EXPECT' (which is general with respect to
wether the agent only expects or is in some stronger epistemological state which
implies expecting). But then it must be explained why maximality markers can¬
not always be left out. If their reasoning is right, then a similar interpretation
procedure should be available for B's reply in example 3.23, as 'KNOW' presuma¬
bly is general with respect to whether the agent just knows about the existence of
the object, or if they know because they caused it to exist. But in this example
it would be odd to leave out the maximality marker, as in the B' reply.
(3.23) A: Does the head know about it?
B: He doesn't just know about it, he arranged it.
B': *He doesn't know about it, he arranged it.
Another problem is the choice of possible interpretations as such. Recall that Atlas
suggested that the correct interpretation of the sentence in example 3.16 (repeated
here) is obtained by choosing specific representations of the sense-general word
"eggs", namely 'EGGS ONLY' for the first occurrence, and 'EGGS (AS A PART)'
for the second one.
(3.16) John didn't cook eggs, he cooked broccoli and eggs.
Why is it that these particular specifications are chosen? For instance, the word
"eggs" must also be general with respect to colour, i.e. it could be used both
about brown and white eggs. Sense-generality does not explain why "John did
not cook only eggs only, bat eggs and broccoli" seems to be a more reasonable type
of alternative formulation than "John didn't cook white eggs, he cooked brown
eggs and broccoli". The latter one would be exactly as likely on Atlas's account
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of sense-generality. But it is implausible that anyone would want to make that
type of corresponding without explicitly mentioning both colours, i.e. it is unlikely
that anyone would use the sentence in example 3.24, which is parallel to that in
example 3.16 in order to distinguish between brown and white ones.22
(3.24) ?John didn't cook eggs, he cooked brown eggs.
If it is the maximality that is the relevant feature in example 3.16 (as suggested
by Atlas), then it must be explained why this is such a central feature, and
indeed differs from other types of properties with respect to which a word is
general. Sense-generality is for this reason at best a description of a property of
linguistic labelling. It does not reflect the cognitive procedure which lead to the
interpretation of example 3.16.
Horn, Kempson, and Atlas lack a possibility to describe the sentences in exam¬
ples 3.18 and 3.19 (repeated here) as different.
(3.18) Les 3/4 des travailleurs touches par des suppressions d'emploi ne
connaitront pas une situation de chomage.
The 3/4 of workers touched by [determiner] suppressions of work [ne¬
gation particle] will-know not a situation of unemployment.
'Three quarters of the workers affected by redundancies will not expe¬
rience unemployment.'
(3.19) Le 1/4 des travailleurs touches par des suppressions d'emploi
connaitront une situation de chomage.
The 1/4 of workers touched by [determiner] suppressions of work will-
know a situation of unemployment.
'One quarter of the workers affected by redundancies will experience
unemployment.'
22My intution is that the sentence could only be used if the speaker considered there to be a
quality difference associated with the colours.
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This is inevitable on at least Kempson's account—if two propositions that are
logically equivalent are fed into the deductive mechanism, the agent cannot pos¬
sibly arrive at different conclusions. Horn does not offer any solution. Atlas has
argued elsewhere (Atlas and Levinson, 1981) that sentences that have identical
truth conditions do not need to have identical representations (and can therefore
have distinct meanings), but it still remains to explain why these sentences are so
different.
It should be said however that Anscombre and Ducrot do not explain this either,
they merely attribute to negation the property of causing this effect. But at
least their framework permits the formulation of this type of feature, and treats
them as significant. If the purpose of utterances are to convey propositions, and
negation can be described exhaustively as a truth function, then it is not possible
to distinguish between two utterances which convey what are obviously equivalent
propositions.
Despite the shortcomings of the pragmatic descriptions of negation discussed in
section 3.3.1, they have an important advantage over a truth functional account
of negation, in that they furnish an explanation of why negation should be used
at all. By describing negation as indicating that someone's expectations are not
met, a reason for using it can be inferred—to make sure that no participant has a
substandard representation of the discourse universe. Unless it is accompanied by
a plausible account of why speakers would want to convey negative facts, the truth
functional description of negation is of little use for the generation of utterances,
as well as leading to problems with their interpretation.
This issue is relevant if one wants to use the description of negation in e.g. a
natural language interface to a database. If the purpose of the system is to
supply information to the user, should it also supply negative facts? Are there
any circumstances where negative sentences would be appropriate? When faced
with this question, it is likely that even the most ardent semanticist would find
themselves taking a similar position to that of Givon: negative sentences are useful
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for indicating that the addressee has an erroneous belief. That is, it is in the end
considered to have a rather significant pragmatic component to its description.
This assumption might work acceptably well in a simple system, but it does not
capture the use of negation in general, as shown above. It would be desirable
that a theory of negation be explanatory in the sense that it has some intrinsic
property which explains why speakers use it. On this account, a truth functional
description does not have much to offer.
In contrast, Anscombre's and Ducrot's approach lends itself more easily to these
concerns. Polemic negation could be hypothesised to be used to object to an er¬
roneous belief, while descriptive negation would typically be expected to be used
when a speaker thinks their addressee may draw some unwanted inference—it
could prevent the addressee from using the information referred to by the cor¬
responding positive utterance as input to some reasoning process. Viewed from
this perspective, Anscombre's and Ducrot's polemic negation would correspond
to the usage described by Givon , and their descriptive negation approximately to
Allwood's restriction that the corresponding sentence without a negation must be
expected to be accurate (minus those cases where it is used for explicit objection).
It is, in other words possible to make predictions about when a speaker would want
to use a negation (whether these predictions are accurate, and explanatory, is of
course a different matter).
Anscombre and Ducrot argue that language can be used for argumentation at
an autonomous level, in that some expressions have functions in the discourse
which are not derived from any informational property. Because of this, their
position is radically different from Horn's and Kempson's, who both emphasise
the relation between language and reasoning in a fairly Gricean spirit (it is difficult
to place Atlas with respect to this dimension, as he is less specific about how the
interpretations are arrived at). Relevance theory and Radical Pragmatics are
closer to Argumentation theory than the traditional semantic approach is in some
aspects, but they are still committed to sentences as corresponding to factual
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descriptions.
With Relevance theory and Radical Pragmatics somewhere between the other two.
it should come as a surprise that when it comes to negation, Anscombre's and
Ducrot's account is closer to Horn's than to Atlas' and Kempson's (ignoring the
argumentative properties for the moment). The reason for this, apart from the
fact that Horn modelled his account on Ducrot's, is that the non-argumentative
properties that Anscombre and Ducrot attribute to negation were specified a long
time ago, when they were assigning much more importance to factual constraints.
In many ways, this part of the specification has outlived itself, and comes very close
to being inconsistent with how Argumentation Theory is described in Anscombre
and Ducrot (1986), as pointed out in the end of the previous section.
It is hardly necessary for them to distinguish between two types of negation any¬
more. Given that they do not consider it utterances to be interpreted as (sets of)
propositions, there is no reason to single out a negation whose main characteristic
is that it corresponds to a truth function. As for the functional definitions of the
two, Argumentation theory does not use any features which depend on whether
the utterance is used as an objection or not.23 The only significant property of the
negations that is used is their, effect on the argumentative orientation of the sen¬
tence. But as noted previously, the definition of descriptive negation as reversing
the argumentative orientation hinges on the possibility of considering ^'potential
utterances", which is not really consistent with their general approach. Moreover,
as suggested by example 3.22, descriptive negation (which is defined as not ob¬
jecting) does not always reverse argumentative orientation, and polemic negation
may either reverse or preserve it, so it would be legitimate to ask whether there
is any reason to distinguish the two. The argumentative orientation of utterances
with negation could depend on something else.
23They probably used to consider this to be a property of the two BUTs though, see chapter
4.
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3.4 Scalar Expressions—A Case Study
3.4.1 The Problem
Sometimes it seems natural to think of a set of linguistic expressions as being
ordered. One such set of expressions are "freezing", "cold" and "fresh". They
relate to a certain quality (temperature), and if "freezing" is used about some
object, it suggests that the object has more of that quality than it would have
if "cold" had been used. Such words are often called scalar expressions, as they
appear to denote positions on a scale. A few examples are given in example 3.25,
together with some expressions that could belong to the relevant set.
(3.25) a. The water is cold.
b. Pat has three children.
c. It's probable.
d. Some students submit
their PhDs in time.
e. She is pleased.
f. He is unhappy.
<fresh,cold,freezing>





How to interpret scalar expressions in natural language sentences is one of the
more frequently debated issues in pragmatics. The reason for this is that there
appears to be a discrepancy between the literal meaning of the sentence, and what
it is usually taken to mean when it is used. If uttering a sentence is equivalent to
conveying that the proposition it refers to is true, then a sentence like "Pat has
three children" would be correctly used if the number of children belonging to Pat
is at least three.24 However, it seems that in the type of contexts where such a
24 At least this is the common position in the literature on the topic. There are however
several ways of representing such sentences. For instance, if it is treated as a statement about
the cardinality of the set of children belonging to Pat, then it would not be true if she in fact
had four. In mathematical text, it is common to use the numbers on t.heir own as doing this,
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sentence would be used, it would be natural to interpret it as a statement that
Pat has exactly three children.
The same holds for the other examples: assuming that it is possible to specify
exactly what "cold" means, an utterance of example 3.25(a) would entitle the
addressee to assume that the water was not such that it could be called "freezing",
but just cold. In other words, there is a discrepancy between the chosen primary
meaning and the preferred interpretation.
As such, scalar expressions are not of primary interest to this thesis. However,
the way they have been accounted for by some of the proponents of the different
theories of negation examined in section 3.3 highlights and may clarify the dif¬
ferences between their approaches to describing language. Horn, Kempson and
Anscombre and Ducrot all propose quite different accounts of scalar expressions,
and their interaction with negation. The discussion of their accounts has so far
been quite terse, and it is hoped that by using this case study as an illustration,
the difference between them can be more easily appreciated.
3.4.2 Scalar Expressions and Negation
Scalar expressions pose an interesting challenge to a truth functional description
of negation. It was noted above that the interpretation of the sentence in exam¬
ple 3.25(b) is often more specific than its truth conditions. For the corresponding
sentence with a negation however, the default interpretation and its truth condi¬
tions seem to coincide, i.e. the sentence is interpreted as meaning that Pat has
less than three children.
i.e. "there are three elements which fulfil this condition" does not mean 'there are at least
three elements which fulfil this condition'. However, it. will be assumed for the sake
of the argument that the sentence "Pat has three children" has a prepositional representation
which is true when Pat has at least three children, as this is the representation that linguists
have chosen.
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(3.26) Pat doesn't have three children.
However, that is not the only possible interpretation of that sentence. If it was
followed by an assertion that Pat has more than three children, that interpretation
obviously is not available.
(3.27) Pat doesn't have three children, she has four.
In this case, the meaning is quite different from the truth conditions normally
associated with the sentence. When interpreting an utterance of this type, one
may first be lead down the garden path, and assume a different representation
than the speaker intended. But after the utterance there is no question of what
the speaker meant, and the addressee is not left with the impression that the spea¬
ker said something contradictory. Given this, it seems that one of the following
hypotheses about the representation of sentences must be abandoned.
H I. "Not" corresponds uniformly to the bivalent negation of predicate calculus.
H II. A set of expressions which can be taken to denote positions on the same
scale can be ordered by implication.25
H III. The meaning of natural language sentences can be derived from the linguistic
form.
The three accounts which will be discussed here differ in which hypotheses they
reject: for Horn (1989) it is the first one, for Kempson (1986) the second and the
third, and for Anscombre and Ducrot, all of them.
2oIn fact, it is enougli that some scales have this property, since it suffices that negation can
apply to a logically ordered scale in the way it does in example 3.27 for it to be non-truth-
functional.
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3.4.3 Scalar Implicature: Reasoning with the
Expressions
According to Horn (1989), scalar expressions should be interpreted as assigning a
"lower bound"26 to how much of a certain quality, such as coldness, applies to an
object. He writes about numbers that (1989, p. 214):
Cardinals like 3 are lower-bounded by their literal or conventional
meaning; hence [Pat has three children] means (is true iff) Pat has at
least three children.
What he means by this is that by saying "the water is cold", one has effectively
only conveyed that it is at least cold (assuming that what one conveys is what
one means, which, to judge from the quote, Horn considers to be equivalent to
the truth conditions of the sentence. But when an addressee hears the sentence,
they are usually permitted to infer that the speaker has communicated an upper
limit of the quality as well, so that the water is in fact not any colder than what
could be described as exactly "cold", i.e. "cold" applies but "freezing" does not.
Horn favours a Gricean account of the process by which this happens (Grice,
1975). Essentially, the "exactly" reading is arrived at by appealing to some impe¬
ratives governing communication which stipulate that speakers should make their
contributions as informative as required by the context, and that they should only
convey information which they believe to be true. A well known example of such
rules are Grice's (1975) conversational maxims, the relevant ones being the maxim
of quantity (first submaxim), and the maxim of quality:2'
The Maxim of Quantity
26It is unfortunate to use "lower bound" in this sense, as it is usually taken to mean that no
entity less than the lower bound can be included in a set. For Horn however, if "freezing" has
been used about an object, then "cold" also applies.
2'Horn uses his own version of these.
84
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the cur¬
rent purposes of the exchange).
The Maxim of Quality: try to make your contribution one that is
true.
1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack evidence.
Horn proposes that while a scalar expression e means 'AT LEAST E', 'EXACTLY
E' can be derived using conversational implicatures,28 which arise as a result of
assuming that other agents obey the maxims because they are being cooperative.
The 'EXACTLY THREE' reading of example 3.25(b) ( "Pat has three children') is
arrived at by reasoning in approximately the following steps:
i. It would have been possible to make a stronger statement (i.e. "Pat has four
children").
ii. If the speaker had believed that it is true that Pat has four children and
that it is in the addressee's interest to know that, they would have used that
sentence.
iii. For all the speaker knows, Pat does not have more than three kids.
He argues that his account generalises to "all weak scalar operators, including
cardinal numbers and evaluative or gradable adjectives such as good' (p.213).
Although the maxims appear to refer only to interactive behaviour (i.e. how
the speaker's linguistic behaviour should be from the perspective of being co¬
operative), there are also references to how language means—the account of scalar-
expressions depends on there being some kind of ordering of them. This is because
of the notion of "informativeness" in the maxim of quantity: it must be possible
28Actually, he writes (p. '212) "context-dependent, generalised conversational implicature"
which is a contradiction. Generalised conversational implicatures are by definition not context
dependent. Jay Atlas (personal communication) suggest that he meant generalised conversatio¬
nal implicature despite the reference to context.
to order the scalar expressions according to how informative they are. On Horn's
account, an expression is more informative than another if it implies it.
For some types of scalar expressions it is quite easy to accept such an order, but
for others it is less obvious. Some expressions that exhibit the type of behaviour
associated with scales cannot be associated with some universally applicable scale
available, as illustrated by the sentence below:
(3.28) Most photographers were inarticulate if not subhuman.
It is not generally the case that "subhuman" and "inarticulate" are thought of
as positions on the same scale, or even on a scale at all. Horn (1989) suggests
that they can however be ordered that way with respect to a certain context (this
approach was originally suggested by Fauconnier (1975), who labels such local
orders pragmatic scales). The expressions are considered to imply each other
given the appropriate background constraints.
It remains now to explain the behaviour of scalar expressions with negation. The
issue is how to obtain for instance the two different readings 'PAT HAS LESS
THAN THREE CHILDREN' and 'THE NUMBER OF Pat's CHILDREN IS NOT THREE'
respectively for the two examples below.
(3.26) Pat doesn't have three children.
(3.27) Pat doesn't have three children, she has four.
Horn's solution is to reject the hypothesis that negation unambiguously corre¬
sponds to the bivalent truth function. That means that the negation in the for¬
mer example is interpreted as a truth function, and hence "not three " as meaning
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'NOT AT LEAST THREE' (= less than three).29 The first clause of the sentence in
example 3.27 may first be interpreted in the same way, but when this is found to
be inconsistent with the second clause, the negation is reinterpreted as a metalin¬
guistic negation. This means that it is considered to be an objection to a previous
utterance, so the first clause does not have an ordinary semantic representation.
Its representation must contain a metalinguistic operator and something which
denotes an utterance.
3.4.4 Relevance: Reasoning with the Context
For Kempson, the intuition that negation corresponds to the bivalent truth fun¬
ction is so strong that she prefers to reject another one of the three hypotheses
listed on page 83. She agrees with Horn that a different analysis of negation is
needed for the cases where it appears to apply to e.g. the pronunciation of a word,
but not for example such as 3.27. She writes (1986, p.88):
I conclude that though a metalinguistic analysis is available for these
paradoxical negation cases, the problems they present cannot be pus¬
hed aside by only providing a metalinguistic analysis; they can, and
naturally are interpreted as straightforward cases of descriptive nega¬
tion.
Instead, she rejects the hypothesis that natural language sentences have repre¬
sentations that can be derived from their linguistic form (H III above). She also
partially rejects H II, that scalar expressions can be ordered. The expressions de¬
note positions on a scale, and those positions can be ordered universally or locally,
but the expressions as such do not imply each other.
29He does not explain exactly why "three" does not get interpreted as 'exactly three' in
this example. The latter is a stronger statement, but there is no reason why one should prefer
a stronger interpretation per se, as the maxim of quantity is not defined in terms of maximal
strength, but in terms of strength relative to the context. It could be argued that the addressee
should select the 'less than three' interpretation because that is stronger than 'not exactly
three', but the maxims could equally well used to argue the opposite point ("if the speaker
had meant the stronger statement, he or she would have used it").
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According to her, a scalar expression e denoting the quantity e receives either
of two readings, which are 'at least e' and 'exactly e\ She exemplifies the
process of how these readings are assigned using the following example:
(3.29) A: How many children do you have?
B: I have two children.
If the context of these utterances is one in which B wants to claim a state benefit,
which happens to be a fixed amount for all families which have two or more
children, then the 'at least two' reading will be selected. This is because all
the "interesting" inferences that can drawn from the number of children that B
has can be drawn from this weak statement. It wouldn't matter if B had four or
five children, as long as there are definitely two of them. If, on the other hand, the
dialogue was uttered among friends, while talking about families in general, the
"exactly two' reading should be selected. Kempson explains this by arguing
that the information that one can infer about someone's family life depends on
the number of children they have. If A is not allowed to assume that B has exactly
two children, A cannot infer enough of B's domestic situation for the utterance to
be informative.
Despite insisting earlier that scalar expressions are not ambiguous between two
readings, and that neither interpretation should be chosen at the decoding stage,
Kempson considers them to have different status. The "at least" reading is the
"lexically stipulated meaning", whereas the "exactly" reading is the one obtained
by applying relevance criteria (1986, p. 97). From this it appears that the two
readings are after all not alternatives, but that just as in Horn's account, the
"at least" reading is the actual meaning of scalar predicates, which is potentially
restricted by the context.
The reference to the "at least" interpretation as being more basic is made in
relation to the explanation of the interaction of scalar predicates with negation.
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The idea that the "exactly" reading is more difficult to arrive at is used to explain
why sentences such as the one in example 3.26 is usually interpreted as meaning
"LESS THAN THREE CHILDREN'. Kempson writes (1986, p. 97):
The explanation of why, in negative sentences, the 'at least' reading is
normally predominant follows directly from the principle of relevance.
In order to be able to interpret an utterance of 'Mark didn't eat three
biscuits' as compatible with 'Mark ate three biscuits' [sic] one has to
be able to process both the linguistic meaning of the sentence and its
narrowed "exactly 3' interpretation, simultaneously, and yet separately,
as it were, ignoring the lexically stipulated meaning in favour of the
relevance restricted one. Other things being equal then, this predicts
that a negative sentence containing a numeral [sic] construed as within
the scope of the negative element will be interpreted as 'at least n".
If scalar expressions have a conventional meaning which can be restricted, then
it makes sense to claim that the "at least" reading is more common, because the
cognitive cost (as measured in "increased processing complication") of picking
that one will be lower. This is because the agent does not need to carry out the
processing that leads to the relevance restricted reading. However, this predicts
that the more common reading of the corresponding sentence without the negation
is the more expensive one.30
3.4.5 Argumentative Scales: Determining the Reasoning
Anscombre's and Ducrot's (1983) account of scalar expressions is quite different
from the previous two, in that they consider the interpretations of sentences that
contain them to derive from argumentative properties instead of informational
ones. Rather than using scales which are ordered by logical properties of the re¬
levant concepts, they consider the expressions to be ordered for communicative
30A similar contradiction arises with the use of Grice's maxims—it does not seem possible to
formulate any rules of this type which will generate the right interpretation for both sentences
with and without negation. This was noted e.g. by Atlas and Levinson (1981).
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purposes. That is, the most, and sometimes only, significant property of many
expressions which appear to be ordered is that they have different argumentative
strength with respect to a quality. This means that the perceived order of e.g.
<fresh,cold,freezing> reflects the impact of the expressions when used in argu¬
mentation, rather than denoting a position on a scale corresponding to increasing
or decreasing quantities of some external quality. The claim is not that such 01-
derings do not have any relation to external properties, only that they are not
isomorphic to one. For instance, the expressions <fresh,cold,freezing> are used to
make arguments of various strength with respect to coldness, not to correspond
to decreasing temperatures.
It might seem that the distinction between argumentative ordering and logical
ordering is unnecessary. Horn (1989) dismisses argumentative strength as being
equivalent to an external, implication based ordering, since he considers that an ar¬
gumentative ordering always must depend on an external, implication-based one.
However, the distinction is non-trivial, and there are some advantages of adopting
Anscombre's and Ducrot's account when it comes to explaining the behaviour of
certain expressions.
One set of expressions that are often thought of as being of the same type and
related by implication are <permitted,compulsory>. If the sentence below is
uttered about an action, one tends to assume that it is forbidden.
(3.30) It is not permitted.
This could be explained logically, if it is assumed that for all actions, any agent
stands in either of three relations to them: either they must perform it, they must
not, or they have a choice. Then if 'COMPULSORY' implies 'PERMITTED-, denying
that something is 'PERMITTED' also excludes that any predicate which implies it
could apply.31 Hence the sentence in example 3.30 excludes the possibilities that
31I will try to adhere as strictly as I can to distinguishing between expressions (e.g. "permit-
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the agent has a choice whether to perform the action or must do it, and this is
why an utterance of the sentence typically would be interpreted as suggesting that
the action is forbidden.
Anscombre and Ducrot give a different explanation. They argue that by predi¬
cating about an action that it is "permitted" or "compulsoryone is typically
making an argument for performing it.32 The latter expression is stronger than
the former, so with a descriptive negation (it must be assumed to be descriptive
in the absence of an utterance that it could be considered to object to) the sen¬
tence will count as a strong argument against performing the action (by the law
of inversion).33
This is only a comparative judgement, but presumably, by making the same as¬
sumption as for the logical explanation above (that the agent must, mustn't, or
has a choice whether to perform the action), the effect of using "not permitted"
in a discourse can be similar to that of using "forbidden". That is, the exclusion
of the agent having a choice whether to perform the action is made by the actual
assertion; and the exclusion of the agent having to perform the action is achie¬
ved by assuming that the negation is descriptive, finding the relevant topoi, and
applying the law of inversion. The equating of that expression with an assertion
that the action is forbidden must however be done by reference to the statuses of
performing the action as such.
ted") from representations of words ('PERMITTED') in the discussion in this section. This is
because of the fact that neither Kempson, nor Anscombre and Ducrot consider there to be a
direct correspondence between the two. For Horn this does not matter; if two concepts imply
each other, the corresponding words do as well.
32 To be more precise, the words can be used in this sense given the right topoi. Without
access to a particular context, a standard, or minimal context is used, in which people do what
is compulsory. In a more particular context, for instance talking about Anne, who likes to break
rules, the observation that something is compulsory could be an argument for believing that she
avoids doing it. However, without access to such a context, one tends to assume a general one.
in which people are law abiding. The semantically defined scales would obviously have to be
sensitive to exceptions like this too.
33Note that for Anscombre and Ducrot this is not a property of reasoning with the predicates,
but a property of using the expressions. It is not a result of "not permitted" undermining the
reasons to perform the action, but a general property of negating an expression, captured by
the law of inversion.
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Which one of the approaches that is chosen does not seem to matter in this case,
but consider the following example:
(3.31) It is not optional.
"Optional" and "permitted" seem to denote similar states of affairs (where the
agent has a choice as to whether to perform an action or not). If something is
'OPTIONAL', it should be 'PERMITTED' too. Despite this, the sentence in ex¬
ample 3.31 tends to be interpreted differently from the one in example 3.30—it
suggests that the action is compulsory. If this is to be explained logically, in the
same way as the sentence in example 3.30, then 'FORBIDDEN' must imply "OPTIO¬
NAL-. But this is counterintuitive, in particular since it means that 'FORBIDDEN
would imply 'PERMITTED' too.
By characterising <optional, forbidden> as an argumentative scale instead, the
default interpretation can be accounted for. While <permitted,compulsorv> are
typically predicated of actions as an argument for performing them, these two
tend to be used against performing them. This can be seen by considering the
combinations in example 3.32, where the status of the action of giving money is
presented as being in opposition with what someone actually did.34
(3.32) a. ?Although giving money was permitted, she did.
b. Although giving money was permitted, she didn't.
c. ?Although giving money was compulsory, she did.
d. Although giving money was compulsory, she didn't.
e. Although giving money was optional, she did.
f. ?Although giving money was optional, she didn't.
34 "x although y" indicates that "y" is an argument against "x". Note that some of the examples
which are preceded by a ? would be acceptable given a different topos in a different context
(such as the one mentioned in footnote 32).
g. Although giving money was forbidden, she did.
h. ?Although giving money was forbidden, she didn't.
Presenting the fact that an action is "permitted" or "compulsory" as an argument
against performing it makes for odd utterances (given a context where people
are assumed to comply with regulations). The corresponding sentences using
the expressions "optional" or "forbidden" are however quite natural. Anscombre
and Ducrot argue that although it would be absurd to claim that "forbidden"
implies "optional" (or that their representations do), they support the same type of
conclusions (have the same argumentative orientation), and "forbidden" is stronger
than "optional". The negation in example 3.31, just as in example 3.30, reverses
the orientation, and hence "not optional" is interpreted as a strong argument for
performing the action.
Anscombre and Ducrot do not discuss examples such as "Pat has three children"
above, but a plausible account of it in Argumentation theory would be to as¬
sume that agents will make as strong arguments as possible (while ideally being
truthful), with respect to the topos used in the context.
As for the interaction between scalar expressions and negation, their account is
less convincing. Similarly to Horn, they propose that this is a different type of
negation, and that speakers only use it when they are objecting to a previous
utterance. But there is no need to do this, as using a descriptive negation could
not lead to a factual contradiction anyway, by their assumption that linguistic
expressions do not imply one another. If the negation were descriptive, there
would obviously be a clash in argumentative orientation, but that is only by their
stipulation that the two negations are different. As pointed out in section 3.3.5.
that claim is not supported by data.
The consequence of their approach is that the negation used in example 3.26 is
conceptually different from the one used in example 3.27, despite the only "real"
difference being the argumentative orientation. The law of inversion obviously
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does not apply in example 3.27, but it seems drastic to solve this by redefining
the negation pragmatically. A more plausible approach would be to generalise the
description of negation and reformulate the law.
3.4.6 Summary
Horn and Kempson consider sentences with scalar expressions to have two different
interpretations: one in which the expression is taken to have an "at least" reading
and one in which it has an "exactly" reading. They both treat scalar expressions
as if the problem is whether the "exactly" reading should apply or not. The "at
least" reading is assumed by both of them to be more primary than the other one.
Why, if one is allowed to infer the "exactly" reading from all the sentences in
example 3.25, is this not considered to be their meaning? To someone who is not
a linguist or a logician this must seem odd—it would be more natural to maintain
that the "exactly" reading is the primary one, and that the "at least" one is
permitted in retrospect, if it should turn out that the water is freezing or Pat has
four kids. But the problem with considering the "exactly" reading primary is that
the following sentences would be contradictory.
(3.33) a. The water is cold, in fact freezing.
b. Pat has three children, in fact four.
c. She's pleased with her job offer. In fact absolutely thrilled.
They are not inconsistent on the "at least" reading, so this is a reason to prefer it.
However, adopting the "at least" reading as primary can cause exactly the same
type of problems as the adoption of the "exactly" reading would for the examples
above. Consider the following example:
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(3.34) Morten wants to run a marathon in three hours.
This sentence should clearly be interpreted as Morten aiming for a time less than
three hours. It is not possible to attribute this reversal of the order to any se¬
mantic feature of the sentence. The only candidate for causing this would be the
preposition "in", which would then be assumed to mean 'LESS THAN'.35 But this
position is not tenable either, as illustrated by the following sentence:
(3.35) Doing ten miles in more than thirty minutes is pretty bad.
This sentence docs not mean that only exactly thirty minutes is a bad time, but
rather that any time from thirty minutes upwards is, so "in" cannot mean 'LESS
THAN'. The interpretation of the sentence in example 3.34 cannot be attributed
to the linguistic realisation of the sentence, but it is obtained from using world
knowledge about how time is important in fixed distance sporting events.
Another example of why it would be a disadvantage to consider the "at least"
reading primary is that some numbers can be used in yet another sense:
(3.36) Lisa has twenty rabbits.
References to certain numbers "n" are often used to mean 'APPROXIMATELY N\
This sentence could be used to say that Lisa has a lot of rabbits, somewhere
around '20, which is so many that one more or less does not matter. The sentence
could be used to make an acceptable utterance even if Lisa only has 19 rabbits.
These examples show that there are more than two possible interpretations of at
least numerical modifiers. None of these can be considered more basic ('literal')
35For this to work, the default reading of a scalar expression e has to be 'e\ rather than 'at
least e', or else the combination "in e hours" could only mean 'exactly e hours'. I am not
sure why Kempson chose to call it the "at least" reading.
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than the others, as it is not possible to define all the readings in terms of a single
one of them.
The problem with an approach such as Horn's is that although it takes context
into account when there is no obvious order of the descriptions, cases where there
seem to be default interpretations are considered to derive from reasoning with the
expressions as such exclusively. But this means that e.g. "three" in example 3.34
and "Pat has three children" will be interpreted in the same way, which is obviously
not appropriate. The context cannot be ignored.
The Relevance account is more flexible, since the specific interpretations are attri¬
buted to context rather than to the expressions (at least in principle—in practice
Kempson's account is quite similar to Horn's). It would however be necessary to
permit other interpretations, apart from the 'AT LEAST' and 'EXACTLY' ones.
However, both these accounts treat scalar expressions as if their use can be de¬
scribed in terms of entailments or contextually motivated implications. It was
demonstrated in section 3.4.5 that this cannot explain the seemingly scalar beha¬
viour of expressions such as '*forbidden' and "optional". The failure of the data
based approaches for these expressions suggest that argumentative properties may
indeed be cause of our intuitions that some expressions can be ordered.
3.5 Summary
This chapter has reviewed some different approaches to describing natural lan¬
guage, in terms of the general assumptions that are made about communication,
and at a more specific level, how they account for negation, and the use and in¬
terpretation of scalar expressions. A distinction was made between data oriented
approaches and manipulation based ones. The former assume that the function
of language in communication is to refer to factual descriptions, which speakers
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convey to addressees, whereas the latter views the function of language as a tool
for making the addressee process information in a certain way.
Although this is perhaps not a intrinsic feature of data oriented approaches, the
ones discussed here all attribute a great deal of specificity to the meaning of
sentences when they are uttered. This is because uttering a sentence is seen as
equivalent to conveying a proposition which has a truth value. This makes it
necessary to attribute very detailed specifications to what is in principle vague
expressions.
Both Radical Pragmatics and Relevance theory acknowledge that sentences are
general, and only acquire a specific interpretation when they are used. It would be
natural to assume that the sentences remained general even when they are used,
and that the specific interpretation only is a property of the agent's representation
of the world. But because certain expressions, such as negation, are considered
to have a logical function in the language, it is necessary that the rest of the
sentences (what negation applies to) correspond to a logical form as well. The
consequence of this is that an addressee's processing of a sentence is effectively
considered to be fed back into it.
As opposed to the data oriented accounts, Argumentation theory does not view
communication as a matter of conveying propositions. Instead, utterances are
used to constrain the addressee's representation. Like Relevance theory and Ra¬
dical Pragmatics, the meaning of a sentence depends on the context where it is
interpreted. However, they make the additional claim that certain expressions
of language directly influence which type of context should be chosen, without
requiring the addressee to select the particular interpretation by reasoning. Ar¬
gumentation is about indicating that there is a reasoning.
Argumentation theory has a lot to offer, for instance the possibility of viewing
what is obviously acceptable discourse as coherent although the facts that the
sentences correspond to are incompatible. In can also help explain the function
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of connectives. What it did not offer was a convincing account of negation. It
is however possible to see how a different characterisation could be given using a




Negation and its Linguistic
Environment
4.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates how negation interacts with other linguistic factors.
Firstly, it will be considered whether there is any motivation for postulating that
negation has two different functions from the perspective of requirements on the
linguistic environment. If it could be shown that there are two different sets of
constraints imposed by "not", then that could support a claim that negation has
two distinct functions.
Secondly, even if functional ambiguity cannot be supported, constraints on the
linguistic environment are interesting with respect to the description of negation as
such, and the rest of the chapter will examine various relevant correlations. Some
of the relevant phenomena have already been discussed in relation to negation,
such as its interaction with "but" (Anscombre and Ducrot, 1977; Horn. 1989).
Other interesting data have not been widely taken into account. The goal of
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analysing these constraints is to specify a set of requirements on a representational
framework such that a characterisation of negation can be given.
4.2 A Well Founded Split?
4.2.1 Does Negation Have More Than One Function?
If it is accepted that natural language negation is ambiguous (pragmatically or
otherwise), the two core functions are usually taken to be the reversal of truth
values and the indication of erroneous linguistic realisation. But where the precise
boundary between the functions is drawn varies between different accounts. For
instance, both Horn (1989) and Kempson (1986) acknowledge a truth functional
and a metalinguistic use of negation but they differ on which category some of
the data belongs to. Horn distinguishes between truth functional and non-truth-
functional use of negation, which means that a distinction is made between senten¬
ces in which negated information is incompatible and sentences in which negated
information is non-optimal. Kempson prefers to draw the line between negation
which applies to information, and negation that applies to language, i.e. as long
as it is the information and not the language that is non-optimal, there should
be no metalinguistic interpretation of the negation. Horn cites various linguistic
evidence for his distinction, while Kempson relies on the difference between infor¬
mation and language at the representational level. This section examines whether
their positions are justified.
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4.2.2 Incompatibility vs Non-Optimality
4.2.2.1 Preamble
It was shown in chapter 2 that natural language negation can be used to indicate
a wide range of inaccuracies of sentences. Ignoring for the time being those in¬
accuracies that derive from the linguistic realisation, there are at least two cases
where some information can be negated. It may be that the information is in¬
compatible with the speaker's representation of the discourse universe (illustrated
by example 4.1), or that it is not the optimal characterisation of the situation in
question (example 4.2).
(4.1) A: I thought Megan was back in New Zealand.
B: She's not. I saw her in Negociants the other day.
(4.2) Graeme Obree comments on his choice of gears for a hilly cycle race:
I wasn't a bit overgeared, it was a big bit.
Horn (1989), as well as Anscombre and Ducrot (1977, 1983), considers this distin¬
ction relevant for the description of negation: the "not" in the former example
is different from that in the latter. This section considers whether there is any
linguistic evidence in support of this distinction.
A couple of points will need clarifying prior to commencing this discussion. Firstly,
Horn sometimes suggests that the difference between the two negations is one of
pragmatic ambiguity. Now, if this were the case, then an examination of possible
differences in linguistic environments would be of little use, as the data that
has been cited as instances of pragmatic ambiguity typically does not exhibit
distinct linguistic characteristics correlated with the two uses. It is the concept
of pragmatic ambiguity as such that would need defending. As for Horn's two
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negations, they are not analogously defined, and if they have different meanings
and exhibit different linguistic behaviour, then it is an ambiguity of some other
type. This, and similar points have been made in several replies to Horn (1985),
e.g. by Burton-Roberts (1989).
Horn primarily offers his metalinguistic negation as an account of such uses of
negation that are not compatible with the truth functional description. He argues
that the division is justified, on the grounds that this type of negation has distinct
requirements on the linguistic context. For the purpose of evaluating this claim,
it will be assumed that the two functions are both defined at the same level, as
compatible and incompatible with the truth function respectively. This is true to
Horn's spirit, if not exactly to his words.
4.2.2.2 Is Non-Optimality Linguistically Marked?
Since erroneous information is certainly non-optimal, it could be argued that a
negation which indicates incompatibility is a special case of negation which indi¬
cates non-optimality. If compatibility with the bivalent truth function is the only
criterion of definition, then it would be necessary to find some independent justi¬
fication for considering incompatibility negation a separate category, rather than
representing a typical or default interpretation. Identifying a. special incompatibi¬
lity negation by appealing to an intuition that some negation is truth functional,
i.e. indicates incompatibility only, will not do, since that "intuition'" in all like¬
lihood is a learned one—an ordinary language user does not think of linguistic
expressions in terms of truth values.
As noted above, Horn does not use compatibility with the truth function in both
his descriptions, but the distinction he makes is analogous. He argues that it is
supported by an observation that when speakers use "not'' metalinguistically, this
must be signaled by immediately providing an alternative statement (and using a
special intonation). This claim is put forward, perhaps with even more insistence.
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by Anscombre and Ducrot (1986). What this means is that for the negation in
example 4.2 to be interpreted as indicating that Obree did not have low enough
gears, it was necessary that he added that he was very much overgeared, and he
also had to use contrastive intonation on the first occurrence of "bit".
Horn suggests that this requirement indicates that such uses of negation are dif¬
ferent from "ordinary truth functional negation", and that moreover, it shows
that negation indicating non-optimality is of the same type as a negation used to
object to an erroneous linguistic realisation, since the same constraint holds for
such uses. For instance, the speaker who corrects the choice of gender for viande
must add a sentence containing the correct gender afterwards:
(4.3) Non, je n'ai pas 'cou-pay luh vee-and', j'ai coupe la viande.
No, I not have not cut the{masculine} meat, I have cut thejfeminine}
meat.
'No, I haven't cut the{masculine} meat, I've cut thejfeminine}
meat.'
For Horn, as well as for Anscombre and Ducrot, a rectifying sentence is necessary
in order for the addressee to be able to reinterpret the negation as metalinguistic.
Horn writes (1989, p.374), with respect to uses of negation that are "irreducible
to the ordinary truth functional operator" (e.g. objections to scalar implicature.
lexical choice, and linguistic realisation) that for sentences containing them.
a felicitous utterance involves contrastive intonation [and it must be]
followed by a continuation in which the offending item is replaced by
the correct item in the appropriate lexical, morphological and phonetic
garb—a RECTIFICATION to borrow the label of Anscombre and Ducrot
(1977).
Anscombre and Ducrot, as mentioned above, insist that this is always necessary
for a metalinguistic negation, but Horn allows for some exceptions. He suggests
later, on p.403, that
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the rectification might not occur overtly, in which case the 'incomple¬
teness' of what I am calling the metalinguistic understanding of not
will still be 'made explicit through intonation'.
It is not clear whether this passage refers to such instances of metalinguistic
negation where the negation can in principle be interpreted as truth functional,
or to any instance, since he otherwise suggests quite strongly that a rectification
is needed. If the rectification can be left out, the 'requirement' for one can hardly
be considered a distinctive feature of metalinguistic negation.
A relevant question to ask here is who it is that needs the rectifying sentence.
Is it the addressee of the utterance, whose general interpretative activities are
performed with reference to a context and background knowledge, or is it the
analyst, who constructs sentences and pretends to be interpreting them without?
It is virtually impossible to avoid using world knowledge when interpreting sen¬
tences, even if they are considered without reference to a particular context. For
instance, one tends to prefer to interpret the first of the two sentences in exam¬
ple 4.4 as if the person referred to as ''her'' is seen through the binoculars, and
the second one as if she is carrying a gun.
(4.4) a. I saw her with my binoculars,
b. I saw her with a gun.
This happens despite no context being given beforehand, and there is no syntactic
justification for assuming that the preposition phrase modifies a different constitu¬
ent in these two cases. That is, in interpreting the sentences, contexts are selected
using knowledge about the objects referred to. The contextualisation process can¬
not be switched off—there is no such thing as a null context. The examples above
with the limited information they provide illustrate that even for such restric¬
ted examples, it is knowledge that determines the interpretation, rather than the
linguistic form.
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Given this, it is quite conceivable that addressees are able to select a non-truth
functional interpretation of a negation without the speaker having to provide any
linguistic clues, as long as they use a context in which that interpretation is the
one which makes sense. The interpretation of a non-optimality negation could be
achieved by accommodating the information into a representation, just as that of
an incompatibility negation would be interpreted.
What Horn proposes is, however, that this is not the case: in order to recognise a
metalinguistic negation, agents do not use their representations, but rely on the
recognition of certain linguistic clues. In order to use this linguistic markedness as
an argument for considering metalinguistic negation different from descriptive, it
would be necessary to show that the former is always marked this way, while the
latter never is. But as it happens, contrastive intonation, and rectifications is by
no means restricted to cases where the information that the negation applies to is
non-optimal without being incompatible. This is illustrated by examples 4.5, 4.6
and 4.7.
(4.5) A: Tim behaves so strangely you start wondering if he's in love
with her.
B: He's not in LOVE, he HATES her.
(4.6) A: So Carol's going out with Abby.
B: She isn't going out with HER, she's going out with THERESE!
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(4.7) Den kvallen gjorde [Aron] den stora forandringen. Han skrev om allt-
sammans rakt av utan att bry sig om huruvida det blev en helhet eller
inte, om spraket var perfekt eller om det blev en enda rappakalja. Att
skriva var inte langre ett tvang utan en befrielse. Sida efter sida skrev
han i rasande fart.1
'That night Aron made the big change. He rewrote everything straight
off without worrying whether it held together or not, if the language
was perfect or if it was a great big mess. Writing was no longer a
duty, but a liberation. He wrote page after page at breakneck speed."
These examples are all contrastive in the sense that the rejection of one item is
immediately followed by the presentation of a preferred one. They nevertheless
contain a negation which applies to some unit of information which, given the
context, is incompatible with the world, i.e. the negation is compat ible with the
bivalent truth function. This shows that rectifications are not confined to cases
where the negation applies to information which is in principle correct but non-
optimal. Rather, they occur whenever the speaker considers it useful to contrast
two items, be they compatible or not (contrastive use of negation will be discussed
further in section 4.3 and in chapter 5 and 6).
Conversely, it is not necessary that a negation which cannot be given a straight¬
forward interpretation as a truth function must be followed by a rectification. For
instance, consider example 4.8.
(4.8) At a cycling club meeting, and A wants to know the latest results. It
is generally accepted that the person who won is a better cyclist than
everyone else in the club.
A: How did you get on last week?
B: Dave managed to win the Road Club ten {mile time trial}.
C: He didn't manage to win.
It is quite possible for those present to interpret B's utterance as a statement that
"manage" does not accurately describe Dave's effort to win, without B having to
'From Passionsspelet by Jonas Gardell, 1991, Norstedts Forlag AB, Stockholm. The italics
are mine.
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acid that "it was easy for him" or some sentence to that effect. The interpretation
does not depend on the speaker providing a linguistic rectification, but on the
availability of the information required to process the utterance to the addressee.
Analogically, an objection to a linguistic realisation need not be followed by a
preferred version either, if the speaker thinks that the addressee can recognise
their mistake anyway. Consider a situation where both A and B know that A
tends to confuse take and bring (as discussed in chapter 2, section 2.2.3), and
makes mistakes regularly, which B usually corrects.
(4.9) A and B are discussing what camping equipment B should take on a
trip to Italy.
A: What are you bringing?
B: I'm not bringing anything.
It is not necessary for B to linguistically mark the negation as metalinguistic, by
adding that A should have used "take". A is able to interpret the sentence as an
objection to the choice of "bring" anyway. In the dialogue where the sentences in
example 4.9 occurred, "bringing" was not marked intonationallv either.
When a sentence like "he didn't manage to win" is interpreted "out of context",
what one does is to assign a likely context to it. Additional knowledge about
the person in question might mean that there are constraints on what a likely-
context would be. Additional information provided by the speaker (e.g. "it was
easy for him") may have the same effect, but it is not the utterance of the infor¬
mation as such that makes the addressee interpret the negation as not signaling
incompatibility, it is the fact it refers to.
In other words, the addressee's ability to interpret a negation as doing something
other than indicating that some information is incompatible with the context
does not depend on linguistic clues given by the speaker. It depends on which
context is the most natural one to interpret the utterance in. It may be necessary
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that the speaker indicates what context they intend linguistically, by adding more
information in a following sentence, but this is by no means always so. The task
of interpreting a negation as applying to different types of inaccuracies is not one
of recognising a particular linguistic form, but one of interpreting utterances in a
context.
4.2.2.3 Horn's Negation Diagnostics
Linguistic markedness does not justify a split between an incompatibility negation
and a non-optimality one . However, Horn also cites some other linguistic factors
which he suggests covary with these negations to a greater or lesser extent. These
are whether the negation can be incorporated prefixally, what type of polarity
item it induces, and what type of BUT-morpheme it would be followed by. Sig¬
nificantly, Horn terms these factors "diagnostics"—the state of one of them may
decide of what type the preceding negation is, but not necessarily—indicating that
he does not consider there to be a direct correlation between them and the two
negations. This means that they are of limited interest to a discussion of whether
Horn's negations are well founded, and will as such only be briefly described. The
exception to this is the BUT-morphemes which are relevant for other reasons.
Prefixal Negation
According to Horn, a word of the form NegativePrefix+stem, e.g. "unhappy
"improbable"disoriented", and "non-entity" can be analysed as ->STEM, and
can be alternatively expressed as "not (stem)", in which case the negation is
descriptive. The reverse is only true if the negation is descriptive. This means
that if the sentence in example 4.10a. is suitable in a discourse, then so is the
(b)-sentence.
(4.10) a. She's unhappy.
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b. She's not happy.
The latter cannot be replaced by the former if the negation is used metalinguisti-
cally:
(4.11) a. She's not happy, she's ecstatic,
b. *She's unhappy, she's ecstatic.
If a negation can be incorporated prefixally, it is a descriptive one, otherwise it
may or may not be metalinguistic. This is because of several factors, some of
which are discussed by Horn himself.
A prefixal negation only applies to the word that carries the prefix. A "not" which
is descriptive in Horn's sense need not do that, and for some types of sentence, it
may indeed be impossible to obtain a reading in which the negation only applies
to one word. He gives the following examples:
(4.12) a. She was not fortunate enough to lose her husband,
b. She was unfortunate enough to lose her husband.
The freestanding negation cannot take scope over the word fortunate only, and
hence the (a)-sentence cannot be used in place of the b-sentence.
Certain negative prefixed words such as "uneasy" can simply not be analysed
as —'EASY. . And even when a pair of expressions NegativePrefix+stem and
"not (stem)" seem interchangeable when considered out of context, this is not
necessarily the case in a discourse, as illustrated in example 4.13 (further evidence
for this will be discussed in section 4.3).
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(4.13) A knocks on the bedroom door:
A: Can I come in?
B: No, I'm not decent.
B': *No, I'm indecent.
Only a subclass of words can be prefixed. Not all words that can be negated
accept a negative prefix—they primarily occur with adjectives, and to a lesser
extent with nouns, in which the affixed noun often seems to denote the lack of a
property or characteristic:
(4.14) A Renault 4 is a non-car.
Rather than functioning as an incompatibility negation in general, a negative
prefix denotes the absence of a characteristic. Moreover, Horn points out that
negatively affixed words tend to have negative connotations: we have for instance
uncivilised, unclean, untrue but not unbarbarian, undirty, unfalse, which means
that the class of words that take negative prefixes is even further restricted.2 Gi¬
ven this, prefixal incorporation cannot be cited as evidence for the existence of a
specific incompatibility negation. At most, it defines a subset of such negation.
Polarity Items
Polarity items are words and phrases which occur only in either affirmative syntac¬
tic environments (declaratives) or non-affirmative ones (e.g. after a negation, in
questions and in conditionals). The ones that are found in the former are POSITIVE
POLARITY ITEMS (PPIs) while the ones that are found in the latter are NEGATIVE
POLARITY ITEMS (NPls). Examples of PPIs are "would rather", "some", "still",
"already", while "can be bothered", "any", "ever" and "yet" are NPIs. The idea is
2This is a rather interesting issue with respect to the representation of information, but it is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
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that the (b)-sentences in example 4.15 and 4.16 are not acceptable, unless in very
specific circumstances.
(4.15) a. I have already done that.
b. ?I haven't already done that.
(4.16) a. I haven't done that yet.
b. ?I have done that yet.
Several authors, e.g. Baker (1970) have observed that PPIs can occur in non-
affirmative contexts, e.g. after a single negative element, as illustrated by the
sentence in example 4.17.
(4.17) I haven't already finished it, it was supposed to be handed in weeks
ago.
Baker suggests that this happens when the speaker's purpose is to emphatically
deny a previous speaker's assertion "word by word". It is not clear whether he
meant that this was the only situation, or just one that merited particular interest.
Horn chooses the narrow approach, suggesting that word by word denial is the
only time a PPI can occur after a negation, and that a descriptive negation must
be followed by an NPI. A polarity item in a sentence containing a metalinguistic
negation, however, might be either negative or positive, meaning that the situa¬
tion is similar to that of negative prefixes: the correlation with his categories of
negation is only partial. It could have been a relevant observation if the choice of
polarity item after a metalinguistic negation was free, but it is not. The sentences
in examples 4.18 and 4.19 contain metalinguistic negation, but in one case a PPI
is required and in the other an NPI.
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(4.18) A: Chris solved some of the problems.
B: She didn't solve some of the problems, she solved all of them.
B': ?She didn't solve any of the problems, she solved all of them.
(4.19) A: Did you manage to put the wheel back on?
B: I didn't manage anything. It was dead easy.
B': ?I didn't manage something. It was dead easy.
Clearly there is some factor which determines whether a PPI or an NPI should
be selected, but this is not whether the negation is compatible with the bivalent
truth function or not. Horn himself suggests that the reason why PPIs occur after
metalinguistic negation is not the nature of the negation, but that they are scope-
sensitive. The scope of a metalinguistic negation is typically, but not always,
different from that of a descriptive one, and it is this feature rather than the
negation as such which determines the choice of polarity item.3 While differences
in scope seem like a plausible explanation, other research suggests that the issue
is more complex than that. For instance, examples 4.20 and 4.21, illustrate how
in one case a PPI is preferred and in the other an NPI, despite the syntactic
environments being identical.
(4.20) a. Did they at least say something?
b. ?Did they at least say anything?
(4.21) a. ?Has he at least cooked dinner already?
b. Has he at least cooked dinner yet?
3Since Horn argues that metalinguistic negation takes its scope over the entire sentence, the
polarity item in these two sentences ought to be of the same type. If scope really is a deciding
factor, Horn must be wrong about the scope of metalinguistic negation—rather than having a
wide scope over the entire sentence, it would be limited to the particular word or phrase that
the negation applies to, i.e. "some" in example 4.18 and "manage" in example 4.19.
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The pairs "some"/"any" and "already'"yet" are often cited as typical examples
of polarity items, and are considered similar. But it has been pointed out, e.g.
by Zwarts (1991), that there seem to be different categories of NPI, depending on
on what type of expressions that is needed to license them (e.g. an overt negation
might be required or an expression like "few" might suffice). Lakoff (1969) and
Baker (1970) cite examples which suggest that the difference between "some" and
"any" is one of meaning rather than of conforming to a syntactic environment. As
in the case of negative prefixes, it must be concluded that although the selection
of polarity items depends on something, it is not whether a negation that precedes
it indicates incompatibility.
"But"
The last diagnostic proposed by Horn is the selection of BUT-morpheme. This one
differs from the previous two, in that he suggests that there is not only a tendency,
but a significant correlation with his two negations. The background to this claim
is that several languages (e.g. Spanish, German, Swedish and Finnish) have two
morphemes corresponding to the English "but", and they are not interchangeable.
The difference between the two was described in some detail by Anscombre and
Ducrot (1977) in terms of Argumentation theory, and will be examined in sec¬
tion 4.3. They label the two morphemes PA and SN, from the Spanish Pero and
SiNo and the German Aber and SoNdern (I will follow Horn, and refer to them as
BUTpa and BUTsn). Anscombre and Ducrot argue that a BUTsn is always preceded
by a metalinguistic negation, and that if there is a negation before a BUTpo, then
it is a descriptive one.
Their categories of negation are, as indicated in chapter 3, functional, or at least
the definitions in Anscombre and Ducrot (1977) are. This means that they differ
from Horn's descriptions, since at least one of his is descriptive and not functio¬
nal. However, Horn argues that Anscombre's and Ducrot's theory carries over to
his descriptions, with a slight modification: a negation before a BlTpa is always
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descriptive, while a negation preceding a BUTsn is "typically understood as me¬
talinguistic". As it happens, neither Anscombre and Ducrot nor Horn are right
about these correlations, but the interaction between the BUTs and negation is an
interesting area, which will be explored further later in this thesis.
4.2.2.4 Summary
There is no reason to distinguish between two negations which indicate incompati¬
bility and non-optimality on the grounds that they have different requirements on
the linguistic environment. The interpretation of sentences with negation seems
to be driven by their accommodation into the addressee's representation, rather
than, as Horn argues, being a matter of recognising certain linguistic clues. If
the speaker considers the addressee to have sufficient background knowledge to
interpret a negation as indicating incompatibility, then the speaker does not have
to provide any specific hints that this is how it is intended. Similarly, the speaker
may or may not want to specify how an incompatibility negation should be trea¬
ted. The only reason to draw a line between these two is that one is convinced
that some natural language negation is best characterised as corresponding to the
bivalent truth function.
4.2.3 Information vs Language
Kempson's (1986) account of negation differs from Horn's in that she does not
consider it ambiguous with respect to different types of informational inaccuracies.
Her account is in accord with the idea that context determines the interpretation
of sentences, not the linguistic form. But she also maintains that negation is truth
functional—this is not one potential interpretation, but the only one, which the
representation of the sentence is enriched to fit. This procedure is available when
the reason for using the negation is to mark some information as inaccurate, but
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since she does not advocate the inclusion of metalinguistic predicates in the logical
form, it is not an option when the negation appears to be applying to a linguistic
realisation. For Kempson, natural language negation therefore either corresponds
to a truth functional operator or to a marker of linguistic inappropriateness.
The distinction between a negation which applies to information, and one which
applies to linguistic realisations at first blush might seem so clear that there is
no reason to object to it—language and information are distinct categories, so
two functions of negation based on these categories would be easily defined and
justified. This is a pragmatic ambiguity that is perhaps not too hard to accept:
negation reinterpreted as applying to language rather than information. Theore¬
tically, it should be unproblematic to identify any use of negation as belonging
to one category or the other, and with the type of sentences that are usually em¬
ployed to illustrate the difference (exemplified in 4.22 and 4.23), one can easily
believe that this is so.
(4.22) John does not love Mary.
(4.23) Claire de Lune is not by [d'VbAnsii], it's by [daby'si].
In practice, however, the difference between linguistic realisation and informatio¬
nal inaccuracy is not as clear cut as it may seem from these examples. Consider
example 4.24 (which was discussed in more detail in chapter 2):
(4.24) A and B live in Edinburgh. B is going to Glasgow to practice with his
band. A is not a native speaker of English.
A: Do you want me to help you to carry the stuff to the station?
B: No. it's OK, thanks.
A: Are you bringing the {guitar} amp?
B: I'm not BRINGING it, I'm TAKING it.
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To recapitulate the circumstances of this example, A is native in Swedish, which
has only one word corresponding to the English words "take" and "bring". As
far as A is concerned, there is only one relevant concept in this context, which
roughly corresponds to 'agent transports object'. For B, on the other hand, there
are two concepts, which are informationally distinct, and in this case depend on
the position of A and B with respect to the target location (Glasgow) of the
transporting event. If either of them is at the target location at the time of the
utterance or at the time of the event, then "bring" should be used, otherwise
"take".
There is no reason for B to assume that A actually thinks that they are in Glas¬
gow at the time of the utterance, so the problem with A's utterance is not the
information that A refers to, but A's linguistic realisation of it: what B consi¬
ders inadequate is not A's beliefs, but A's utterance. As in example 4.23, it is
the expression chosen to refer to some information that is inadequate. At the
same time, the reason why this particular utterance is perceived as inadequate
is that the linguistic realisation that A chose conventionally is used in a state
of affairs which does not obtain. From this aspect it has more in common with
example 4.22: the negation applies to some aspect of information.
Is B objecting to "bring" as if it were informationally inaccurate, or as if it were
a linguistic mistake? It seems difficult to decide if only this example is conside¬
red. but some other observations can shed light on the problem. As it happens,
recognising that a sentence has been badly realised is not sufficient for negating
it. This can be seen by considering the situation described in example 4.25. in
which B cannot identify what A is referring to with the expression ['wuduj.
(4.25) B: Is there anything interesting in it? ("it" refers to a magazine)
A: There's an article about ['vvudu].
B: f'wudu]?
A: Oh shit, I don't remember, is it 'v' or 'w'? You know, the religion.
B: Oh, you mean Voodoo.
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B can, however, identify [wudu] as a non-signifying expression, and given that B
knows that A is not native in English. B can safely assume that A has misprono¬
unced something. Now if it were true that the function of some uses of negation
is to indicate an erroneous linguistic realisation, then B should be able to object
to A's utterance of "there is an article about ['wudu] "by uttering the sentence in
example 4.26.
(4.26) It's not about ['wudu].
However, an utterance of this sentence could hardly be considered acceptable
in this context. B could only use this sentence if B had understood what A
intended by ['wudu] in the first place. An inadequate linguistic realisation as such
is therefore not enough to allow a speaker to use a negation. The speaker must
know what the offending speaker meant.
Another relevant case is when a speaker uses a negation to object to a linguistic
realisation of a word when it has been mispronounced in such a way that it sounds
like another word (example 4.27, A is a child).
(4.27) B: What pudding do you want?
A (reading from the packet): Raspberry [maus]!
B: You don't want raspberry [maus]. That would be horrible. You
want raspberry [muis].
Speaker A mispronounces the word "mousse" in such a way that it sounds like
another word, "mouse". A did not intend to refer to the animal, but B treats A's
utterance as if A did, which is made clear by B's use of the sentence "that would be
horrible". Given this, the negation used by B must be operating on information.
But what would the status of the negation be if B had left out the utterance of
"that would be horrible"? If B had not made explicit that she was considering
the interpretation usually associated with [maus], then her utterance would have
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been analogous to the standard examples of "objections to linguistic realisation",
as exemplified by 4.23. In my opinion. B would not have been using negation in
a different way in that case. It would be hard to justify, and one would have to
address problems such as what would happen if B left out "that would be horrible "
because she thought that the reference to mice was obvious, etc.
Agents cannot use negation as a single means of objecting to the linguistic realisa¬
tion of a sentence unless they can identify what they offending speaker intended.
In view of this, the distinction between objecting to language and objecting to in¬
formation is not as clear cut as it may seem from the examples usually employed to
illustrate it. Instead of considering such use of negation to apply to the linguistic
realisation, it should be seen as the speaker treating the badly chosen expression
as if the offending speaker had used it to refer to some inaccurate information.
Whether or not the expression conventionally refers is not relevant—the correc¬
ting speaker is treating it as if it did, which means contrasting either a real, but
unintended object, or a pseudo-object (referred to by the bad expression) with a
preferred object (referred to by the preferred expression).
Linguistic and informational mistakes must be treated on the same conceptual
level, but not by introducing metalinguistic predicates into the representat ion
of information. If this approach were taken, a metalinguistic predicate which
failed to apply would be sufficient to allow a negation to be used but as has been
shown, this would make incorrect predictions of how negation can be used. A
metalinguistic negation is hence not just a shorthand for a longer expression which
includes predicates expressing well-formedness. It is an ordinary negation which
applies to an item in the agent's representation which has been added because of
the expression, even if the agent does not consider it to correspond to anything
particular in the world they are talking about.
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4.2.4 Consequences for a Theory of Negation
The assumption that negation is truth functional is sometimes justified by rese¬
archers by saying that they have an intuition that this is so. This reflects the
following observation: there is a "default" interpretation of sentences with nega¬
tion, which is that the negation signals that something the sentence refers to is
incompatible with the context that an utterance of it is to be interpreted in. This
is something that probably everyone who studies negation agrees 011. In all like¬
lihood, it is an accurate observation, and it seems that a reasonable requirement
of a theory of natural language negation is that it predicts this interpretation in
the absence of more specific knowledge which suggests something else.
This thesis by no means wishes to take objection with this observation. What
is questionable, however, is the extrapolation to the claim that natural langu¬
age negation is truth functional, which is arrived at by making two additional
assumptions. The first one is that what was described above as "something is
incompatible with a context" can be equated with "the corresponding sentence
without a negation is false" (i.e. that a truth functional account of reasoning with
incompatibility can be given). The second one is that the incompatibility interpre¬
tation, now transformed into a falsity interpretation, is not just one interpretation,
but the very meaning of (some) negation.
It is interesting to compare this attitude to the characterisation of negation with
how that of other types of expression have been approached. One relevant example
is scalar expressions (chapter 3): in order to avoid inconsistency, they are assumed
to have a weak meaning, which tends to be strengthened in certain contexts in
the absence of a counterindication. It is curious that negation has not received a
similar treatment, but that the specific interpretation is considered primary.
What I have sought to show in this section is that the incompatibility interpre¬
tation of negation is just that: one way of accommodating the information in
an utterance into the addressee's representation. If a "not" is interpreted in a
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different way, it is not because it represents a different type, or use, of nega¬
tion, but because the context and background knowledge suggest that some other
understanding is better.
4.3 'BUT' and Negation
4.3.1 Background
This section introduces the two BUTs, and presents the descriptions of them pro¬
posed by Anscornbre and Ducrot (1977). The purpose of this is twofold: I want
to show that the connection between the two BUTs arid the categories of negation
proposed by Anscombre and Ducrot and by Horn does not exist, but I also want
to give a thorough introduction to the BUTs themselves, as it will be argued in
section 4.4.1 that they provide some important pointers to the understanding of
negation. As there is a lot to be said for Anscombre's and Ducrot's understanding
of the two BUTs, their descriptions will be an good starting point.
The issue of describing "but", in particular in comparison with "and", has received
a lot of attention (e.g. Dascal and Katriel, 1977; Elhadad and McKeown, 1988;
and Moeschler, 1989). It has sometimes been suggested to be ambiguous, e.g.
by Lakoff (1971), but it is worth noting that the purported ambiguity concerns
whether "but" in Anscombre's and Ducrot's BUTpa sense is ambiguous. This claim
has been refuted by e.g. Kenrpson (1986) and Blakemore (1987). I will not discuss
these ambiguity proposals, suffice to say that the relevant data are all covered by
Anscombre's and Ducrot's description of BUTpa. The distinction between the two
BUTs considered here is a. different one.4
4I will not. use the term "ambiguity", as I am referring to the lexicalisat ion of different
discourse markers, rather than a semantic ambiguity. The BUTs are maybe better viewed as two
functions than as two senses. The exact characterisation of the nature of the different is not
relevant for the present discussion.
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Prior to examining the formal descriptions, an informal account of the difference
between them will be given, since it may not be an obvious one to speakers of
a language that does not distinguish them morphologically. BUTpa is the more
familiar one: indeed a lot of the writings about "but" acknowledge only this
function (e.g. Lakoff, 1971; Cohen, 1984; Kempson, 1986; and Blakemore, 1987).
It can be thought of as concessive. A BUTpa is used in order to prevent the
addressee from drawing an unwanted conclusion from a statement that the speaker
accepts, as illustrated in examples 4.28.
(4.28) a. The river has flooded but the bridge is still there,
b. The river hasn't flooded, but it is not far off.
"But" used in the BUTsn sense is less common in English, in particular in spoken
language. When translating a sentence with a BUT.sn into English, it often sounds
natural not to use an overt "but" at all, and it might even be necessary to do so.
BUTsn is used to contrast an item which the speaker considers should not be part of
an accurate representation, with one that should be. It must be preceded by a ne¬
gation. and can therefore be viewed as an optional marker of contrastive negation:
the type of negation that Horn labels linguistically marked (section 4.2.2). This
means that it basically has the same properties as the morphologically distinct
contrastive negation in the languages that have such (chapter 2, section 2.3).
(4.29) a. It's not semantic, but pragmatic.
it's pragmatic,
b. Pedro doesn't smoke cigarettes, but cigars.
he smokes cigars.
In languages which distinguish the two BUTs, the morphemes are associated with
different preferences with respect to their syntactic environment: BUTsn is typi¬
cally, although not necessarily, followed by a reduced clause (this will be discussed
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in detail below). Anscombre and Ducrot argue that the French "mais" has syntac¬
tic constraints which correspond to these preferences, so that the distinction is
present, but syntactically rather than morphologically. Horn (1985) argues that
the same holds for "but" in English. It is by no means a failsafe test, but it is
often the case that when an English "but" is followed by a reduced clause, it is
used in the BUTsn sense.
In the sentences in (4.29), it is possible to use an overt "but". In some circum¬
stances, however, a BUTsn-morpheme can be used in the languages which distin¬
guish them phonetically, while it is not possible to use a "but" in English. For
instance, it seems more natural not to use an overt "but" if the two items are
obviously mutually exclusive. Using a "but" in the sentence in example 4.30(a)
does not seem very natural (if it is the properties, as opposed to the words that
are contrasted). The corresponding Swedish sentences are equally natural.
(4.30) a
b
Moreover, there are syntactic environments which do not permit a BUTsn reading
in English, only a BUTpa one, where this is notthe case if there is a morphological
difference. English would have to use a "so" or an "instead instead in these
cases:
T ,, f?but hard. |it wasn t easy, < . >
lit was hard. J
x-, . . ^ ,.... futan svart. 1Det var mte latt, < >
Ldet var svart. J
t, , fBUTsn hard. 1it was not easy, < , >lit was hard. J
(4.31) a. Jag orkade inte tala med honom, utan at frukost pa Cafeva.
I had-the-energy not talk to him, BUTsn ate breakfast in Cafeva.
1 didn't have the energy to talk to him, so instead I had breakfast
in Cafeva.
b. 1 didn't have the energy to talk to him, but had breakfast in Cafeva.
It is difficult to interpret the English sentence in such a way that the speaker
having breakfast in the cafe was something that was done to avoid the person
in question. Despite the ellipsis, one tends to prefer a BUTpa reading, where the
speaker went to the cafe despite having to talk to the person there. In other words,
it is sometimes necessary to use a different word than "but" in order to achieve
the BUTsn effect: "but" does not entirely cover the use of the two morphemes in
languages that have both.5
The two BUT-morphemes are crucially not interchangeable. From a discourse
perspective, if one was used, the other one could not have been used to the same
effect. This is a communicative distinction, not a semantic one. The two BUTs
could sometimes be used to link references to the same information, as illustrated
by the Swedish sentences in example 4.32
(4.32) a. Han ar inte spanjor, men han ar argentinare.
He is not Spaniard, BUTpci he is Argentinian.
'He isn't Spanish, but he is Argentinian/
b. Han ar inte spanjor, utan argentinare.
He is not Spaniard, BUTS„ Argentinian.
'He isn't Spanish, he's Argentinian.'
Although both these sentences could theoretically be used to make a well-formed
utterance in similar circumstances, they differ in the effect they would have on
the addressee. To use the first sentence would suggest that the speaker accepts
that assuming that the individual in question is Spanish would have been a good
guess. The second sentence suggests that this assumption is unjustified.
°It is possible that the purported correlation with two different negations is partially a result
of assuming that it does.
4.3.2 The BUTs
The descriptions of BUTpa and BUTsn given by Anscombre and Ducrot (1977) are
quite complex. I have made some changes to the presentations, in particular to
that of BUTsn, for the sake of clarity. In some cases, I have chosen to expand on
their observations, as I felt that a more thorough explanation was needed. The
only part of it that will be examined critically in this section is the purported
restrictions on a preceding negation. Some other aspects of the descriptions will
be discussed in section 4.4.1. It is important to bear in mind that the references
to descriptive and metalinguistic negation made in the article are to the early
descriptions, as given in chapter 3 section 3.3.4, not the ones in Anscombre and
Ducrot (1983) which are more similar to Horn's.
4.3.2.1 BUTpa
Although their conception of negation has changed, Anscombre and Ducrot (1983)
still use the original description of BUTpa, and it has been used by others too, e.g.
Moeschler (1989), and Elhadad (Elhadad and McKeown, 1988; Elhadad, 1990).
Description of BUTpa
Given an utterance of the form P BUTpa Q,
1. P is presented as a possible argument for a conclusion C.
'2. Q is presented as an argument for --C.6
3. Q is a stronger argument for -iC than P is for C.
The whole utterance of P BUTpa Q is thus oriented towards ->C'.
BUTpa and Negation
Given an utterance of the form NEG-R BUTpo Q (i.e. the clause prece¬
ding the "but" contains a negation),
1. The negation must be descriptive.
2. If R and Q can be thought of as belonging to a graded scale,
then R must be stronger than Q.
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The first two conditions of the description taken together mean that P and Q
must have opposite argumentative orientations with respect to a theme. This
requirement is an interesting one: it means that the speaker must have access to
some context which links the information expressed by the two clauses. Accessing
such a context is not equivalent to relating the information expressed by the two
clauses through logical properties. It has to be one which is provided by the
immediately preceding discourse. Consider the following two Swedish examples
(adapted from Anscombre and Ducrot)7.
(4.33) A: Carlos pratar spanska valdigt bra. Ar han spanjor?
Carlos talks Spanish very well. Is he Spaniard?
'Carlos speaks Spanish really well. Is he Spanish?'
B: Nej, men han ar argentinare.
No, BUTpa he is Argentinian.
'No, but he is Argentinian.1
(4.34) A: Juan maste kanna till Spanien val.
Juan must know about Spain well.
'Juan must know Spain well.1
B: *Nej, for han ar inte spanjor, men han ar argentinare.
No, for he is not Spaniard, BUTpa he is Argentinian.
'No, because he's not Spanish, but he's Argentinian.'
In example 4.33, it is possible to use BUTpa, because a context (that Carlos speaks
Spanish) has been provided which would be justified both by Carlos being Spanish
and by his being Argentinian. In example 4.34 however, the preceding context
bAnscombre and Ducrot and use ->C in the article where the description first appeared. This
is perhaps unfortunate, since the argument relation is defined as holding between utterances
and not between an utterance and a belief. But the original notation will be used here, as the
intention is to discuss the descriptions in the 1977 article. It might be more true to Anscombre's
and Ducrot's later writings to think of it as Q being an argument against C, or as P and Q being
opposed with respect to whether c should be accepted.
T chose to translate these examples since Anscombre and Ducrot gave them in French, which
does not. have two morphemes.
does not provide such a standard (being Argentinian is not a reason for knowing
Spain), and therefore BUTpa cannot be used. Although the facts contrasted in
(4.33) and (4.34) are the same, only the former allows for the use of BUTpo. This
shows that the possibility of using a BUTpa cannot be judged simply by considering
the sentences, but depends on the discourse context. As a general rule, it does not
make sense to study a sentence with a BUTpa in isolation, because there simply
will not be enough information to decide whether it is well-formed or not.
The claims about negation preceding the BUTpa are intended to explain why ex¬
ample 4.35a may be acceptable while 4.35b can never be:8
(4.35) a. No es cierto pero es probable.
Not is-it certain, BUTpa is-it probable.
'It's not certain, but it's probable.'
b. *No es probable, pero es cierto.
Not is-it probable. BUTpa is-it certain.
'It's not probable, but it's certain."
4.3.2.2 BUTsn
Restrictions on the Linguistic Context of BUTsn:
i. BUT.sn only occurs in utterances of the type NEG-P BUTS), Q,
i.e. the preceding clause must contain an overt "autonomous"
negation.
ii. Both the NEG-P clause and the BUTsn Q clause must be uttered
by the same speaker.
8The corresponding examples with "sino", i.e. BUTjn, are both possible utterances:
No es cierto, sino probable.
Not is-it certain BUT,n probable.
'It is not certain, but probable.'
No es probable, sino cierto.
Not is-it probable BUTsn certain.
'It is not probable, but certain.'
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Description of BUTS„
i. An utterance of the type NEG-P BUTS„ Q serves to present Q as
a reason to reject P.
ii. P and Q must be alternative descriptions of the same type of fact.
BUTsn and Negation
i. The negation preceding the BUTsn must be polemic.
There are no restrictions on the linguistic context of BUTpa comparable with those
on BUTsn. As for the requirement of an overt negation, a sentence of the form P
BUTpa Q may have an overt negation in either, neither, or both, of P and Q. The
"autonomous overt negation" before a BUTsn can be either a "not" or a negative
particle such as "no", "nothing", "never", "nobody" and "none", as illustrated by
the Swedish and German examples below.9
(4.36) Jag sag ingenting, utan horde honom bara.
I saw nothing, BUTsn heard him only.
T saw nothing, but only heard him/I didn't see anything, 1 only
heard him.'
(4.37) Ich babe keine Pferde gesehen, sondern nur Kiihe.
I have no horses seen, BUTsn only cows.
'I saw no horses, but only cows/I didn't see any horses, only
cows.'
Negative prefixes and "negative verbs" (such as deny) on their own (i.e. when not
in combination with an overt negation) do not admit the use of BL'Tsn. Compare
the following Swedish examples:
9The English translations tend to sound better using "not anything'' rather than "nothing
etc.. as well as hardly permitting the use of an overt "but", which illustrates the point made
earlier that "but" does not fully cover the BUTj,n function.
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a. Det ar inte praktiskt, utan omstandigt.
It is not practical, BUTsn complicated.
'It's not practical, but complicated.'10
b. * Det ar opraktiskt, utan omstandigt.
It is impractical, BUTsn complicated.
a. Han sa inte att han skulle komma utan antydde bara.
He said not that he would come BUTsn hinted only.
"He didn't say that he'd come, he only hinted.'
b. *Han forneka.de att han skulle komma, utan sa atl de skulle
stanna hemma.
He denied that he would come, BUTsn said that they would stay
home.
The second restriction on the linguistic context of BUTsn, that both NEG-P and Q
must be uttered by the same speaker, is an interesting difference between the two
BUTs. It is common to follow on from another speaker's utterance with a BUTpa
clause, as illustrated in the Swedish example 4.40.
(4.40) A: Jag vill ha ett utkast till det kapitlet till torsdag nasta vecka.
I want-to have a draft of the chapter-the by Thursday next week.
'I want a draft version of that chapter by Thursday next week.
B: Men jag maste bli fardig med artikeln.
BUTpa I must be finished with article-the.
'But I've got to finish my paper.'
10While this sentence is not perfect in English ( "It's complicated" would be better), it was
chosen because it is one of the relatively few sentences where an overt "but" can be used in
the BUTsn sense in English, when the two contrasted descriptions are obviously incompatible.
In Swedish and German, there is no corresponding restriction, and BUTsn can be used for any
contrast whatever the nature of the contrasted items.
The reason why translation with an overt "but" was chosen is that it is definitely not acceptable
after "it's impractical", while "it's complicated" would be. But an utterance of "it's impractical,
it's complicated" would have the nature of providing two pieces of evidence, rather than of
contrasting two different descriptions, and hence is not equivalent. To see this, consider how
unnatural it would seem to insert a "rather" or "instead" between the two sentences, which
would be quite acceptable if an overt negation had been used (this is probably the nearest
linguistic analogy in English to the requirement of a negation before a BUTS„. ). Negation in
combination with markers of contrast provides an important counterexample to the theory that
an incompatibility indicating negation is a feature of information, which could equally well be
expressed by a negative prefix (section 4.2.2.2).
(4.38)
(4.39)
Corresponding use of BUTsn is not possible. Speakers cannot continue from other
people's utterances with a BUTsn clause, at least not unless they take it over and
"treat it at theirs" (as in utterances made jointly by Huey, Dewey and Louie to
Donald Duck in Walt Disney's comics). The utterances (in Swedish) in exam¬
ple 4.41 below would thus be unacceptable if the speakers did not act as if it were
a single joint utterance.
(4.41) H: Vi vill inte ha...
We want not have .. .
'We don't want...'
D: . .. karameller. ..
'.. . sweets
L: . . . utan glass!
. . . BUTsn ice-cream.
'. . . but ice-cream."
Anscombre and Ducrot describe the function of BUTsn as signaling that the de¬
scription referred to by the second (usually reduced) clause excludes that of the
first clause. However, this characterisation, like that of BUTpa must be seen in
relation to the speakers purposes, and cannot simply be determined bv static pro¬
perties of the information. It is not necessary that the two pieces of information
are logically incompatible to allow for the use of BUTsn, nor is it sufficient if they
are.
The second part of the description of the function of BUTsra is rather vague, stat ing
that the juxtaposed clauses must be descriptions of the same fact. It is difficult
to express this constraint more precisely, but it is a very interesting phenomenon
which deserves more attention than it has received so far. Anscombre and Ducrot
phrase it as (1977, p.25. my translation):
the utterance of Q must be a characterisation—held incompatible with
the one given by P—of the same fact that P purports to characterise
(my translation).
This is a slightly different claim from the one associated with BUTpa—the clau¬
ses joined by a BUTsn are not required to be arguments for or against believing
something, but express different instantiations of a certain parameter.
The statement that the two clauses must be descriptions of the same type of fact
is meant to capture the difference in acceptability between the B-sentence and the
B'-sentence in example 4.42.
(4.42) A: Al-Helal har stangt pa onsdagar.
Al-Helal have closed on Wednesdays.
'Al-Helal is closed on Wednesdays.'
B: Det ar inte onsdag idag, utan (det ar) tisdag.
It is not Wednesday today, BUTS„ (it is) Tuesday.
'It isn't Wednesday today, but Tuesday.'
B": * Al-Helal har inte stangt idag, utan det ar tisdag.
Al-Helal have not closed today, BUTsn it is Tuesday.
'It is not the case that Al-Helal is closed today, but that
it is Tuesday.'11
Only the B-sentence is acceptable as a reply to A's utterance, and it is virtually
impossible to think of any context at all that would license the B'-sentence. This
is because it is difficult to think of "it is Tuesday" and "Al-Helal is closed" as
descriptions of the same type of fact.
While it could be thought that the problem with the sentence in the B'-reply is
that there is no ellipsis in the second clause of the Swedish sentence, this is not
what makes the sentence odd. According to Anscombre and Ducrot, language
text books have often suggested that the only difference between the two BUTs
is their requirements on syntactic context, which they note is incorrect. They do
not elaborate this point further, but it is worthwhile explaining why the difference
cannot be explained merely in terms of syntactic context.
uThe translation of the B'-sentence in example 4.42 is admittedly a bit odd, since "It is not
the case. . . " is hardly part of ordinary English. The reason it was chosen is that "Al-Helal is
not open today but it is Tuesday" could only have a BUTpa reading in English.
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In at least Swedish and German, a BUTsn can be followed by a full clause. For
instance, the Swedish sentence in example 4.43 is a possible utterance.
(4.43) Karo bet inte Fido, utan Fido bet Karo.
Karo bit not Fido, BUTsn Fido bit Karo.
'Karo didn't bite Fido, Fido bit Karo.'
There is often a preference for ellipsis after a BUTsn, if the speaker has a choice,
as well as for the two clauses to have the same syntactic subject. These syntactic
preferences do not, however, in general entail any constraints on the type of infor¬
mation which can be contrasted. The preferred syntax can often be achieved by
selecting an appropriate syntactic structure (typically an zY-cleft which also has
a contrasting function, see von Ivlopp and Humphreys, forthcoming). That is,
although example 4.43 is acceptable, Swedish speakers would prefer the sentence
in example 4.44, which has an ellipsis in the second clause, and a dummy subject
"common" to both of them.
(4.44) Det var inte Karo som bet Fido, utan Fido som bet Karo.
It was not Karo who bit Fido, BUTsn Fido who bit Karo.
'It wasn't Karo who bit Fido, but Fido who bit Karo.'
Given the choice of syntactic structure, it is usually possible to refer to most
information in such a way that an ellipsis can be made. So it is not the syntactic
context which constrains what information a BUTsn can link. In particular it is
not the case that it cannot contrast two states of affairs because they would have
to be referred to by a full sentence.
4.3.3 The Connection Between the BUTs and Negation
The functions of the BUTs will be discussed in more detail below (section 4.4.1).
but for the moment the discussion will be limited to the purported connection
between the BUTs and two. possibly different, types of negation.
From Anscombre's and Ducrot's (1977) descriptions it emerged that a BUTS„ is
always preceded by a negation, while a BUTpa may or may not be. They claim
that the negation before a BUTsn is always polemic, while a negation before a
BUTpa is descriptive. Horn (1989, p.413) writes that
the negation which (optionally) figures in the concessive PA construc¬
tions is necessarily descriptive, while the negation required by the SN
environments is typically understood as metalinguistic.
Horn claims about this statement that it is "consistent with Anscombre and
Ducrot's thesis", which it is not, if by "typically understood" Horn means "not
always". The reason for Horn's use of "typically understood" is probably that
some of the examples of BUTsn that he cites contain a negation which is in prin¬
ciple compatible with the bivalent truth function. As noted previously, this is a
conflict for Horn—mostly he stresses truth functionality as the defining criterion,
but sometimes he uses the definition of metalinguistic negation, i.e. whether the
it is used to object to a previous utterance.
Starting with BUTsn, its function is to indicate that the speaker wishes to mark
some description as unsuitable and suggest another one. It is difficult to see
why someone would want to do this unless the former description was likely to
be adopted by someone. Given this, it can be understood why Anscombre and
Ducrot and Horn assumed that BUTsn only occurs in utterances which reject a
previous assertion—the most likely situation where a speaker may want to replace
a non-optimal description is if it has been explicitly communicated. In this case,
the BUT5n would be used for an objection. Since both Horn and Anscombre and
Ducrot want to distinguish between two negations, one of which objects to pre¬
vious utterances, the negation preceding a BUTsn is considered to have a rejecting
function as well.
Although BUTsn can occur in contrastive utterances used to object to some pre¬
vious description, the objection part is not essential to the use of BUTsn. One
feature that should count against such a characterisation is that it is so common
in written text, which would not normally be expected to contain objections to
previous sentences. Consider example 4.7 again:
(4.7) Den kvallen gjorde [Aron] den stora forandringen. Han skrev om allt-
sammans rakt av utan att bry sig om huruvida det blev en helhet eller
inte, om spraket var perfekt eller om det blev en enda rappakalja. Att
skriva var inte langrt ett tvang utan en befrielse. Sida efter sida skrev
han i rasande fart.
'That night Aron made the big change. He rewrote everything straight
off without worrying whether it held together or not, if the language
was perfect or if it was a great big mess. Writing was not a duty
anymore, but a liberation. He wrote page after page at breakneck
speed."
In this case the writer contrasts Aron's previous experience of writing with his
present one. It has not been suggested previously in the text that Aron felt that
writing was a duty after he changed his approach to the task. It would be difficult
to construe it as an objection to a previous utterance—if there was a sentence
which suggested that Aron found writing to be a duty under any circumstances,
and the writer sincerely objected to its use, then he could have changed it.
The important property of BUTsn is not that it objects to a previous utterance,
but that it contrasts two items in the representation. It is a mistake to equate
the reasons an agent might have to take a certain action with the action itself.
Rather than viewing the combination of the negation and BUTS„ as an objection
to a previous linguistic action, it would be more natural to consider it as an
instruction to the reader to do something with their representation. The speaker's
ideas of the addressee's representation is a result of previous linguistic activity.
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but that does not mean that they are equivalent.
Defining the function of polemic negation as objecting to any information expres¬
sed. implied or suggested by the previous discourse would make the connection
between it and BUTsn trivial, but it does not entail that there is such a thing as a
polemic or metalinguistic negation in the first place. Even if BUTsn were conside¬
red to express correction, this is no reason to assume that the negation preceding
it has the exact same function. The fact that a sentence which contains a BUTsr,
typically also contains a negation in the rejection part definitely says something
about how negation can be used, but it does not prove that it is of a different
type.
Negation used before a BUTsn exhibits the same variation as it does in other
contexts. It may be compatible with a truth functional interpretation or not, and
it can apply to information or to a linguistic realisation:
(4.45) a. Vi gick inte till stationen, utan sprang av bara helvele.
We walked not to station-the, BUTsn ran of only hell.
'We didn't walk to the station, but ran like hell.'
b. Jag har inte tva manader pa mej, utan bara en.
I have not two months on me, BUTsn only one.
'I don't have two months, but just one.'
c. Han har inte tva cyklar, utan tre.
He has not two bikes, BUTS„ three.
Tie doesn't have two bikes, but three."
d. Jag sag inte Lisa, utan Magnus.
I saw not Lisa, BUTsn Magnus.
'I didn't see Lisa, but Magnus.'
e. Jag sag inte Lisa, utan Lisa och Magnus.
I saw not Lisa, BUT5n Lisa and Magnus.
'I didn't see Lisa, but Lisa and Magnus."
f. Jag vill inte ha en appel, utan ett apple.
I want not have "an apple'"{mispronounced Sz wrong gender}. 'I
BUTsn an apple.
don't want an "an apple", but an apple.'
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This shows that BUTsn does not only occur with non-optimality negation.
BUTpa
The connection between BUTpa and descriptive negation is also questionable.
BUTpa was described as concessive: in an utterance of P BUTpa Q, the state of
affairs referred to by P supports a state of affairs C. The state referred to by Q.
on the other hand, indicates that C does not obtain. There are several possible
reasons why a speaker could want to make such a concession. For instance, some
description of an object may have been accepted in a communication, and C would
usually be a likely consequence. It does not obtain on this occasion, and one of
the participants wants to prevent the other(s) from inferring or otherwise accep¬
ting it. In example 4.46, B considers there to be an association between the river
flooding and the bridge being washed away. A supports the information that the
river has overflown12, which B accepts, but B wants to prevent A from inferring
that the bridge is gone.
(4.46) A: Looks like the river has overflown.
B: It has, but the bridge is still there.
In example 4.47, the writer introduces some new information ( uyov may have to
take off any cable end covers") and wants to make sure that the reader prevents
the state of affairs in which the cables fray from obtaining.
(4.47) If you can't take out the cable at the lever end, which is probably
unlikely, then you'll have to undo the bolts on the calipers. Mark the
cable positions before you do, and you may have to take off any cable
end covers, but be careful not to fray the ends.
1 - It may be in the reader's interest to know that Collins English dictionary supports both
"overflown' and "overflowed''.
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These examples were deliberately chosen because the speaker (or writer) agrees
with the addressee, or introduces new information to them. But there is 110 reason,
given the description of BUTpa, why it should be restricted to contexts in which
the information in the P-clause is compatible with the addressee's representation.
And, naturally, there is no such restriction either. In example 4.48, B refutes the
information provided by A, showing that a BUTpa certainly can follow a clause
which is used to signal that an agent disagrees with what another agent has
communicated.
(4.48) A: Johan kommer aldrig hit nufortiden.
Johan comes never here nowadays.
'Johan never comes here anymore.'
B: Det gor han visst13, men du ar aldrig har nar han kommer.
That does he so, but you are never here when he comes.
'Yes he does 1 , , , , , ,but you re never here when he comes.
'He does so
Disagreement with some statement can of course often be expressed by a clause
containing a negation, which would then be polemic or metalinguistic. The nega¬
tion in example 4.49 is polemic on Ducrot's account, and metalinguistic on Horn's
(although perhaps Horn would say that it is simultaneously descriptive).
(4.49) A: Sa du har hela frysen full me appelmos nu?
So you have entire freezer-the full of apple-mash now?
'So you've got the whole freezer full of apple sauce now?'
B: Du de vart inte sa mycke applen i ar men de vart en jakla massa
plommon.
You it was/gave not so much apples in year BUTpa it was/gave a devil's
lot of plums.
'Well, there weren't a lot of apples this year, but there were a fair few
plums.'
13 Visst is a particle marking adversity, which is used similarly to "at all", except that it is not
a polarity item. In some dialects of English, "so" or "too" is used in this way in non-negative
sentences.
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Another example of BUTpa following a polemic/metalinguistic negation is B's ut¬
terance in (4.33) on page 125. Anscombre and Ducrot actually recognise this type
of example, and cite (4.50) as a potential counterexample.
(4.50) A: C'est probable qu'il va faire mauvais.
It is probable that it will make bad.
'The weather will probably be bad.'
B: Non, ce n'est pas probable, mais ga reste possible.
No, it is not probable BUTpa it stays possible.
'No, it's not probable, but it's still possible.'
They argue that the "ne. . . pas. . . " in B's utterance is a descriptive negation, on
the grounds that the "non" preceding it is the only polemic element, thus allowing
the descriptive "ne. . . pas. . . " to combine with the BUTpa. The problem with this
explanation is that B's utterance would be just as acceptable without the "non".
which forces the negation to take on the polemic function.
A solution based on illocutionary speech acts only being performed once has no
real foundation. It is common to attempt to convey some information, and then
rephrase the utterance to convey the same information again. This is not limited to
cases where the speaker thinks they failed to convey the information the first time,
but is common as a rhetorical device. The same holds for rejecting information.
To argue, as Anscombre and Ducrot do, that the act of rejecting information
can be carried out only once means that the sentence "ce n'est pas possible" in
example 4.50 would have different functions depending on whether B used a "non"
before it or not. It also leads to difficulties when the word "non" is used twice
(which is common in French): what would the second negation in example 4.51
be considered to do if only the first one could carry the rejection function?
(4.51) Non, non, ce n'est pas probable, mais ga reste possible.
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The negation in examples 4.49 and 4.50 must be polemic and hence cannot be
descriptive on Anscombre's and Ducrot's (1977) account.
Horn could probably claim that the "not" in these examples are simultaneously
metalinguistic and descriptive on his account, thus avoiding the problem so far.
But BUTpa can be used in utterances with negations that cannot be descriptive
on Horn's account either:
(4.52) A and B are two native Swedish speakers living in Britain. A transla¬
tes the English "do you take sugar" literally into Swedish.
A: Tar du socker?
Take you sugar.
'Do you steal sugar?'
B: Jag TAR inte socker, men jag brukar ha lite i kaffet!
I take not sugar BUTpa I do-usually have little in coffee-the.
'1 don't STEAL sugar, but I normally have a bit in my coffee."
(4.53) A is a non-native Swedish speaker, who pronounces "ett apple" like
the English "an apple"-.
A:Vill du ha en appel?
Want you have "an apple" {mispronounced}?
'Do you want "an apple" {mispronounced}?'
B: Nej, men ett APPLE vore inte sa dumt.
No BUTpa ett apple were not so bad.
'No, but I wouldn't mind an apple.'
Both these negations are metalinguistic on Horn's account, demonstrating thai
BUTpa is not always used with a descriptive negation.
4.3.4 Summary
This section examined whether there is a covariation between the two BUTs and
some categorisation of negation. Anscombre's and Ducrot's intuitions about the
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BUTs having distinct functions were found to be basically sound. These functions
are drawing attention to a contrast between two objects or descriptions, while
selecting only one of them (BUTsn), and preventing an inference or consequence
from some accepted fact (BUTpa). The descriptive and metalinguistic/polemic
negations, if defined in terms of the presentation of new information and the
objection to a previous utterance, are viewed as speech acts. The descriptions of
the BUTs do not entail that either of them should be used exclusively tied to one
of these speech acts, as they are defined at a different level of description, and the
data does not support such a connection.
It was also considered whether the BUTs would combine with different types of
negation with respect to whether it can be defined as a truth function or not. It
was shown that "not" preceding both the BUTs span the same wide range of uses
as negation in general.
Even if it had been possible to show that a negation before one of the BUTs tended
to have a particular function, that would not have proved that it was a different
type of negation—it would only have shown that negation could be used for that
effect. It would still have remained to show that it was a different negation, as
opposed to a specific use of the ordinary one.
4.4 The Behaviour of Negation
In certain circumstances, the behaviour of negation, or the interaction between
negation and other linguistic expressions is distinctly at odds with what one would
expect given the conventional view of it as corresponding to the bivalent truth
function. This section discusses three important features of natural language ne¬
gation, picking up and expanding on previous threads: the interaction between
negation and BUTsn, how one must know what one is negating, and finally, nega¬
tion in yes/no-questions.
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4.4.1 More on BUTsn and Negation
When the BUTs were discussed in section 4.3, only the nature of a possible prece¬
ding negation was paid attention to. This was because it was the only connection
between them and negation considered both by Anscombre and Ducrot (1977)
and by Horn (1989). This section considers another interesting requirement on
negation by BUTsn, which is analogous to one already mentioned by Anscombre
and Ducrot.
Anscombre and Ducrot note that BUTsn needs an overt preceding negation, i.e.
that in a sentence of the form P BUTsn Q, there must be a "not", "no", "nothing",
"none" or similar in the P-clause. This accounts for the difference in acceptability
between the two Swedish sentences in example 4.38.
(4.38) a. Det ar inte praktiskt, utan omstandigt.
It is not practical, BUTS„ complicated.
'It's not practical, but complicated/
b. *Det ar opraktiskt, utan omstandigt.
It is impractical, BUTsn complicated.
But equally interesting, the inverse holds for the Q-clause: an overt main clause
negation is usually not permitted. That is, similar to the pair in example 4.38.
there are pairs like the German one in example 4.54.
(4.54) a. *Es ist nicht schwer, sondern nicht moglich.
It is not difficult, BUTsn not possible.
'It isn't difficult, but not possible.'
b. Es ist nicht schwer, sondern unmoglich.
It is not difficult, BUTsn impossible.
'It isn't difficult, but impossible.'
If this restriction is considered in the view of the function of BUTsn, the result is
rather startling. The function of BUTS„ is to reject one description in favour of
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another one, but a main clause negation is not premitted in this presentation of
what would conventionally be considered new information. This is a significant
observation in the context of Ducrot's and Horn's proposals about negation: if
there were such a thing as a descriptive negation, which is used only when there
is no reference to a previous utterance, then the clause following a BUTsri would
be a typical syntactic context where one would expect to find one. But negation
cannot occur in this context, despite negative prefixes being allowed. This is
particularly problematic for Horn, who suggested that prefixal incorporation is a
test of descriptive negation.
The fact that negation is restricted this way suggests that no function of it can
be exhaustively described as a property of information—if it could, then "not
possible" and "impossible" should be interchangeable in this context. It is possible
that the function of BUTS„, rejection and presentation of a description, may be
central to a negation being necessary and forbidden in the two clauses respectively.
While the claim that negation objects to erroneous beliefs was noted to be too
strong, it seems that its function after all may have to be thought of in terms of
considering someone's representation.
4.4.2 Do You Know What You Are Talking About?
In section 4.2.3, while considering whether it was possible for negation to apply
to the linguistic realisation of an utterance (as opposed to being used to object
to it), example 4.25 was employed to illustrate that a speaker cannot negate a
sentence (as in example 4.26) unless they know what the speaker who made the
mistake refers to:
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(4.25) B: Is there anything interesting in it? ("it" refers to a magazine)
A: There's an article about [wudu],
B: [wudu]?
A: Oh shit, I don't remember, is it 'v' or 'w'? You know, the
religion.
B: Oh, you mean Voodoo.
(4.26) It's not about [wudu].
It was suggested that in order to use a negation in an utterance which refers to
information asserted by someone else, the speaker must be able to identify the
objects, individuals, actions, etc. that the information concerns.
This is not only relevant to mispronunciations, but also to other types of data..
To see this, it will be useful to consider the example below again, as well as some
related ones.
(4.55) The king of France is not bald, there is no king of France.
There are basically three types of accounts of this sentence:
1. The definite article "the" can be viewed as a logical operator, which specifies
that one, and only one, referent exists. If one of these conditions fail, then
the sentence is false. This was the approach taken by Russell ( On Denoting,
1967), and a similar one is probably necessary if negation is to be kept truth
functional as on Kempson's account.
2. The expression "the king of France" lacks a referent, so the sentence "the
king of France is bald" is neither true nor false. The negation in example 4.55
indicates that the sentence has a third truth value because of presupposition
failure (Seuren, 1985).
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3. The expression "the king of France" lacks a referent, so the sentence "'the
king of France is bald" was badly used. The negation in example 4.55 is me¬
talinguistic, and indicates that the speaker objects to the fact that someone
has used it (e.g. Anscombre and Ducrot, Horn).
Although the details differ, all three approaches are based on the assumption that
the negation indicates referential failure. There are however some problems with
this. Firstly, although it may seem that this is what the "not" in example 4.55
does, negation cannot in general indicate referential failure in the Russellian, one-
and-onlv-one sense. If the problem is that there are several possible referents of
the definite expression, "not" cannot be used.
(4.56) A: Lisa's teacher is mad.
B: Which one?
B': *Lisa's teacher isn't mad, she's got more than one teacher.
The B -sentence would not constitute an acceptable reply to A's utterance. This
is inconsistent with the logical explanation of "the" as a logical quantifier, and so
rules it out. For the other two, the sentence "Lisa's teacher is mad" is presumably
ambiguous, and it is possible that the difficulties with using the negation can be
explained as originating from this fact. But excess of referents is not the only
problematic case. Consider this dialogue:
(4.57) A: Was the tape that Justin gave you any good?
B: What tape?
B': Justin didn't give me any tape.
B": *The tape that Justin gave me wasn't any good, he didn't give
me any tape.
While the first two replies in example 4.57 come across as natural, the third
one does not.14 In view of examples 4.25, 4.56, and 4.57, it seems that a sentence
14Atlas (personal communication) argues that this sentence would be less bad without the
contraction "wasn't". Whether this is so, contracting "is not" in example 4.55 does not seem
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cannot be negated unless the speaker can identify the entities (objects, individuals,
relations, descriptions, etc.) that the sentence refers to. The B speakers in these
examples do not know what [wudu] is meant to refer to, which one of Lisa's
teachers the A speaker intends, or what a referent of "the tape would be.
These examples are in fact typical—referential failure usually cannot be indicated
by a negation. Instead, it is the sentence in example 4.55 which must be accounted
for as an exception.15 The reason why it seems possible for the negation to indicate
referential failure in that sentence is that we have some background knowledge
about heads of state, how they tend to be the only person in their position, etc.
Especially with some habituation, we can reason with "the king of France" as
a hypothetical, but specific, individual. B in example 4.57 does not have this
option—she has no knowledge of a referent of "the tape".
It would be impractical to deny "the" the function of picking out a particular
referent, or set of referents. The fact that one referent is singled out is. in addition,
definitely part of the information that the utterance of such a sentence conveys.
But a negation cannot apply to this referential information. An alternative way
of thinking about negation, which avoids this problem, is to distinguish between
the information in a sentence and the representation that the sentence refers to in
the agent's mind. A referring expression is an instruction to use a certain object
in the representation. Negation applies to representations of the world, and not
to the information carried by the sentence.
to have any effect, although these examples are parallel.
15Although there is no standard account of definite noun phrases in DRT, it seems likely that
"The king of France is not bald" would fail to have a proper representation on the grounds that
the expression "the king of France" lacks a referent (see chapter 6). This means that contrary
to most accounts, DRT would not consider the sentence well-formed with respect to a world
where there is no king of France.
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4.4.3 Yes/No-Questions
The most compelling argument against considering negation truth functional is
probably its behaviour in yes/no-questions (this issue was first raised in chapter 2,
section 2.2.7). It is not only an argument against the truth functional account,
but also provides further evidence that negation should not be seen as applying
to the information of the sentence.
(4.58) a. Is that Alan Peiper?
b. Isn't that Alan Peiper?
As for the factual verification requested by utterances these two sentences, they
are equivalent: both can be used to ask for a confirmation of whether a designated
person has the property of being Alan Peiper. To answer "yes" or "no" would
amount to making the same statement whichever of the questions were asked. As
observed in chapter 2, the two sentences are not completely equivalent, in that
the second one would probably be interpreted as the speaker is quite sure that the
person in question is Alan Peiper. This is less likely if the (a)-sentence is used.
This makes it seem that negation is used about representations, rather than being
a feature of them.
4.4.4 Some Properties of Natural Language Negation
This section used some data which has not been widely taken into consideration
so that two hypotheses about natural language negation can now be formulated.
The first one is that a negation does not apply to the information in a sentence,
but to the parts of a representation of the topic that the sentence refers to. This
is supported by two observations. Firstly, negation cannot apply to referential
failure as a feature of a sentence. It, can be used by a speaker to draw atten¬
tion to referential failure under certain circumstances, i.e. when the speaker can
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conceptualise a hypothetical entity which would have been a referent. But lack
of referent on its own does not license the use of a negation. Secondly, using
a negative ves/no-question is not equivalent to asking for a verification that a
description is inaccurate. The function of the negation seems to be to indicate
something about an agent's representation, and not of the description as such.
The seconatlas claims that noone did not attend the party has two descriptive
negations.d hypothesis is that using a negation cannot be viewed as conveying the
status of a proposition—instead, it should be seen as an attempt to perform an
operation on some agent's representation. The reason for making this assumption
is that the restrictions on negation in combination with BUTsn suggest that a
negation cannot be used in an expression which is used to convey what according
to the speaker is a suitable description.
4.5 Summary
This chapter has examined the use and interpretation of negation in relation to
various other linguistic phenomena, markedness, contrast and referential failure,
to name a few. The purpose of this was twofold: to decide whether negation
should be considered to have more than one function, and to gather data which
provide indications as to what is required of a representational framework in which
it can be characterised.
No support was found for considering negation to have more than one function
in terms of there being any special linguistic constraints associated with some
particular use of it. A more realistic approach would be to argue that it is the
available contextual and background knowledge which determines what function
the negation has. Speakers may help their addressee to select a certain inter¬
pretation by linguistic means, but the speaker uses e.g. a rectification in order to
suggest one particular interpretation, it is not the fact that a rectification was used
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that had this effect (i.e. the interpretation is not a consequence of the linguistic
form). Rather, it is the changes to the addressee's representation(s) that result
from interpreting the rectification that constrains the interpreting of the sentence
with the negation.
It was also noted that there is no clear-cut boundary between a negation which
applies to information, and one which applies to linguistic realisation. In fact there
can be no such thing as a negation whose function is to indicate that the speaker
dislikes a linguistic realisation. Speakers can use negation for this purpose, but
no function of it can be defined that way, without causing erroneous predictions.
Negation should be viewed exclusively as applying to information. In those cases
where a speaker appears to be using negation about a linguistic realisation, the
speaker is treating the linguistic mistake as if it denoted some erroneous fact
asserted by the addressee.
Using some observations about the interpretation and use of negation, two hypo¬
theses about its function could be formulated: that it applies to representations
of the discourse universe rather than to the information of utterances, and that
it is used to manipulate someone's representation. This suggests that signifi¬
cantly more representational capacity is required for the purpose of characterising
negation than has usually been assumed. The next chapter will discuss these
requirements in more detail.
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Chapter 5
Towards a Characterisation of
Negation
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to propose a characterisation of natural language
negation, which adequately accounts for all the data which has been discussed
in this thesis. In chapter 4 it was argued that negation should be viewed as a
uniform phenomenon, which has a function, rather than a meaning. The reason
for this is that at least in some cases, it would lead to an inadequate analysis to
assume that there is some operator corresponding to the negation at the level of
the factual descriptions that sentences are conventionally taken to express. For
this, and various other reasons, it was suggested that negation should be viewed
as being about an agent's description, rather than being part of it.
The aim here is to define, in general terms, what properties are required of a
representational framework to permit the formulation of a description of negation.
It is not within the scope of this thesis to try and suggest appropriate amendments
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to any existing framework. Rather, the characterisation will be given in theory
neutral terms, and the terminology and illustrations that are used are employed
mainly for reasons of transparency.
Despite the fact that a large body of data has been considered, there are still
not many indications as to what negation actually does. Instead of speculating
further, the approach taken here will be to begin by discussing another problem,
although one that has been suggested to be partially related: the description of
the two BUTs. The idea is that by providing a set of properties of information
that permits a description of what the BUTs are used for, these properties could
also be used for the description of negation. I will attempt such a description in
section 5.4.
5.2 Perspective in the Representation of Infor¬
mation
The claim that negation is not part of, but about, someone's representation of the
discourse universe has some important consequences for how the relation between
sentences and a representation of the world should be viewed. It is not possible
to think of sentences as factual descriptions of the world. In order to characterise
negation it is necessary to consider not only the representation of the person
who utters it, but also how the speaker thinks that the other participants of the
communication represent the topic.
Although it is common for linguists to discuss language as if the informational
aspects of many sentences can be described in terms of a single representation,
the idea of maintaining separate representations for the participants of a com¬
munication is not new. Multiple representations have been used extensively in





Figure 5.1: RDUs in a two-person communication,
interpretation of utterances (e.g. Cohen and Perrault, 1979).
The basic assumption of these frameworks is that each participant of a commu¬
nication have their own representation of the topic, which they may believe to be
accurate or which they have just chosen for the present purposes. They also have
a representation of how the other participants in the communication represent the
topic, either individually or collectively, but these secondary representations are
not identical to the primary ones of the people concerned.
For the present purposes, the following notation will be used: the different re¬
presentations, or perspectives, of the topic will be labeled Representations of the
Discourse Universe (RDUs), and they will be indexed for who holds them, and,
if they are secondary representations, for whom they are held (as exemplified in
figure 5.1). One reason for choosing this notation is that it is more convenient
for talking about the objects in, and the structure of, someone's representations,
which would be difficult using a more conventional BELIEVE(AGENT,PROPOSITION )
notation. There are also other reasons for avoiding a commitment to some par-
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ticular framework, in terms of the assumption of what the nature of these re¬
presentations are (beliefs or temporary constructions).1 This will discussed in
section 5.3.
Multiple representations are often used to allow for the definition of speech acts,
at the level of adding and removing propositions in an agent's representation (cf.
Cohen and Perrault, 1979). The type of acts (or intentions) that can be formulated
this way are e.g. "inform", "request information" and "deny". Using the RDU-
notation, an act such as "inform" may be defined as having the preconditions
that a proposition p G RDUspeaA:er and p ^ RDUspeaker,addressee- The speaker's goal
is that p G RDU speaker,addressee > and the description of the act may specify that this
is typically achieved by uttering a declarative sentence which expresses p.
This means that multiple representations are typically used for a fairly high-level
planning of the communication, where the goals are defined in terms of adding
and possibly removing propositions in them. This is not quite how they will be
used here. They will not be considered to contain propositions, but structured
representations of information. Using the idea that utterances are made in order
to manipulate someone's representations, the important use of them will be to
reflect how agents have chosen to structure the concepts in their representations,
and what they want to do with this structure.
The RDUs will be seen as representations that agents use for a specific communi¬
cation. The RDUa3enj need not be identical to the agent's beliefs about the topic
under discussion. Consider for instance a physics professor when she writes a
paper for a scientific journal, lectures undergraduates, or gives a series of talks to
children on television. In all these cases, she is likely to use different representa¬
tions, in such a way that what she says is (hopefully) intelligible to the audience.
When talking to the children, she might for instance behave as if Newtonian phy-
'This is not to be taken as an assertion that a framework based on e.g. a belief operator
necessarily represents beliefs, but as it will be argued that the distinction is important, 1 prefer
to use a notation which does not carry the connotations of representing knowledge and/or belief.
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sics applies globally. It is a good enough approximation and it works for all the
cases she will talk about, so she simplifies and pretends that it always works. The
way she talks about physics to her different audiences reflects the way she chooses
to represent it on each particular occasion.
Simplification is of course not the only reason why RDUs may differ from the
beliefs of the agents who hold them. They may have been asked to argue some
arbitrary point in a French conversation class, or by a political party, or they
may be lying or joking. The fact that people are able to talk coherently in such
situations means that they must be able to represent the information somehow,
even if it is not a representation that they actually believe is accurate.
5.3 Representing Information
If a. perspectival framework such as the one outlined above is combined with a
representation of information in the form of a list of propositions or equivalent,
then the level of manipulations that can be expressed are of the same type as the
speech acts mentioned above: they permit us to talk about propositions being
added or removed from someone's representation. For the purpose of describing
negation, this would allow for a characterisation of e.g. "denial of an erroneous
belief", which was suggested by Givon (1978) to be its function. However, it was
shown in chapter 2 that this was too crude a description, so it will be necessary t o
use a representation of information which permits more sophisticated operations.
In other words, propositions cannot be treated as the basic unit.
Data on the use of negation gives precious few hints to what its actual function
is. A common assumption is that it indicates that there is something wrong with
a sentence, but this was shown not to apply to e.g. yes/no-questions. A notion
of denying an expectation (pace Allwood, 1927) may be more suitable, but it is
unclear how it should be defined. A consequence of this lack of pointers to what
its function is, is that theorising about negation typically has a taste of vagueness
or speculation. Rather than speculating further using the insufficient source of
data on negation on its own, the problem of deciding what the relevant features of
the representation of information are will be approached from a different angle: by
considering what features of a representational framework that would be needed
to characterise the two BUTs. Given that BUTsn always occurs together with a
negation, and that BUTpa sometimes does, it is possible that the representational
properties that are needed to understand these two could also be used for the
characterisation of negation.
5.3.1 Constraints associated with BUTpfl
5.3.1.1 Communication Matters
How to describe the two BUTs is an issue which has already been considered several
times in this thesis. The discussion has so far been centered around the account
given in Anscombre and Ducrot (1977), which in the case of BUTpo only refers
to argumentative properties, and not to representational ones (the description of
BUTsn on the other hand relies on features of the organisation of information).
Argumentative orientation was later (1983) defined in terms of topoi, which can
be thought of as a type of probabilistic rule. This section will try to link the
argumentative properties to representational ones, and examine what is required
of the rules.
Anscombre and Ducrot (1977) pointed out that it is not possible to characterise
the BUTs in terms of a single representation, i.e. as conveying a factual constraint.
If this were the case, then both the replies in the examples below should be
acceptable, as they both connect the same factual descriptions. But because of
the context from the preceding dialogue, in each case only one of them is suitable.
This was taken to suggest that it is necessary to take the addressee's representat ion
into account.
(5.1) A: Carlos pratar spanska valdigt bra. Ar ban spanjor?
Carlos talks Spanish very well. Is he Spaniard?
'Carlos speaks Spanish really well. Is he Spanish?1
B: Nej, men han ar argentinare.
No, BUTpa he is Argentinian.
'No, but he is Argentinian."
B1: ?Han ar inte spanjor, utan argentinare.
He is not Spaniard BUTS„ Argentinian.
'He isn't Spanish, he's Argentinian.'
(5.2) A: Juan maste kanna till Spanien val.
Juan must know about Spain well.
'Juan must know Spain well.'
B: *Nej, for han ar inte spanjor, men han ar argentinare.
No, for he is not Spaniard, BUTpa he is Argentinian.
'No, because he's not Spanish, but he is Argentinian."
B': Han ar inte spanjor, utan argentinare.
He is not Spaniard BUT<,„ Argentinian.
'He isn't Spanish, he's Argentinian.'
By linking two clauses P and Q with a BUTpa, P is presented as an argument
against a conclusion which Q is an argument for (or vice versa). Since it is not
in B's interest to argue for some conclusion which both the fact that Juan is
Argentinian and the assumption that he is Spanish would support, a BUTpa is not
suitable.
5.3.1.2 What are the Rules?
The fact that BUTpa must be described in terms of the interaction between parti¬
cipants of the communication does not mean that there is no factual background
to the argumentation, only that it is not sufficient for a description. It will be
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useful to consider what type of factual constraints an agent may consider when
using a BUTpa.
It is clear that the argument relation cannot be thought of as corresponding to
material implication. The "obvious" translation into propositional logic (with P
and Q expressing the propositions p and q respectively) would be to say that there
is a third proposition c such that p —> c and q —> ->c. However, with the usual
interpretation of material implication, P BUTpa Q would lead to a contradiction
(c A-1 c). The link between at least p and c must be something different from
implication, since this link is always overridden. It would have to be a default
implication or a probabilistic rule.
Considering some examples, it becomes clear that the relation between q and c is
not typically one of material implication either, and the notion of default is often
too strong to capt ure the sort of links that are referred to. Consider the following
two examples:
(5.3) A: Victor speaks Spanish really well. Is he Spanish?
B: No, but he's Argentinian.
(5.4) A: Victor speaks Spanish really well. Is he Spanish?
13: No, but he's married to a Spanish woman.
Assume that they can be explained in terms of defaults that are overridden. Then
we have for example 5.3:
X is not Spanish x does not speak Spanish.
, r . * i • • default , r i o • l
a is Argentinian —> A speaks bpanish.
and for example 5.4:
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X is not Spanish deJ^.lt x does not speak Spanish.
X is married to a Spaniard deJ-!^lt X speaks Spanish.
To begin with the links that were used for the second clauses of the examples,
it is probably reasonable to assume that the speaker can appeal to an accepted
generalisation that Argentinian people speak Spanish. It is however questionable
if the same can be said to hold for people who are married to Spaniards (at least if
they are of a different nationality and live outside Spain). So is the speaker really
trying to make the addressee access a general rule of this form, or is t he speaker in
fact conveying specific knowledge about Victor? The question is whether on the
one hand, the speaker uses the "but" and the addressee separately interpretations
the sentence by using their own internalised rules, or, on the other hand, if the
speaker uses it in order that the addressee can infer that a particular individual
has some property (which may be more or less likely).
Interpreting "but" has often been viewed statically (semanticallv), as a question
of finding the right rules; whether the sentence can be understood or not depends
on whether the the addressee's representation contains the required rule or not.
Alternatively, it could be viewed dynamically, as the speaker telling the addressee
how to structure the knowledge, possibly by making a connection which is only
appropriate in the particular context where the sentence is uttered.
The appeal to default rules for the first clause also raises some questions. The
notion of a generalisation is in principle more plausible with respect to the state
of affairs referred to by this clause, as the "but" often appears to be used in order
to prevent the addressee from making what could be construed as a reasonable
inference. However, the fact that some generalisation or default rule is involved
does not necessarily mean that the relation between the fact referred to by the
clause and the linking context is in the form of a default, at least not where the
clause contains a negation, as in examples 5.3 and 5.4. It is easy to accept a
default rule from being Spanish to speaking Spanish, but should the same be said
to hold between not being Spanish and not speaking Spanish? This is where it is
appealing to switch from properties of information to properties of argumentation.
Anscombre and Ducrot suggest that if a sentence S can be used to make an ar¬
gument for C in a context (for instance because S refers to a fact s which implies
C by default) then uttering NEG-S would be an argument against C in the same
context (the "law of negation"). The law of negation is not a claim about proposi¬
tions, but about the significance of referring to a state of affairs in a discourse—it
cannot be concluded from s —> C that ->s —> ->C. However, if a fact s could be
used in a particular discourse to support a certain other fact C, and someone takes
the trouble to point out that s does not obtain, it does seem reasonable that the
utterance should be taken as an argument against C unless the speaker indicates
otherwise.2
In principle, it would be possible to attribute the link between 'NOT BEING SPA¬
NISH' and 'NOT SPEAKING SPANISH' to a default rule. But it is not a rule that
one would assume that people would have internalised. The alternative, which is
not based on the generalisations or rules as such, but on their applicability under
the circumstances offers a more satisfactory explanation.
5.3.1.3 More than Simple Generalisations
The previous section dealt with whether BUTpa can be defined in terms of the
properties of the states referred to by the clauses it conjoins. It was suggested
that rather than characterising BUTpa directly in terms of probabilistic rules that
are overridden, it would be more realistic to use argumentative properties, which
rely on, but are not equivalent to, such rules. This section further discusses the
rules and generalisations that arguments can be based on.
The examples considered above used BUTpa in order to contrast descriptions of an
2As shown in chapter 4, this phenomenon is stronger than simply depending on the fact that
the sentence is uttered.
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individual. The data of BUTpa that is studied is often of this type: the "but" is
used to indicate that some entity does not have a property that it would usually
be expected to have. The type of knowledge that is required is declarative; it
relates to properties of classes of objects. Another such example is given below:
(5.5) A: But I thought he had a. PhD.
B: No, he's a lecturer, but he actually only has an MA.
There are however other types of examples, where more complex representations
are required. It may for instance be necessary to consider properties of series of
actions, as illustrated by the following example:
(5.6) The waiter came, but he didn't bring a menu. Later we learnt that
there was usually one, or sometimes two main courses, and a more
or less fixed set of starters—you just go in, sit down, tell them which
starter you want and then get served.
It is not a default property of waiters that they bring menus when they go to a
table. However, it is something that they often do the first time they go to a table
after a customer has sat down at it (in certain types of restaurant). As in the case
of the lecturer in example 5.5 above, the restaurant in example 5.6 could be said
to deviate from some expectations, but the latter example differs from the former
in that the deviation cannot simply be attributed to the waiter, but is a property
of the waiter's behaviour at a certain stage of a routine.
It has been suggested that this type of knowledge, which relates to procedures
rather than objects can be represented in the form of plans in which subgoals
are executed, e.g. .STRIPS (Fikes, 1971), or scripts (Schank and Abelson. 1977).
Examples such as example 5.6 led Jayez (1989) to attempt a description of Bl Tpu
in terms of a representation which is inspired by AI planning systems. The sig¬
nificance of this slight digression is that the generalisations that speakers have in
mind when using a BUTpa are not always easily captured by simple rules.
5.3.1.4 Who Infers?
In the examples discussed so far, the BUTpa has been viewed as having the function
of indicating that some state of affairs C which could be assumed to obtain if the
clause preceding the "but" is accepted as accurate, does in fact not obtain. For
many of the examples, it is natural to assume that the speaker is using the BUTpa
sentence in order to prevent the addressee from inferring that C obtains. However,
using a BUTpa is not always equivalent to trying to avert a misrepresentation.
Consider the following example:
(5.7) If you can't take out the cable at the lever end, which is probably
unlikely, then you'll have to undo the bolts on the calipers. Mark the
cable positions before you do, and you may have to take off any cable
end covers, but be careful not to fray the ends.
In this case, the speaker is not trying to prevent the addressee from inferring that
the cables will fray. If the writer had considered the addressee to be aware of the
problem of the cables possibly fraying, he would probably not have expressed it
in this way.3 So this is not a case of preventing an inference, but rather of trying
to make the addressee take actions such that a situation where she will have to
add to her representation that the cables are frayed does not obtain. Although
the "but" is used to prevent a certain description from entering the addressee's
representation (as in the previous examples), in this case it is not a question of
avoiding a misrepresentation, but of avoiding a state of affairs which would make
the description accurate.
5.3.1.5 Summary
Describing BUTpa is an intricate problem, and this exposition has hardly paved
the way for a straightforward characterisation of it. It should be clear that it
3In such circumstances, if the fraying were to be mentioned, "and" would probably be a
better choice.
has argumentative properties, which cannot be ignored, but it is not trivial how
these can be defined. Although the notion of argumentative orientation might be
intuitively acceptable, it hardly solves the problem unless it is clearly stated how
they reflect topoi or rules, since the data examined above seems to suggest that
there is no direct correspondence between the argument relation and some type
of rules.
The nature of the rules or links that are used for these purposes is by no means a
settled matter either, as demonstrated in the discussion above. It would have been
elegant to be able to formulate a rule which says that speakers use sentences of the
type P BUTpa Q when they want to make a point of rejecting the conclusion C (the
linking context), while accepting P, which describes a fact p, if the probability
of C given that p exceeds a certain threshold (for an utterance of the type ->P
BUTpa Q it could be preferrable to refer to a rule which uses p rather than —«p, see
section 5.3.1.2). However, this does not seem to correctly describe what is going
on.
Consider example 5.7 again. It is not necessary that the cables usually fray for the
writer to warn the reader that it might happen when the cable covers are taken
off. It does not have to happen most of the time. In fact it is not even necessary
that it has ever happened, as long as the writer thinks that it is a possible, and
significant, consequence of removing the cable ends.
It would be possible to use a BUTpo in example 5.7 even if the probability of the
ends fraying is low. Using the same probability threshold in another situation,
however, may not work. Assume that the same person who wrote the text has
knowledge about an individual called Stephan who regularly goes hill walking in
the Scottish Highlands. This being Scotland, the probability that it rains when
Stephan goes hill-walking is much higher than the probability that the cable ends
will fray. Now assume that the writer wanted to report that last time Stephan
went hill-walking, it was not raining. If the choice of BUTpa only depended on the
probabilities of the two correlations exceeding a certain threshold, then it would be
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predicted that the sentence in example 5.8a is better than that in example 5.8b.
(5.8) a. Stephan went hill walking on Sunday, but it wasn't raining.
b. Stephan went hill walking on Sunday, and it wasn't raining.
The linking context in this example is that it did not rain (analogically to the
cables not fraying being a linking context in example 5.7).'4 One could speculate
about the relative importance of links, or perhaps the difference in preference is
due to the fact that the weather being dry is usually seen as advantageous, as
opposed to the cables fraying. Clearly, a lot of research remains to be done.
5.3.2 Constraints associated with BUTsn
BUTsn is used to contrast two description of the same type. As in the case of
BUTpa, the reasons for considering two descriptions to be of the same type may.
but does not have to be a globally applicable constraint. The following three
examples illustrate how properties and actions can be contrasted for increasingly
context specific reasons.
(5.9) Han ar inte spanjor, utan argentinare.
He is not Spaniard, BUTsn Argentinian.
'He isn't Spanish, he's Argentinian.'
(5.10) Det fanns ingen meny, utan nagra. oaptitliga referenser till vegan
bonrora var nedkrafsade pa en griffeltavla.
It was/existed no menu, BUTsn some unappetizing references to vegan
bean-gunk were scribbled on a blackboard.
'There was no menu, instead a couple of unappetizing references to
vegan bean gunk were scribbled on a blackboard."
4This means that the Q-clause refers to the conclusion, rather than to some reason to accept
it. In both these examples, the BUTfa is used for a DIRECT OPPOSITION, as opposed to an
INDIRECT one. in Anscombre's and Ducrot's terminology.
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(5.11) Borja inte med sasen, utan med gronsakerna.
Start not with sauce-the, BUTS„ with vegetables-the.
'Don't start with the sauce, start with the vegetables."
While BUTpa is used to indicate that some states of affairs which the speaker consi¬
ders to be correlated should not be taken to stand in their ordinary relationship on
a particular occasion, BUT5„ is used for quite different purposes. As with BUTpa,
there is a requirement that the two contrasted entities have something in common,
but when a BUTsri is used to reject a description, the speaker typically indicates
that the reasoning that would lead to the adoption of it is invalid.
(5.1'2) A: Mans har varit och gravt bland ringblommorna igen.
Mans has been and dug among the calendulas again.
'Alans has been digging in the calendulas again.
B: Det var inte Alans, utan den dar katten som inte har nagon svans.
It was not Mans, BUTsra the there cat that not has any tail.
'It wasn't Alans, it was the cat that doesn't have a tail.'
B simply rejects the association of Alans with the damage done to the flowerbed.
There is no element of concession that this was a valid assumption, the way that
a BUTpa indicates that some states of affairs would normally be linked.
5.3.3 Comparing BUTs
There is an important general point to be made about the BUTs and the descripti¬
ons that they link. Alost accounts of the BUTs (BUTpa mainly) attempt to describe
them as indicating that some rule does not apply on a particular occasion. Howe¬
ver, given an utterance of the type P BUTpa Q, the links between the state of affairs
referred to by P and Q (as obtaining or not obtaining) and the linking context C
need not be of the type that one would think of as a commonly accepted rule or
generalisation. Consequently, the reason for using a "but" is not necessarily to
draw the addressee's attention to a known rule, but it may be used to convey that
the speaker considers there to be a link. Still, most accounts of BUTpa emphasise
their reference to rules.
Ivempson (1986) and Blakemore (1987) offer explanations of the function of BUTpa,
in which it is essentially seen as a constraint on the context in which the sentence is
to be interpreted. Kempson proposes that the function of BUTpa can be described
in terms of defaults (p.94):
the contrastive element in but is a lexically specified instruction to the
hearer to consider only particular kinds of context, namely those in
which some contextual implication drawn off the propositions expres¬
sed by the first sentence conflicts with some implication to be drawn
off the two sentences taken together.
She argues that part of the linguistic meaning of BUTpa consists of a contextuali-
sation as described below (she does not indicate what the other part would be).
It should be said that she specifies this as an instruction as to how a BUTp(J should
be interpreted. She does not argue that this description can be used for the gene¬
ration of sentences. This is what she suggests (p.94, the symbol corresponds
to the negation of predicate logic, the symbols R and Rm are rendered as in the
original):
In interpreting 'P but Q' where P and Q are prepositional variables,
construct a context Cm for P such that:
Cm & P -» R
and also construct a context Cn for (P &) Q such that:
Cn & (P &) Q " Rm
Blakemore's (1987) account of BUTpa, like Kempson's, is set in the Relevance fra¬
mework, but hers is different and is closer to the argumentation based description.
As opposed to Kempson. she argues that "but" (in the BUTpa sense) does not have
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a linguistic meaning, but only affects the '"pragmatic interpretation" of utteran¬
ces, by which she means how the information is assimilated into the addressee's
representation. Specifically, she argues that "but" does not have "and" as part of
its meaning. She does not give the particulars of a representation of BUTpa, but
writes that it (1987,p.130)
constrains the interpretation of the proposition it introduces so that its
relevance must be understood to lie in its effect on the interpretation of
the proposition in the preceding clause. More specifically, the hearer
is instructed to process the proposition but introduces in a context
in which she can derive a proposition logically inconsistent with one
assumed to have been derived from the proposition expressed by the
utterance of the first clause.
While all these accounts emphasise the importance of using context in the inter¬
pretation, they attribute the interpretation of "but" to the use of logical rules. It
could be thought that this does not matter from the point of interpretation, but
one effect of referring to deduction is that it is difficult to explain how we are able
to "understand" an utterance with a BUTpa without being able to access some
very specific contexts which permit the deduction of two incompatible propositi¬
ons. Consider for instance the following example, discussed by Kempson:
(5.13) My father's coming to stay in our house, but he's going to be out of
the house all day.
On seeing this sentence outside a context, we know that a speaker could use it to
indicate that they consider there to be an opposition between the two states of
affairs that it refers to. If this sentence was uttered in a context, the addressee
would probably have the background knowledge to be able to infer whether the
speaker thinks it is good or bad that the father is going to be out of the house— it
does not follow from the sentence above. Assuming it is a good thing, it is not
necessary to know exactly why that is—it could be intended to be interpreted in
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a general way, and there is no reason to assume that an addressee would need to
know all the (possibly unpleasant) details.
However, the deductivist approach requires not that the addressee makes a general
mental note about the state of the speaker's well-being with respect to the fatherly
visit, but that the addressee finds a particular proposition that is implied by the
father being around, unless he is out of the house. The particular proposition
that Kempson proposes (without actually describing a context) is that the speaker
would have to keep the children quiet. But are such specific interpretations really
required, and moreover, are they not bordering on the unrealistic?
Another problem is that many utterances with a BUTpa fall well short of providing
enough material for a successful deduction until a contradiction is reached. This
was pointed out in section 5.3.1.2, with respect to the example in which an agent is
questioned whether Carlos proficiency in Spanish is due to him being a Spaniard.
The reply ''No, but he's Argentinian" would have to oppose the two propositions
that Carlos is not Spanish and that Carlos is Argentinian in such a way that
a logical contradiction can be derived. The prospect of adding rules such that
propositions like these can lead to logical contradictions seems rather daunting.
In the discussion of example 5.3 (repeated below), it was suggested that if it is to
be explained in terms of default or probability rules, it would be necessary that
agents come equipped with a rule that says that if someone is not Spanish, then
they (probably) do not speak Spanish.
(5.3) A: Victor speaks Spanish really well. Is he Spanish?
B: No, but he's Argentinian.
It was argued that an argumentation based account of this example would be more
realistic. Such an account would still use e.g. probabilistic rules, but although
the argument relation depends on there being a reasoning behind it, il is not
isomorphic to the reasoning. For the example above, asserting that someone is
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not Spanish can be an argument agains assuming that they speak Spanish, by
virtue of the fact that there is a generalisation that Spaniards speak Spanish, and
the fact that the speaker found it worthwhile to point out that the individual
is not Spanish in a context in which Spanish speaking is relevant. That is, the
argument relation depends on the generalisation, but does not correspond to it.
This effectively means that the speaker is considered to have imposed a structure
on the information which is specific to the communication. This structure is
different from the agents knowledge, as inferences can be made that are based on
linguistic actions, and not only on rules governing information. In other words, it
is suggested that agents use a type of intermediate representation for the purpose
of carrying out individual communications which are based on, but not equivalent
to, their knowledge representation. This is why it is desirable to use intermediate
representations, which are specific to a particular communication, rather than
reflecting a general, fixed, representation of agents' knowledge: argumentation
and knowledge representation are different, and something is needed to bridge the
gap between them.
5.3.4 BUTs and Structured Information
It will be useful to look at some of the examples of the BUTs with respect to the in¬
formation structures that they may correspond to. Let us reconsider examples 5.1
and 5.2.
(5.1) A: Carlos pratar spanska valdigt bra. Ar han spanjor?
Carlos talks Spanish very well. Is he Spaniard?
'Carlos speaks Spanish really well. Is he Spanish?'
B: Nej, men han ar argentinare.
No, BUTp(l he is Argentinian.
'No, but he is Argentinian."
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B': ?Han ar inte spanjor, utan argentinare.
He is not Spaniard butsn Argentinian.
'He isn't Spanish, he's Argentinian.'
(5.2) A: Juan maste kanna till Spanien val.
Juan must know about Spain well.
'Juan must know Spain well.'
B: *Nej, for han ar inte spanjor, men han ar argentinare.
No, for he is not Spaniard, butpa he is Argentinian.
'No, because he's not Spanish, but he is Argentinian.'
B': Han ar inte spanjor, utan argentinare.
He is not Spaniard butsn Argentinian.
'He isn't Spanish, he's Argentinian.'
The setting initiated by A in example 5.1 is that Carlos speaks Spanish, which
A tries to relate to Carlos being Spanish. That is, A first associates 'CARLOS'
with 'SPEAKING SPANISH', and then tentatively also with 'BEING SPANISH'. On
hearing this utterance, B attempts to reconstruct A's representation (RDUjg^),
by making the associations that A has indicated in it, and also assumes that
A considers the descriptions 'SPEAKING SPANISH' and 'BEING SPANISH' to be
linked figure 5.2. The full lines in the figure represent the associations that B
thinks that A has made (the one between 'CARLOS' and 'BEING SPANISH' is only
tentative, which is indicated with a question mark). The dotted line represents a
link between two descriptions, that is, B assumes that A thinks that if one applies,
then so does the other.5
B also constructs a. corresponding structure in rdu#. 'Carlos' is associated with
"speaking Spanish', and with 'being Argentinian', and these descriptions
are correlated. B accepts that 'being spanish' is correlated with 'speaking
spanish' too. Presumably B could think about a lot of other descriptions that
5The notation is used for the sake of transparency, to illustrate the "association" and "link"











Figure 5.3: RDUb after A's utterance in example 5.1
would be linked to the property of speaking Spanish too, such as being a Hispanic
American, being married to someone Spanish-speaking, having studied Spanish,
etc. But although B probably knows that there are other possible reasons, it is
unlikely that B will use that knowledge in this context. A possible representation
of rdu# is given in figure 5.3.
The rdug and the rdu# 4 are different. B judges that rdug is the more adequate
one, and therefore wants a not to associate 'carlos' with 'being spanish".
But as an acknowledgement that the first association was accurate ('carlos'
with 'speaking spanish", B provides an alternative association: 'c'arlos' with
'being argentinian' (figure 5.4). The butpa indicates that both the rejected
and the preferred descriptions are linked to the first one.
I11 example 5.2, A associates 'Juan' with 'knows spain1' for some reason that
does not show in the discourse fragment. B associates the relevant entities in






Figure 5.4: Intended changes to RDUb,.4 after B's utterance in example 5.1
know
Figure 5.5: RDUg^ after A's utterance in example 5.2
sumption derives from another assumption, that Juan is Spanish (figure 5.5).
B disagrees with both these associations, on the grounds that Juan is Argenti¬
nian. Being Argentinian and being Spanish are descriptions of the same type, (for
whatever reason B might consider—possibly because they are both nationalities,
or because they are both correlated with Spanish speaking, if that is relevant
enough for B), and JUAN should only be associated with the former (figure 5.6—
the dashed line indicates that two entities are of the same type. T is used as a
placeholder for whatever type B considered.). That is, B is effectively trying to














Figure 5.7: Intended changes to rdub,a after B's utterance in example 5.2
Entity
Figure 5.8: butsn
and associate it with 'being argentinian' instead (figure 5.7).
The fact that there is no linking description in this context is why butpa cannot
be used. As for using a butsn in example 5.1, it is possible, but il requires the
speaker to ignore the linking description and only treat the nationality descriptions
as being of the same type, i.e. B does not acknowledge the link from "speaking
spanish' to 'being Spanish'—A is simply wrong and has not made a reasonable
guess.
From these examples, it can tentatively be assumed that the information structu¬
res referred to by butsn is of the type illustrated figure 5.8, and that one typical
structure referred to by butpa is as in figure 5.9. The first figure illustrates how
a butsn indicates that an entity in the rdu has been or could be associated with
some other entity (Entityl in the figure), but this should be avoided, and instead
it should be associated with another one (Entity2) of the same type. It is worth
recalling that "entity" is used in a very weak sense, meaning an object, a relation,









The second figure illustrates one of the possible structures that could be manipu¬
lated by using a BUTpa. The one in the figure corresponds to a sentence of the type
—>-PBUTpaQ where there is an indirect opposition between some entities referred
to by P and Q. This is the most common type of sentence that has been discus¬
sed here, which is why I have chosen to illustrate that. The extension to direct
oppositions and inhibitory links between entities can easily be imagined.6 This
suggests that the two BUTs operate on quite different levels of the representation:
while BUTsn is about the associations of entities as such, BUTpa is about the links
between e.g. properties which determine whether the association of an entity with
one property means that it should be associated with another property as well.
This chapter has sought to suggest a conceptual framework such that what has
previously been considered to be distinct pragmatic and semantic features can be
integrated. By using representations of the discourse universe which are not con¬
sidered to correspond to general knowledge or beliefs, but whose structure largely
are motivated by the particular context, it is possible to characterise connectives
6A direct opposition would have been used if B had replied "No, but he dots speak Spanish
well" in example 5.1). Most of the examples of BUTpa discussed here had it link two descriptions
whose applicability increase the probability of one another. But it can also be used when to
descriptions tend to, or should exclude each other (inhibitory links):
He'd had four pints but he still insisted on driving home.
5.4 The Function of Negation
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such as the BUTs as being about someone's representation, rather than correspon¬
ding to some state in it. With this background, it is time to return to negation.
In the discussion of BUTsn and negation in chapter 4, it was noted that BUTsri
requires a negation in the clause that precedes it and will not allow one in the one
that follows it. Taken together with the function of BUTS„, which is to reject the
association of an entity with a description and instead associate it with another
one, it could be hypothesised that negation indicates that some entity should not
be associated with a certain description.
This would explain the confrontational nature of much use of negation, since
there are particularly good reasons to reject an unwanted association if someone
has indicated that they have made it. As a feature of representations, negation
would be used to point out that an association that has been, or could be made
should not be. It would not be expected to be used unless the association of the
entity with the description could be made, either because the association seems
likely (rejection), or because the description applies to a similar entity (contrast).
Chapter 6 will use this hypothesis to give an alternative account of the examples
that have been discussed in this thesis.
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Chapter 6
Examination of the Hypothesis
about Negation
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter suggested that natural language negation can be characte¬
rised as indicating that two entities in an agent's representation should not be
associated. This chapter will explain how and why this description differs from
other ones, by comparing how they account for the type of data that the tradi¬
tional accounts seem to handle well, as well as the data that were problematic for
them. It will also be shown how the characterisation of negation proposed here
can be used in conjunction with agent-specific context-motivated representations
of the discourse universe to give a comparatively simple account of the use of
scalar expressions. Finally, the consequences of using the present approach for
the interpretation and generation of utterances with negation will be discussed.
173
6.2 Negation and the Representation of Infor¬
mation
The characterisation of natural language negation proposed in chapter 5 makes
the assumption that sentences do not have representations that are isomorphic
to some part of an agent's representation. Instead, it was suggested that they
contain information of (at least) the following two types:
1. Expressions that refer to entities (concepts) in a representation (individuals,
objects, actions, properties, etc.).
2. Expressions which suggest how these entities should be organised.
Steps in this direction have already been taken to account for certain types of
linguistic expression. An example of this is the account of referential expressions
in Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp and Reyle, in press). DRT acknow¬
ledges the need to look at individuals and objects as separate entities. However,
properties and actions, etc. are treated in a more traditional way, which means
that they are seen as conditions on the objects. Because of this, their approach to
negation is essentially equivalent to the classical semantic approach,1 with a few
exceptions.2
DRT basically views the task of interpreting sentences as one of finding a set of
referents and making sure that a certain set of conditions holds for them.
1 Apart from the verification process, which is more complex.
2This is why it has not been considered on its own. The main notable advantage over other
semantic accounts is that it would probably not consider
The king of France is not bald.
to have a proper representation in the absence of a king of France, so referential failure could
not indicated by negation (I say "probably" because there are no rules for definite noun phrases






Figure 6.1: The associations made for the sentence in example 6.1
(6.1) Simon saw James.
A sentence such as this is interpreted as being about two entities (say u and v).
which have the properties of being Simon and James respectively. It also states
another condition on u and v, that u sees v. The sentence is true if two objects u
and v exist in the discourse universe such that simon(u), james( v) and see(u,v) is
true about them.
For the purpose of characterising negation, it is necessary to take this type of
reasoning further: not only objects are entities that we reason about, but so are
properties, actions, etc. All these need to be viewed as separate entities which may
be associated or not. For instance, the sentence in example 6.1 may be interpreted
as conveying that there is a relation between two objects, and that the relation
is one of seeing. This can be represented as in figure 6.1. in the same graphical
notation as in the previous chapter.3 It was argued that a speaker who uses a
negation indicates that some association between two entities should be rejected.
So if the sentence in example 6.2 is used, then (at least) one of the associations
in figure 6.1 should not be made.
(6.2) Simon didn't see James.
3The reason for using this notation is, as stated in chapter 5, that it is more transparent for
the present purposes, not to make any theoretical claims about representations, except that not
only objects must be viewed as separate entities. In practice, it would be necessary to account
for argument structure, etc., but these issue will be ignored here, for the sake of simplicity.
But which particular one the speaker intends cannot be determined simply by
looking at the sentence. It could for instance be about who Simon saw, who saw
James, or what the relation between Simon and James is. The addressee should
usually be able to determine this from the context, or perhaps the speaker would
use intonation to mark one entity, or supply more information which decides it:
(6.3) a. Simon didn't see James. He saw Peter though.
b. Simon didn't see James, but Peter did.
c. Simon didn't see James, but he heard him.
Without a context, it can only be inferred that some association should be rejected,
not which one, and because of this it appears equivalent to a representation such
as ->SEE(SlMON,JAMES). However, I claim that in a discourse, addressees are
usually able to identify which association the speaker intends, and that this is an
important part of decoding a sentence (token) with a negation. This cannot be
captured by a simplistic representation like ~iSEE( SlMON, JAMES). It will therefore
be necessary to use a more powerful framework, such that all the associations
between the relevant concepts can be singled out. There is still a case for viewing
negation as being about a representation, rather than part of it, and this is what
the following two sections are about.
6.3 Why Negation is Not a Property of Sen¬
tences
6.3.1 Yes/No-Questions Revisited
In chapter 4, section 4.4, three issues were discussed which were considered to
constitute strong evidence against traditional accounts of negation, as well as
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providing important constraints on what type of representation could be used: the
interaction between negation and BUTsn, how negation cannot apply to referential
failure, and its behaviour in yes/no-questions. The two former were used more or
less directly for the formulation of the hypothesis of the function of negation--as
evidence that negation applies to (structured) representations—while the third
one was only used indirectly, as evidence that negation should not be viewed as
an operator which is part of factual descriptions conveyed by sentences.
As shown in chapter 2, section 2.2.7, the problem with negation in yes/no-questions
is that whether they include a negation or not does not affect the type of answer
that should be given. For instance, the following examples have been discussed:
(6.4) a. Is Manchester rainy?
b. Isn't Manchester rainy?
(6.5) a. Is that Alan Peiper?
b. Isn't that Alan Peiper?
When answering questions such as these, whether a "yes" or a '"no" should be
used is not affected by whether the question contains a negation or not, i.e. if a
person who replies thinks that Manchester is rainy, "yes" would be an appropriate
answer to both of the questions in example 6.4. The problem with viewing nega¬
tion as part of the factual description is that the opposite prediction is made. The
sentence in example 6.4(a) would be used to ask for a confirmation that Manche¬
ster is rainy, while the (b) sentence would be used to ask for a confirmation that
it is not.
If negation is viewed as an indication that two entities in an agents RDl should not
be associated, then this observation can be accounted for quite easily. Consider a






Figure 6.2: RDU^ before uttering one of the sentences in example 6.5
Alan Peiper. A's representation (RDU^) now contains an entity P corresponding
to the person, and the property of being Alan Peiper, and A wants to know if
they should be associated (figure 6.2). Whether A uses a positive sentence (asks
if the association should be made) or one with a negation (asks if it should not be
made) they draw attention to a possible association of the two entities. It would
be possible to hypothesise that they use a negation if they have already made the
link and want to verify that it is correct. A "yes" has the function of accepting
an association, whereas an "no" rejects it (in the same way as "not" does). In
this case the distinction between being about and being part of a representation
matters. "Not", "yes" and "no" are all about the entities in the representation,
and because of this cannot apply to each other.
6.3.2 Double Negation
In section 6.2 it was claimed that interpreting a sentence with a negation typically
involves determining which particular association is being questioned. In English,
this usually cannot be decided directly from the sentence, as the syntactic position
of negation is relatively fixed. Speakers can often rely on their addressees' contex¬
tual knowledge to allow them to understand which association is intended.4 If the
4In fact, this is frequently capitalised on, in English and also in other languages, by putting
the negation in the preferred (main clause) position, even though it would be possible to have it in
a position closer to the references to the entities whose association is rejected. This phenomenon
was named neg-raising by Horn (1975, cited in 1989). The first of the two sentences below sounds
more natural than the second one, although the second one puts it closer to the expressions
denoting the relevant entities.





Figure 6.3: RDU.4 for example 6.6—which association does B mean'?
speaker does not think that the addressee is able to determine which association
is relevant, it can be marked linguistically: contrastive intonation, BUTsn, //-clefts
(see von Ivlopp and Humphreys, in preparation), etc., or they can provide more
information about the context.
However, this does not mean that it never happens that a participant in a com¬
munication is unsure of which associated entities that a speaker means, or that it
never matters. On the contrary, there are many situations which can lead to un¬
certainty about which association the speaker intends. One typical case of when
it is unclear which link the speaker intended arises with questions such as the one
illustrated in example 6.6.
(6.6) A: Do you mind if I leave?
B: No.
A "no" answer to this type of question often leaves the A speaker feeling not quite
sure whether the reply was meant to indicate that B does not want to be associated
with having objections to A leaving, or if B wants A not to leave (figure 6.3). But
interestingly there is not the same uncertainty if the question includes a negation,
such as the one in this example:
(6.7) A: Do you mind if I don't go?
B: No."
'2. I think he hasn't come.
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In this case, there is only one likely interpretation, that B should not be associated
with minding. With a truth functional negation which reverses truth values, this
is difficult to explain. It is possible to get the right interpretation of example 6.7
by treating the conditional as a material implication, but then there will only be
one possible interpretation of example 6.6. Conversely, if (6.6) is allowed to have
two different interpretations, then (6.7) would too.
However, if negation is about representations, it cannot be about another rejection
(cf. "yes " and ''no " as replies to negative yes/no-questions in section 6.3.1). So in
example 6.7 there is only one association that can be rejected by B's reply, i.e. the
one between b and 'mind', as the one between 'a' and 'stay' is already rejected
in the condition. This is an interesting feature, which leads to an issue which has
not yet been considered in this thesis, namely double negation.5
In natural language, two negations do not cancel each other out, like the bivalent
negation of classical logic. The two sentences in examples 6.8 and 6.9 are not
interchangeable; definitely not from the perspective of when they would be appro¬
priate in a discourse, and hardly from a detached "meaning" perspective either.
A double negation would not occur unless the sentence which contains it is used
as a reply to an earlier utterance which had a single negation, and in such a case,
a sentence without a negation could not be used to the same effect .
(6.8) a. I'm not not smoking,
b. I'm smoking.
(6.9) a. 1 didn't not like it.
b. I liked it.
5By double negation i mean a "not" combined with another "not", "never" or "no". A
negation and a negative prefix do not count as a double negation, as negative prefixes have a
different function from the free-standing morphemes (see chapter 4, section 4.3.2).
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There are many questions surrounding the use of double negation that still need
to be clarified. I cannot offer a solution to the problem, but I will sketch a possible
explanation based on the characterisation of negation proposed here.
It will be useful to start with some cross-linguistic observations. One notable
syntactic restriction on negation in many languages is that it needs to occur with
a verb, or a "verbal expression".6 This means that a double negation can only be
used where there are two expressions in the sentence which license it. In English,
given that most verbs require the dummy verb "do" when negated, this is usually
a trivial requirement. But if sentences like those in examples 6.8 and 6.9 are to be
translated into e.g. German or Swedish, a reformulation is needed unless they are
expressed with some auxiliary verb. To begin with "I'm not not, smoking", this
cannot be translated directly into either German (6.10a) or Swedish (6.11a). A
sentence which could be used in one type of context where the English one could
be appropriate needs to have more material in it.'
(6.10) a. *Ich rauche nicht nicht.
I smoke not not.
b. Ich bin nicht Nichtraucher.
I am not Non-smoker.
'I'm not a non-smoker."
(6.11) a. *Jag roker inte inte.
I smoke not not.
b. Jag har inte slutat roka.
I have not stopped smoking.
'I haven't stopped smoking."
"Adjective and preposition phrases may count as verbs for these purposes, in the Germanic
languages, as well as any "real" verb. In for example Spanish, however, the requirement seems
to be that not only is there a "real" verb, but that it has tense too.
'The "translations" were suggested by native speakers as phrases that could be used in the
type of situation where they imagined that the English ones would be used.
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As for "I didn't not like it", past tense tends to be expressed with the perfect
construction in German, which means that there are two verbs, and hence that it
can be translated directly. In Swedish this is however not the case.
(6.12) a. Ich habe es nicht nicht gemocht.
I have it not not liked.
'I don't not like it.'
(6.13) a. *Jag tyckte inte inte om den.
I thought not not of it.
'I liked it not not.'
b. Det ar inte sa att jag inte tycker om den.
It is not so that I not think of it.
'I don't not like it.'/'It's not the case that I don't like it."
In order to translate a sentence which lacks two verbal expressions into Swedish
or German, it is thus necessary to add some linguistic material which will typi¬
cally amount to saying that the agent is making a point out of avoiding that the
description in question applies. Obviously, I would not want to make too strong
an argument based on syntactic evidence, but it is nevertheless interesting that it
is often not possible to translate a double negation directly into other languages.
The fact that it often needs to be expressed along the lines of not wanting to
avoid something could indicate that a double negation rejects two associations:
ons leading to two other entities whose association is also rejected. But. I accept
that it is not always clear what these associations would be.
To briefly reconnect to the accounts of negation discussed in chapter 3, it is clear
that if a negation which applies to information is truth functional in the ordinary
way, then the (a) and (b)-sentences in example 6.8 and 6.9 should be equivalent.
In accordance with the Gricean tradition, it could perhaps be argued that there
must be a reason for a speaker to use a longer expression, since it flouts the
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third maxim of manner ("be brief"). This reason could be that the sentence is a
shorthand for one of the longer formulations that would be necessary in Swedish
and German.
Horn and Anscombre and Ducrot would consider the first "not" of a. double ne¬
gation metalinguistic/polemic, objecting to the previous utterance, rather than
being used in the ordinary truth functional way. It may seem a fair assumption
that double negation is only used to object to the fact that a negation has been
used, so stipulating that double negation is only permitted when at least one of
them is metalinguistic/polemic might appear to solve the problem of why they do
not cancel out. However, even if the assumption about the use of double negation
were justified, these two solutions, whether based on the manner maxim or on not
permitting a descriptive negation, are only solutions in the sense that they can be
formulated in the theories. It has not been explained why it seems impossible to
interpret a double negation as two descriptive negations (in the sense of two truth
functions that cancel each other out).8 Using the characterisation of negation
proposed here, it is possible to reach a little further, as negation is prevented from
applying to the same association twice.
8A sentence with a double negation (NEG-NEG-s) and the corresponding sentence without
a negation (s) can never be equivalent from a discourse perspective. This does not mean that
they could not both theoretically be used with reference to the same state of affairs. However,
they would not suggest the same changes to the addressee's representat.ion(s): S would indicate
that one or more associations should be made, while NEG-NEG-S would indicate that some entity
should not be associated with a rejected association between two others. That is, the difference
between two sentences such as "I like it" and "I don't not like it" is that with the first sentence,
the speaker associates (or accepts the associations of) three entities, while with the second one,
the speaker merely removes the associations—he or she has effectively not said anything about
the entities. The addressee may feel justified in reconstructing some associations between the
entities because of the context , so that their representation ends up identical to what it would
have been like if the corresponding sentence without negations had been used. But that is a
feature of the interpretation, and not of the decoding, of the sentence (as defined in chapter 1).
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6.3.3 Equivalent Propositions—Different Utterances
Anscombre and Ducrot (1983) discuss two sentences that correspond to equivalent
propositions, but which have different connotations when used in a discourse.
(6.14) Les 3/4 des travailleurs touches par des suppressions d'emploi ne
connaitront pas une situation de chomage.
The 3/4 of workers touched by [determiner] suppressions of work [ne¬
gation particle] will-know not a situation of unemployment.
'Three quarters of the workers affected by redundancies will not expe¬
rience unemployment.'
(6.15) Le 1/4 des travailleurs touches par des suppressions d'emploi
connaitront une situation de chomage.
The 1/4 of workers touched by [determiner] suppressions of work will-
know a situation of unemployment.
'One quarter of the workers affected by redundancies will experience
unemployment.'
They suggested that the difference between these two is due to the negation re¬
versing the argumentative orientation that the predicate has when applied to a
certain type of object. As pointed out in chapter 4, this may be descriptively
accurate, but it hardly explains the phenomenon. Moxey and Sanford (to appear)
discuss a related example:
A salesman is trying to sell a car to a customer. The customer asks
a question about reliability, and the salesman can give one of the
following replies: A few/Few/Not many of our cars break down within
two years of purchase.
Asking subjects which quantifier would be best for the salesman to use, they
reliably ranked them as "few" being the best one, and "a few" as the worst,
with "not many" in between. Why are "few" and "not many" not equivalent?
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Moxey and Sanford suggest that using unot many" may suggest that the customer
expected a lot, while does not carry this assumption.
On the account proposed here, to use the sentence in example 6.15 is to try to
associate an entity (a group of people) with a state (that of being unemployed).
The speaker is presenting this as a new connection, and because unemployment
for most people is considered to be linked to undesirable consequences, this me¬
ans that the addressee is making a new connection to something that should be
avoided.
By using the sentence in example 6.14, the speaker suggests that an association
between an entity (a different group of people) and a state (being unemployed)
that has been made or is likely to be made should be rejected. The speaker is
effectively treating the situation as if at least someone would have expected the
people in question to become unemployed, but that it did not happen. Because
of the problems linked with unemployment, this presents the situation as if things
are better than expected, and the government is doing well. Similar reasoning
applies to the car salesman example.
6.4 Scalar Expressions Revisited
In chapter 5 it was argued that there are significant advantages in using context-
specific representations of knowledge as an intermediate stage between communi¬
cation and reasoning. This was motivated by the apparent appeal to links between
descriptions which seem to be motivated by particular contexts rather than regular
co-occurrences. This section suggests that there are further reasons for adopting
this approach, by showing that it permits a simple account of the use of scalar
expressions.
The problem of explaining scalar expressions, seen from the perspective of truth
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conditional semantics, is that it seems that there is a default interpretation of
sentences such as the one in example 6.16.
(6.16) Pat doesn't have three children.
This example is taken to (typically) mean that Pat has less than three children.
In order to achieve this semantically, it is necessary to assume that having four
children implies having three, etc., so that all predictions of numbers larger than
N are automatically excluded by the rejection of the number N. This type of
reasoning is extended to other predicates which appear to behave in a similar
way.
However, speakers can, and do, use sentences of this type without excluding the
predications that there would be if the reasoning above was followed:
(6.17) Pat doesn't have three children, she has four.
Sentences such as the one in this example are sometimes considered unusual. In
the sort of contexts where one may want to talk about how many children someone
has. it is probable that the addressee is first lead down the garden path, in that
they may initially assume a representation which they will have to change on
hearing the second clause.9 But the addressee can nevertheless make sense of the
utterance, and can recognise the use of negation as a valid one. although perhaps
unexpected.
Using the concept of an intermediate context-specific representation, I suggest
that the reason why the sentence in example 6.17 appears odd is not that it
violates any rules for how negation is normally used, but that the speaker has












Figure 6.5: "Pat doesn't have three children, she has four. "
chosen to organise their representation in a slightly different way from what is
normally expected in that type of context.
The negation in example 6.17 indicates that two entities should not be associated,
as with any negation. But when it comes to talking about how many children
someone has, it is common to view the cardinality as referring to subsequent
supersets. That is perhaps because usually when people talk about how many
children they have, parents with four children have all the problems of parents
with three children plus presumably a few more, so that having three children is
naturally seen as part of having four. If an agent agrees with that, and uses a
representation which reflects that, then if a speaker indicates that Pat should not
be associated with having three children, this would mean that it can be inferred
that she does not have four either (figure 6.4). A speaker who uses the sentence
in example 6.17 has however chosen a different organisation, where 1 he numerical
modifiers are seen as alternative descriptions of Pat's children (figure 6.5).
The fact that one tends to prefer one organisation over the other might make it
appear that the latter is less available, and perhaps unnatural. But it is worth
noting that even if the speaker wants to refer to the number three, but this is not






Figure 6.6: "Pat has three children, four even. "
they have chosen whether they use the "normal" organisation of the information
or not. If Pat is associated explicitly with having three children, and then with
having four, it is almost necessary to linguistically mark that it is the organisation
illustrated in figure 6.6 that is chosen, for instance by using "even" or "in fact".
(6.18) a. She has three kids, four even.
b. She has three kids, in fact she has four.
Simply lining up the two descriptions—as in example 6.19—would make a strange
utterance.
(6.19) ?She has three kids, she has four.
When talking about the two organisations of the information with respect to the
examples above, one of them was referred to as the "normal" one. It is however
important to realise that the reason why this one seemed more normal is not the
numbers as such, but the type of context one imagines. In other contexts an
organisation of the type illustrated in figure 6.4 may not be natural at all.
One example of a different context which does not invite this structure is when
discussing mathematics. Say that the participants of a conversation are discussing
the equation x2 — 3x — 4 = 0 and that one of them has mistakenly suggested that
x = 3 is a solution. Now if another participant utters the sentence in example 6.20.
they will typically not be interpreted as having claimed that no number larger than
three is a solution.
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(6.20) Three is not a solution.10
Although numbers are ordered, the order is not applicable as licensing inferences
about certain numbers from other ones in this context. So while the participants
certainly recognise that numbers can be ordered in principle, they are not seen
as ordered in the sense of larger numbers implying smaller ones when the topic
is solutions to equations. This demonstrates how important it is 1o distinguish
between having the capability of being ordered according to some criteria, and
the property of being ordered for some particular purpose.
Other types of context may license yet another organisation of numerical modifiers,
as illustrated by example 6.21(b).
(6.21) a. John wants to have three children.
b. Morten wants to run a marathon in three hours.
The (a)-sentence tends to be understood as John not being content if he has less
than three children, while the (b)-sentence tends to be interpreted the opposite
way—a shorter time than three hours would certainly be expected to please Mor¬
ten. The order used in the latter example is the opposite from that used in the
former, and it is the normal one for discussing satisfactory performance in a fixed
distance sporting event.
The use and interpretation of scalar expressions has often been treated as if they
depended at least in part on reasoning with intrinsic features of the expressions
as such (e.g. Horn, 1989; Kempson, 1986, see quote on page 89 ). A simpler
and more plausible account can be given by appealing to representations whose
organisation is motivated by context-specific constraints instead.
10On Atlas' view (1990, quoted with permission) this should be written as "3 is not a solu¬
tionas he considers "3" to mean the numeral, while "three" is semantically general. There
is no similar distinction in spoken language, so even if the written sentence is anomalous, the







Figure 6.7: When scalar expressions appear to be ordered, that is because they
reflect a context-dependent order of a set of modifiers which they refer to. The
modifiers are ordered with respect to association with some entity which in turn
is linked to some state that can be quantitatively assessed.
It should be pointed out, however, that the "links" are not equivalent to (pragma¬
tic) implication caused by contextual factors, as suggested by Fauconnier (1976)
and Horn (1989). The reason why associations of scalar descriptions with certain
types of entities appear to be ordered is that they in turned are linked to some
separate phenomenon that can be perceived as ordered in terms of increasing or
decreasing quantities of a quality. The dependence on an external motivating
context is illustrated in figure 6.7—the previous illustrations were simplifications,
ignoring the licensing context.
The need for a licensing context is acknowledged by Fauconnier, but he considers
it to give rise to a logical ordering of the scalar descriptions also. Anscombre
and Ducrot (1983), in their reply to Fauconnier, argue that although the external
order justifies an ordering of the scalar expressions, this secondary ordering is not
equivalent to a logical one.
Expressions such as "cold" and "freezing", are ordered with respect to the type
of arguments that a speaker may want to make with reference to the quality
of being cold (to take a naive view). They both denote quantities of the same
quality, but they are not ordered in the sense that they correspond to different
quantities. They have sometimes been suggested to be ordered relatively, so that
one implies the other, although order is obviously by stipulation rather than ob-
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servation. The argumentative analysis is that the order is not there by virtue of
implication (which has to be imposed anyway), but that it feels natural to impose
the analysis because of the argumentative properties—using "freezing" amounts
assigning more importance to the cold, in a context where the "quantity of cold"
is correlated with the unpleasantness of taking a swim. The order is there so that
we can make arguments of various strenghts, not so that we can indicate that the
actual "quantity of cold" is larger than if we had used another term. For that,
one would use a temperature, or a precise description of what the effects of the
temperature are.
Anscombre and Ducrot base their claim that the ordering of scalar expressions
is not defined in terms of factual constraints on the behaviour of "optional" and
"forbidden" (discussed in chapter 3. section 3.4.5). They behave like ordinary
scalar expressions, in that "not optional" seems to suggest "compulsory . analo¬
gically to how for instance "not permitted" suggests "forbidden". But while the
latter inference can theoretically be explained as being due to "compulsory" imp¬
lying "permitted (if it is assumed that for any action there are three possibilities:
the agent has to perform the action, must not perform it, or has a choice.), an
analogical analysis is not available in the case of "forbidden" and "optional".
It is actually possible to describe Ansconrbre's and Ducrot's notion of an argumen¬
tative ordering in terms of a representation without equating it with an inferential
link. This is most easily seen if the expressions are considered with respect to fi¬
gure 6.7. The expressions "optional" and "forbidden" are used to label modifiers
which correspond to approximately 'HAS A CHOICE and 'MUST NOT' respectively.
The way to understand Anscombre's and Ducrot's claim about the ordering being
argumentative and not factual is to distinguish between the entities in the RDl"
and the labels that are used to designate them.
Consider a context where the modifier entities 'HAS A CHOICE and 'MUST NOT
are ordered in such a way that the latter is stronger than the former (this may be
because they are used in the context of persuading someone not to do something).
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Because the modifiers are ordered in this way, the labels chosen to refer to them
are selected from a set that reflects this order. In other circumstances, where they
had been ordered the opposite way, "permitted" would have been better than
"optional".
That is, it must be acknowledged firstly that the order is not intrinsic to the
entities in the RDUs as such, but depend on a licensing context, and secondly, that
the choice of labels for referring to the ordered entities may well be determined by
how the entities as such are considered to be ordered. This is why argumentative
ordering can be a property of expressions, while reflecting a context-motivated
ordering of some concepts.
6.5 Why Use a Negation?
The study of the type of linguistic phenomena that have been discussed in 1 his the¬
sis has typically been approached as a task of describing how sentences containing
them are interpreted. The aim of this work was however to provide a charac¬
terisation of natural language negation which can be used for the production of
sentences as well.
It was pointed out in section 6.2 that viewing negation as a truth function, with¬
out a more expressive notation than e.g. ->RELATION(x,Y), means that the repre¬
sentation of declarative sentences with negation only contains an indication that
something is wrong with it. However, it was argued that understanding nega¬
tive sentences typically requires the agent to determine what it is wrong, or in
the terminology used here, which particular association should be rejected. The
characterisation given here therefore means that the interpretation of a sentence
with a negation requires more than the addition of a negative proposition to the
representation.
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When it comes to the generation of utterances, the difference from the traditional
descriptions is significant. It was observed in chapter 2 that it is difficult to explain
why speakers would use a sentence with a negation if the truth functional account
of it were correct, unless it is accompanied by a theory which specifies when it
is suitable to convey negative facts. When negation is characterised as has been
suggested here, however, it is comparatively easy to predict in what situation a
negation would be suitable.
The idea is that negation is used to indicate that an association has been, or is
likely to be made in someone's representation. Each participant of a communi¬
cation is continuously modelling their own and others' RDUs. and there will arise
situations where one of them is likely to contain an association which one parti¬
cipant, A say, does not think or is not certain should be there. To give a possible
reason for A to assume this, another participant may have explicitly mentioned
that they have made an association, or some association may have been mentioned
from which the undesired one could be inferred. Another possible reason for using
a negation is when it makes sense to distinguish two sets of objects on the grounds
that one set has a property that the other does not. Using the characterisation
proposed here for such cases should be fairly straightforward.
6.6 Summary
The appeal of the characterisation of negation suggested in chapter 5 is that it is
extremely simple, while still managing to describe natural language negation as
a uniform phenomenon. All that is required is to distinguish between entities in
the representation and their organisation on the one hand, and talking about this
organisation on the other.
This chapter has tried to clarify how this differs from previous approaches, and to
demonstrate how it can account for the data that is problematic for them, as well
as for the data that they are compatible with. It was also noted that a number





The most serious obstacle in the way of progress towards an adequate theory of
natural language negation is that it has such a long tradition of being done in a
certain way. It is clear that the truth function is inappropriate as a description
of many uses of negation, but because it fits into a well-established theoretical
framework, it is appealing to keep this description anyway. Instead of focussing
on negation in general, the effort has been concentrated 011 accounting for the
exceptions—the academic equivalent of treating the symptoms while ignoring the
cause.
The characterisation of negation that I have proposed in this thesis is not a theory
of exceptions. What is offered is a new, and simple, description of the basic phe¬
nomenon. which also covers the uses that the traditional approach has difficulties
in accommodating. In order to formulate this description, it was necessary to
revise some assumptions that are commonly made about the function of language
in communication. The main points of this can be summarised as follows:
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Sentence RDU
DECODING Instructions -*■ RDIT
INTERPRETATION RDU
Figure 7.1: Schematic model of the interpretation of an utterance.
• Sentences do not represent factual descriptions (propositions, infons, etc.).
Instead, they correspond to descriptions of the structure of a representat ion
of the discourse universe. Sentences are decoded by carrying out changes
to the representation. The changes are not equivalent to the result of per¬
forming them. Sentences do not have meanings in the traditional sense of
corresponding to factual descriptions, but functions.
• The representations that sentences are about contain entities (individuals,
objects, actions, descriptions, etc.—things that can be talked about), cor¬
responding to entities in the discourse universe which are organised into a
certain structure. The entities are structured and connected.
• The expressions that make up sentences can have (at least) two different
functions: they can identify entities in the representations, or they can be
used to say something about how some entities should be organised.
This means that the understanding of sentences involves the following steps (fi¬
gure 7.1): the decoding of a sentence yields a set of instructions to find some
entities in a representation of the discourse universe and to change it in some way.
The representation is changed, and the agent then tries to determine how the
change is significant, which may lead to further changes. With this background,
negation can be characterised as indicating that two entities in a representation
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of a discourse universe should not be associated.
The step from viewing negation as being part of representations of sentences to
applying to representations of the discourse universe is a simple one, but it nevert¬
heless has some very important consequences. It permits a unified characterisation
of how natural language negation is used, and it also works at an explanatory level
for many related phenomena, as shown in chapter 6. It also makes it easier to
understand why speakers would want to use sentences with negation in a commu¬
nication.
7.2 Relation to Other Frameworks
In making the assumptions about the representation of sentences that were sum¬
marised above. I have committed myself to a particular view of the function of
language in communication. It will be useful to compare this with the other
theories that have been discussed in this work.
Briefly, the main points of Relevance Theory, or at least its programme, are
that sentences do not have meanings, in the sense of corresponding to factual
descriptions—utterances do. A sentence only receives a representation when an
addressee processes it with respect to a context. Despite the emphasis on the
importance of information processing, speakers are not considered to be able to
influence it beyond providing simple stimuli in the form of propositions, and lo¬
gical constraints on them. As for knowledge representation and the function of
language, these are intimately linked, in that language is seen primarily as a tool
for information processing. The latter can be adequately modelled using natural
deduction, and language is used to code propositions which function as input to
the deduction process. Natural language expressions such as "not" are considered
to be truth functional, which means that utterances must express highly specified
information, so that the sentence can be assigned a proposition with a truth value.
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Atlas' version of Radical Pragmatics differs from Relevance theory in that langu¬
age is viewed as a tool for communication, rather than directly reflecting some
intrinsic reasoning facility. However, the function of language in communication
is still seen as providing a means for referring to factual descriptions. Despite sen¬
tences being general, utterances are considered to have specific representations,
which can be determined in the context of their use—a parallel assumption to the
one made in Relevance theory.
The idea that sentences are sense-general and can only be considered to refer
to specific facts when they are used suggests that the specificity of meaning in
language should be questioned. If sentences do not have a specific meaning on their
own, why should they be considered to contain that information when because
they are uttered? If it is the speakers processing of the sentence which constructs
the meaning of it, then it was never part of the sentence in the first place. The
consequence of considering negation in natural language to correspond to a truth
function is however that the sentence must contain the specific meaning when it is
uttered. If the negation in the sentence is a truth function, then the sentence must
have a propositional representation that has a truth value, which means that other
expressions in the sentence must be considered to express for instance non-overt
maximality markers. This may only happen when the sentence is uttered, but it is
still necessary that it happens, as the various readings are explained as properties
of the expressions, and not as properties of the structure of the representation.
In other words, sentences are supposed to carry the very information that the
addressee finally arrives at by interpreting them.
Argumentation theory also emphasises the importance of the addressee's proces¬
sing of information, but there the similarities with Relevance theory and Radical
Pragmatics end. For Anscombre and Ducrot, language is a tool for communica¬
tion, and not for information processing, and communication is not equivalent to
conveying factual descriptions. They consider communication to be about steering
the addressee's information processing in a certain way.
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In Relevance theory guiding someone's processing of information is seen as a que¬
stion of making them apply the intended deduction rule. In contrast, Anscombre
and Ducrot argue that this consists in making the addressee organise their in¬
formation in a specific way, independently of whether they actually perform the
reasoning involved in arriving at this organisation. Natural language contains
expressions which have the function of suggesting a certain organisation.
However, Anscombre and Ducrot are mainly interested in the formal (or conven¬
tional) attributes of these expressions, to the point that they sometimes seem to
suggest that e.g. argumentative orientation is not a property of information at
all (it is a "primitive"). But clearly, references to facts can also be used for the
purpose of trying to change someone's representation, so function is not limited
to specific expressions which do not have any other properties. The reason why-
certain expressions appear to have a conventional argumentative function is that
they reflect properties of information structuring. For a better understanding of
them, it is necessary to appeal to a representation of information at the level of
processing where they apply. The conceptual framework suggested in this thesis
can be viewed as an attempt to explain how conventional and non-conventional
features of argumentation can be linked.
7.3 Applications
If the reasoning in this thesis is correct, there are many expressions and features
of natural language whose main function is to suggest an organisational change in
someone's representation of the discourse universe. 1 believe that the conceptual
framework developed in this thesis can be useful as a general approach to the
characterisation of their properties. For example, syntactic variants such as clefts
can be thought of this way (von Ivlopp and Humphreys, in preparation). As the
framework was formulated in order to allow for a characterisation of the Bl'Ts.
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it is likely that other natural language connectives could be characterised in a
similar way. Although no completely satisfactory characterisation of BUTp;I could
be given, at least some of its properties could be described. Significant work
has already been done on similar connectives in Argumentation theory, so this
framework could be used to ground the descriptions in a more representation-
based account.
One issue where this approach should offer a substantial advantage is the descrip¬
tion of the functions of "yes", "no" and comparable expressions. It has previously
only been possible to give relatively informal characterisations of their functions
in different languages (e.g. "accepting/rejecting a factual description" in English,
"agreeing/disagreeing" in Russian), whereas it should be relatively straightfor¬
ward to give precise formulations using this framework.
7.4 Wovon Man Nicht Sprechen Kami. ..
If retrieving information from sentences consisted of deriving a representation
from the linguistic form, the task of describing meaning in language would at
least be straightforward, if not easy—the data would be readily available, making
it comparable to studying syntax. However, I have argued that this is not a
suitable way of viewing the information conveyed by sentences. Instead, it must
be described in terms of a representation of the relevant discourse universe. But
this makes the task a lot more difficult, as knowledge representation, in the sense
of human mental representations, is poorly understood.
At the same time, language is one of the few sources of pointers to how this is
done, which means that we are faced with what appears to be a conflict of enor¬
mous proportions: to study meaning in language, we must understand knowledge
representation better, and one of the few ways to achieve such an understanding
is through studying how language is used. Not only this: we are also forced to
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hold any discussion about it using the very object of the study. The solution, if it
is one, must be to tread carefully, and attempt to rid oneself of prejudices of how
representation should be done, a near-impossible task.
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